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SUMMARY 
This study is about the organisation and government of the 
General Municipal and Boilermakers' from 1970 to 1985. Its 
focus is, as far as is known, unique in that it concentrates 
primarily on government at the regional level, examining the 
GMB's Birmingham, Liverpool and Northern regions. Rather 
than focusing explicitly on the policy issues related to 
recent legislation, it analyses the wider issues of power and 
participation relevant to the debate on union democracy. 
The thesis adopts an eclectic approach to union democracy, 
synthesising previous approaches within the framework of the 
vertical and horizontal dispersion of decision making 
developed by Undy et al, which is given a prescriptive 
dimension. The regional focus, and secondary focuses on 
intervening variables within the framework, are principally 
examined through conducting structured interviews with 
members and officers at all levels of the union. 
The research work is divided into four chapters, which follow 
chapters reviewing the literature and presenting the research 
focus, and giving an historical overview of the union up 
until the research period commences. The first examines the 
national level changes since 1970 and membership 
participation in the national political system. The other 
three chapters have a specific regional focus analysing 
regional variations in membership growth and participation at 
the local level; the locus of regional power and variations 
in participation in regional government; and membership 
participation in collective bargaining. 
The research contributes to knowledge of trade union 
government at the regional level; an almost completely 
explored and, it is argued, an important area which requires 
further research. It demonstrates the significant extent of 
regional variations within a single union and shows how these 
have led to markedly different levels of membership 
participation in decision making structures in the three 
regions. It shows that the commonly held view that GMB 
regional secretaries are barons of their own area is 
misplaced, noting constraints which prevent oligarchic 
domination of regions. It also highlights the pervasive, but 
long since neglected, influence of union constitutional 
provisions as a factor affecting union democracy. Finally, 
it suggests that the eclectic framework could be usefully 
adopted by future contributions to union democracy research. 
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Chapter 1. 
APPROACHES TO THE £3TIJDY OF DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS 
t- 
" In the case of a word like democracy not only is 
there no agreed definition but the attempt to make 
one is resisted from all sides ... The defenders of 
any kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and 
Tear that they miqht have to stop using the word if 
it were tied down to one meaning. " 
George Orwell' 
This study is about the organisation and government of the 
General Municipal and Boilermakers' from 1970 to 19B5. Its 
focus is specifically on organi sati ran and government at the 
regional level which is, as far as is known, unique. It 
also, however, seeks to analyse membership participation at 
national and local level, offering an overall picture of 
democratic practice in the GMB and addressing the wider 
issues of power and participation in the union democracy 
literature. 
The issue of the democratic control of tr-. -ide unions has 
haen a pc rc nni a1, f rrus of study and ciabate in l ndustr" i aa. 
relations. It has also become increasingly important as a 
political policy issue in Britain during the 1990s. The 
Conservative Government's 1984 Trade Union Act, like its 
precursor the 1980 Employment Act, was bitterly opposed by 
trade unions. It has imposed statutory requirements on trade 
unions to hold regular ballots for their principal executive 
body; ballots before strikes; and a ballot every ten years on 
.; } 
whether members wish their union to have a political fund. 
As Undy and Martin have argued, 2 it is not inevitable that 
the wider use of postal ballots will produce the "moderate" 
leaders that the Government imagine, and it is by no means 
certain that these measures will enhance democracy. The 
purpose of this research, however, is not to focus explicitly 
on ballots and immediate policy issues, but to examine the 
deeper issues relevant to the ballot debate. 
The Government's White paper which preceeded the 1984 Act 
carefully avoided defining "Democracy in Trade Unions. " In 
this, it shared the fault, common in much of the literature 
on union government, of lacking a rigorous theoretical 
foundation on which to base its analysis. Although, as Orwell 
noted, there is no agreed definition of democracy, trying to 
evade the issue, or conveniently forget about it, is no 
answer. 
Notions of political democracy are invariably seen as being 
desirable, the sine qua non of a civilised society, but their 
applicability to trade unions has been questioned. Writing 
in the 19505 Allen argued that: 
"trade union organisation is not based on theoretical 
concepts prior to it, that is on some concept of 
democracy, but on the end it serves. In other words, 
the end of trade union activity is to protect and 
improve the general living sta; %dards of its members and 
not to provide an exercise in self-government. ", " 
He has been unfairly pilloried for this view which he has 
long since retracted. 0 14 critics had read his work at all 
4 
closely they would have found that it was explicitly 
predicated on the belief that trade '. ions were voluntary 
societies and could maintain their members only if they 
satisfied them. b At that time, before the massive growth of 
the closed shop, this was not an unreasonable view to hold. 
Allen, however, was also aware of the problem of unions 
becoming, in effect, compulsory societies arguing that "in 
such cases it is important that union constitutions should be 
democratir and that they should be used effectively by rank- 
and-file members. "-7 
There are other reasons why democracy is important in trade 
unionse apart from the special demands of the closed shop and 
the prevailing attitudes and values of Western society. The 
representative character of a union affects its conviction in 
collective bargaining: members are more likely to identify 
with decisions they have participated in making; and managers 
are more likely to believe that union negotiators represent 
the genuine interests of their members. Democracy also makes 
union discipline more easily acceptable, enabling unions to 
be more effective as organisations. This study proceeds, 
therefore, in the belief that democracy should be a hallmark 
of trade union government. 
Democratic theory 
Discussion of union democracy has relied heavily on the 
importation of terms borrowed from political theory. It is 
5 
important in that it has provided the conte;; t of the debate, 
but, in itself, it does not say anything about the operation 
and democratic practices of trade unions. These two elements 
of democracy nPC-d to be clearly separated. Democracy has 
both a descriptive function and a normative, persuasive 
function. Put another way it is necessary to distinguish 
between democracy as it actually is and democracy as it 
should be; the democratic reality from the democratic ideal. ' 
Democracy comes from the Greek and the literal meaning of the 
word is "power of the people. " This is merely a translation 
and it is obvious that democracy stands for something over 
and above the literal meaning of the word. There is no 
accepted view in political theory, however, as to what this 
constitutes. The most influential figure in modern debate 
has been Schumpeter who has argued that democracy is a 
political method, not an end in itself. "There are ultimate 
ideals and interests which the most ardent democrat will put 
above democracy; "'"° we would not approve of a democratic 
constitution that produced the persecution of Christians, the 
burning of witches and the slaughtering of Jews, in 
preference to a non-democratic one that avoided them. 
Moreover, since individuals are members of an unworkable 
committee, the committee of the whole nation, the role of the 
people is to produce a government - deciding issues is 
secondary to the election of the people who are to do the 
deciding. This view leads Schumpeter to offer the following 
definition: 
6 
"the democratic method is that institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people's vote. 1111 
This view, as Nicholson et al note, 12 has been challenged by 
Williams and F'ateman, for its normative implications in 
setting the Anglo-American political system as the democratic 
ideal. The former has eloquently demonstrated that the 
concept of democracy has had very different meanings at 
different times and in different societies, with the modern 
view of representative or parliamentary democracy only 
emerging in the 17th century. 1 
Pateman has located this modern view of democracy more 
specifically within established philosophical deb<te. The 
17th century philosophers Locke and Berkeley, and later, Hume 
in the 18th century, had argued that people were either 
unable or unwilling to exercise active control over the 
processes of government, and that, consequently, the defining 
feature of democracy should be the right for people to choose 
at regular intervals the people who would represent them in 
government. In contrast, however, Rousseau and Mill 
represented a different tradition which stressed the 
importance of direct participation in decision-making, 
arguing that it has a central "educative" function, ensuring 
that people are "forced to be free. " Pateman advocates this 
latter theory and finds evidence to conclude that we "learn 
to participate by participating, "ia but this is illustrated 
7 
by secondary source data of industrial democracy - the John 
Lewis partnership, Scott Bader Commonwealth, and Yugoslavian 
workers' s(=1f-management -. rather than examination of union 
government. 
What is important to grasp from this analysis is that there 
are two different political theories of democracy: 
representative democracy, and participatory democracy. Each 
has separate intellectual antecedents: Locke, Berkeley and 
Hume, in the case of representative democracy, which will be 
termed parliamentary democracy from now on; Rousseau and 
Mill in the case of participatory democracy. Each has modern 
theoretical protaganists: Schumpeter, Dahl and Sartori in the 
first case-, and Pateman and Williams in the latter. 
This intellectual schism is reflected in the literature on 
trade union democracy. Most approaches to the study of the 
subject can be usefully categorised within either tradition 
and it has produced two distinctly separate research focuses. 
Studies in the parliamentary mould have concentrated on 
internal union government; those embracing the participatory 
ethos have focused almost exclusively on the workplace. 
While, there may be no need for an intellectual 
rapproachement within political theory, however, there is 
clearly a need for an eclectic view of democracy as it 
applies to trade unions. Trade unions are essentially 
organisations of a different kind to nation st& es and 
political systems and have di f+ere:, t democratic 
8 
requirements. Union democracy must involve both members 
participating directly in decision-making and, where 
necessary, indirectly through the election of 
representatives. 
This chapter- examines the different approaches to trade union 
democracy within these separate traditions before examining 
two attempts that have been made to combine these views. ss 
It then offers a synthetic view and, in the research focus, 
highlights gaps in the existing literature which will be 
addressed in the subsequent research. 
The c r1iamcntarv tradition and union government 
The logical starting point for any analysis of democracy as 
it applies to trade unions is Sidney and Beatrice Webb'a 
pioneering work "Industrial Democracy. " First published in 
1898, it raised fundamental questions which are still of 
great relevance today. In tracing the origins of trade 
unionism the Webbi found that the early unions were governed 
through what they called "primitive democracy: " a general 
meeting of all members deciding issues affecting them. The 
growth of unions, however, soon made this impractical and "in 
passing from a local to a national organisation the trade 
union unwittingly left behind the ideal of primitive 
democracy. "'' In the modern trade union this system of 
government would lead "straight either to inefficiency and 
9 
disintegration, or to the uncontrolled dominance of a 
personal dictator or an expert bureaucracy. " '' The solution 
to "the fundamental problem. of democracy, the combination of 
administrative efficiency and popular control" was to be 
found in the "frank acceptance of representative 
institutions. "'° The Webbs, therefore, enthusiastically 
endorsed the parliamentary approach, arguing that the more 
developed unions, such as the Cotton-Spinners' Association, 
showed the model for others: 
" the association is a fully-equipped democratic state 
of the modern type. It has an elected parliament, 
exercising supreme and uncontrolled power. It has a 
cabinet appointed by and responsible only to that 
parliament. And its chief executive officer, appointed 
once for all on grounds of efficiency, enjoys the civil- 
service permanence of tenure. "'v 
A completely different approach was adopted thirteen years 
later with the publication of Michels' highly influential 
won:: "Political Parties. " In his view: 
"It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of 
the elected over the electors, of tho mandataries over 
the mandatory, of the delegates over the deiegators. Who 
says organization says oligarchy. '-" 
Michels' argument, based on his experience in the German 
Socialist movement, was that there is a psychological and 
technical need for leadership within organisations. But 
leaders, by the very nature of their job, (as the Webbs 
recognised) become pro+ essional and acquire greater expertise 
and knowledge than members and potential rivals. They, 
therefore, use this position to maintain oligarchic control 
10 
as the organisation becomes identified with them. 
This analysis convinced Mighels that democracy was impossible 
and led him to admire Mussolini. "' It has, however, been 
criticised within political theory not only for for its 
pessimism, "" but also its lack of rigorous analysis, "" and 
more significantly, for its over-determinism. "4 Clegg has 
contentiously called Michels' analysis "the most popular 
academic theory of union govornmant. " " While it has 
certainly been a feature of some studies' and it has even 
been suggested that union democracy is a "futile quest, "'' 
the gravamen of many studies is that there are factors which 
preclude oligarchic control cr unions. 
Within the parliamentary approach to union democracy three 
separate approaches can be identified which suggest a 
modification of the oligarchy thesis. These are the 
existence of faction or party opposition; the closeness of 
electoral competition; and constitutional limitations on 
oligarchic domination. They will be examined in turn. 
Parties and factions 
Modern interest in union government and the problem of 
defining democracy has largely centred around the challenge 
posed by Lipset, Trow and Coleman in their classic study of 
the International Typographical Union. The defining 
characteristic of democracy in their analysis is "the 
11 
institutiontalisatior. of the two party system. "ý-° With the 
e;; ception of the ITU, however, they confirm Michels' iron law 
concluding that: _- 
"the structure of large scale organisations inherently 
requires the development of bureaucratic patterns of 
behaviour. The conditions making for the 
institutionalisation of bureaucracy and those making for 
democratic turnover in office are largely incompa. cible. '' 
At a conceptual level their argument can be challenged for 
its naive belief that oligarchy disappears when a formalised 
two-party system exists. No real reason is given to explain 
why organisation in parties or unions produces leadership 
oligarchy, but if any organisation has internal parties there 
is no oligarchy. At the very least, Upset et al need to 
argue that each party is subject to oligarchic tendencies if 
their analysis is to be consistent. They also need to 
address their analysis to decentralised structures since 
Michels' argued that these "result merely in the creation of 
a number of smaller oligarchies, each of which is no less 
powerful in its own sphere. "1° 
The idea that opposition is the main force limiting oligarchy 
has been taken up by others who have taken a less 
restrictionist approach. Wooton, for example, took the view 
that a party need not be institutionalised so long as it 
offered a clear-cut choice of decision-makers over a 
significant period. 51 Martin has argued that the survival of 
faction is sufficient to ensure democracy because "it limits 
the executive ability to disregard rank and file opinion by 
12 
providing the potential means for its overthrow. "'' This 
view has been supported empirically by Undy who has shown 
that the opposition in the_Enginecars did exercise some 
influence over electoral outcomes in the 1960s and early 
1970s. "" The factional approach has infuenced other 
tudies, '4 but it has been criticised by Dickenson who has 
argued that although factions and parties "may perform 
many similar functions they nevertheless can be distinguished 
in terms of their structure and behaviour. """ Such a strict 
interpretation only leads to sterile debate, however, and, as 
Undy and Martin recognise, the relationship between faction 
and party is best viewed as a continuum with unstructured 
factions at one end and well-established parties at the 
other. ", 16 
The saliency of party or factional activity lies not only in 
providing opposition. it has the further important functions 
of encouraging membership participation and ensuring that 
members make informed decisions rather than random choices. 17 
The approach is limited, however, in that its focus has 
invariably been at the national level. Its relevance to 
individual unions, therefore, depends very much on the degree 
to which significant decisions are taken at that level and 
research has shown that this varies widely among unions. 103 
The closeness of electoral competition 
Another approach within the parliamentary tradition has 
13 
posited the closeness of electoral competition as the 
touchstone of democracy. in doing so it directly translates 
üchumpoter' w competitive struggle for the people's vote into 
union terms. The model, developed by Edelstein and Warner 
and cxaminod in a study of 31 British and 51 American 
unions, "' is related to the debate an opposition noted above 
since it is concerned with the effectiveness of opposition. 
Its "organizational theory of union democracy" also stresses 
constitutional factors and is, therefore, related to the 
approach that is noted below. The approach, however, is 
essentially different in that it has a purely electoralist 
conception of democracy, which, as Clegg has argued, "is not 
very suitable to British unions"40 More the r:? gulclrity of 
election of these posts varies widely. 
The research, by focusing on "the average closeness of 
elections for top-post vacancies or ... to the percentage of 
elections reaching a given level of closeness, ""' again is 
concerned only with the national level. Its concept of union 
democracy has been criticized"" on a number of methodological. 
grounds; and for its concentration on forma organisational 
factors, completely ignoring contextual variables. 
Competitive elections can, at best, only he seen as 
indicative of democratic organization; they are not proof of 
union democracy, which is dependent on more complex factory. 
A similar -failing is apparent in the other strand within this 
approach, the -study of polyarchy. This term has been coined 
14 
by Dahl who has argued that "since ... no large system in 
the 
real world is fully democratized, T prefer to call real world 
systems poiylr'chie's. '"s''-" Its application in industrial 
relations, however, has led to essentially descriptive 
studies" of the democratic reality, which have f oc_used 
largely on electoral processes, and added nothing to the 
discussion of union cler7ocracy. 
Constitutional limitations can oligarchic domination 
The final approach within the parliamentary model of union 
democracy is derived from the U. S. constitution rather than 
British political tradition. Cook argues that this system of 
government can be directly applied to trade unions, openly 
advocating the ideal of "a system o checks and balances 
between the functional branches of government. ,"" in which 
the formal separation of powers is central. Other American 
writers, 41 however, have been content to discuss the 
democratic reality, noting the absence of separation of 
powers and questioning "whether organized Labor is actually 
becoming a menace to freedom. "" 
In Britain the separation of legislative, oxecutive and 
judicial powers has been recognized as a feature of the 
A, EU. 4' Moreover, the importance of formal constitutional 
provisions has been emphasized in a number of studies, most 
notably by Roberts, " whose apprcach is less proselytising 
than Cook. Flanders has also argued that "the constitutional 
15 
checks on bureaucracy in the British trade unions are, 
however, relatively strong. """ In contrast to 
the American 
influenced standpoints of Edelstein and Warner, and Cook, 
most British studies have rightly realised that "a formally 
democratic constitution is only one of a number of possibly 
important factors in trade union democracy. "'' 
The importance of the formal separation of powers in union 
government, however, has tended to be downgraded by the 
workplace orientation of much of industrial relations 
research in the post-Donovan era. This stresses the 
importance of decentralisation in union decision making and 
the approach, in its most extreme manifestation implies that 
internal union government is irrelevant, since the level of 
bargaining is the "key" to democracy. 12 This approach is not 
only one-dimensional, ignoring non-bargaining issues; it also 
assumes that control flows uniquely and unproblematically 
from members to stewards; and there is strong evidence to 
show that this is not the case. " 
This shift i. 1-1 r--mph, is> J. 5; l. n+ortun 
tc since union 
constitution have become more relevant to the democratic 
debate over- the last decade. There are two reasons for this. 
First, they provide the structure for determining proposals 
to change a union's organisation in respon::, e to changes An 
bargaining structures; different constitutions can either 
facilitate or block administrative change. °" Second, 
non-bargaining issues have become increasingly important as 
16 
trade unions seek to redefine their role in recession and in 
the more ho ti. 11. c-- Cl 4. mate of thm i98O s. The "dcecl ine of the 
big battalions"'' is requiring unions to take key decisions 
on arganisationai change, which have implications for 
membership servicing but cannot essentially be described as 
bargaining issues. It is also increasingly leading unions to 
seek legal and political solutions to industrial problems. A 
reassessment of the importance of union rule books, 
therefore, is long overdue. 
Participation and union dc mocriary 
Approaches to the study of democracy in trade unions which 
focus on participation have done so from a number of 
different perspectives. For instance, studies have used the 
findings that few members actually participate to justify 
Michels' iron law, '' or to suggest that research should 
neglect rank and film members and focus on the "active 
minority. "'' In addition, Cook has cited the 
unrepresentativeness of this minority as a reason for unions 
requiring constitutional checks and balancers. "' These 
contributions, however-, are easily distinguishable from 
studies located within the participatory tr<aditieo. 
Participatory analyses, more than studies in the 
parliamentary tradition, have been conducted from a number- of 
dif-Ferent social sciancc standpoints,; they have, however, 
17 
often lacked a coherent theoretical framework. Many have.? 
been content simply to list -factors influencing membership 
activism, "" without defining participation, or recognising 
that the degree of membership involvement and membership 
motivations can vary widely. "° Where attempts have been made 
to adopt theoretical models these have tended to he imported 
from organisational theory and offer views on membership 
involvement not union democracy. "' Despite definitional 
inadequacies and lack of t. heoreti. c_<_al precision, however, 
these analyses share the common attitude that study of union 
constitutions and institutions alone is inadequate; as 
Ramaswamy has noted "without participation these forms will. 
be mere empty 
The variety of approaches in participatory literature make it 
less amenable to categorisation than parliamentary 
approaches, nevertheless, three main focuses can be 
identified. These are socialist democracy; participation in 
job control; and participation at the local level. Their 
ai qni fi cance to union democracy will now be assessed. 
Socialist democracy 
Orwell 's remark that the defenders of any kind of regime 
claim it is a democracy is particularly pertinent to the 
self-labelled "people's democracies" of the eastern block 
countries. The difference between the democratic reality of 
these political systems and the democratic ideal is, in 
is 
rnar:: i t tc! rmM, the di f"ferenc^ ! vi-twe n aocizilis>m and 
communi sm. 
Marxist political theory is clear on the role of democracy. 
Lc. n in in his analysis of cz. ipi t81 i sm in "The State and 
RE: "voi 1.1tion" argLtMd that: 
"Democracy is a state which recognises the subordination 
of the minority to the majority , io, an organisation for the systematic use of force by one class against 
another, by one section of the population against 
another. "", 
This view closely followed that developed by Mart in his 
anal y<.: si s of the P,: ýir-i. Commune where he attacked parliamentary 
or 11c pitalist dc? rnocracy: 11 
the oppressed are allowed once every few years to 
decide which particular representatives of the 
oppressing class shall represent and repress them in 
parliament. "" 
For Marx and Lenin revolution replaced democracy for the rich 
with democracy for the poor: the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. This was socialist democracy; a higher 
democracy than capitalist democracy. It was only temporary, 
as Lenin reminded, in moving from socialism to communism: 
, pit is constantly forgotten that the abolition of the 
state means also the abolition of democracy: that the 
withering away of the state means the withering away of 
democracy. ""'s 
In essence, there=fore, there is no democratic ideal from 
communist analysis which can be applied to the study of trade 
unions; the ideal is a society where there is no democracy. 
19 
Socialist democracy, however, is an intarmediate 
step; the party Programme of the 
t' 
Soviet Union scats its aim as the 
"extension and perfection o 
active participation of all 
administration of the state 
Commutn i st Party of the 
F socialist democracy, the 
citizenss in the 
A similar strand of reasoning within this approach, but 
encompassing a different, more libertarian, concept of 
socialism, is Fair-brother 's argument that "union democracy is 
about membership participation and involvement, even at the 
highest level. "'' Openly propagandist, its contention that 
"union democracy represents both the embodiment of socialist 
practice and the prospect that socialism can be achieved"''' 
is, however, based more on assertion than on reasoned 
argument. it also contains a number of naive assumptions 
about workplace-based branch representational structures, the 
role of full-time officers, and the influence of national 
conferences which cannot sustain the argument that is 
generated from them. 
Participation in job control 
A closely related approach to socialist democracy has been to 
define the ideal type of union democracy in terms of 
membership "job control. "'' Hyman succinctly expresses this 
view of democracy: 
"its traditional meaning it c1 mar. popular power, the 
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active involvement in decision-making of the ordinary 
members of a community or institution or 
organisation. "O' 
As a marxi. st, however, Hyman offers the following dý-finition 
of power- 
"the ability of an individual or group to control his 
(their) physical and social environment; and, as part of 
this process, the ability to influence the decisions 
which are and are not taken by others. ""- 
In defining power in terms of control, industrial and union 
democracy are fused as concepts; union democracy can only be 
effectively achieved through the hegemonic control of the 
workplace, Fay the rank and file. 
This type of approach was carefully avoided by Pateman, who, 
nevertheless, pointed out the beneficial effects of 
membership participation in decision-making in industry M1 
It cannot be accepted as a satisfactory decription of union 
democracy. It is neither useful nor desirable to define the 
democratic ideal of trade union organisaticn in terms which 
necessitate the overthrow of capitalism. Trade unions were 
not formed with this purpose in mind and have not, thus far, 
shown any indication of being converted to such a view. 
Participation at the local level 
The final approach that can be identified within the 
participatory tradition, local level participation, has 
typically had two separate -focuses, the branch and the 
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workplace. The branch focus has tended to produce 
descriptive empirical studios rather than proscriptive 
democratic theorizing . 7" The significant exception to this 
is Nicholson et al's social psycholgical study of a large 
NALGO branch in Sheffield. This usefully applies two 
borrowed concepts: Seidman et al's insight that the essential 
factor of democracy "is the ability of the rank and file to 
affect decisions, replace leaders, and to change policies; "71 
and Child et al's model of union activity, which 
distinguishes between administrative and representative 
rationality. "" Nicholson et al incorporate into the latter 
the concept of negative control: control via non- 
participation. The study found that the role of the 
representative, the steward, as: 
"crucial to explaining some degree of individual 
membership participation and also as contributing 
substantially to the political processes of the 
organization, via informal factionalism and formal 
competition over outcomes. "" 
This view is predicated, however, on regular and easy access 
between stewards and members, the existence of which has boon 
shown to be empirically variablc. 10 While Nicholson et al 
usefully confirm the importance of factionalism and also, 
following ! Martin, '" stress "educational levels and background 
political socialization factors"'' in developing an 
individuals capacity to participate, it appears that the link 
between stewards and participation is not as clear or as 
simple as they suggest. 
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The study of the workplace and the decentralisation of union 
decision making has made a 
signi i= nt contribution to the 
debate on union domoci acy. ^- 
lt cannot, nr^: ve'rtheless, provide 
a conp. letr analysis of union democracy. This has been 
realised by Clegg who has mod'ifiwd Ai: provocative assertion 
to deTOCrý., c that the l cvol. ct bargaining is tk ay kc: 'y y, 
taking the more eclectic view that factional competion and 
workplace organisation have helped promotk democracy but "do 
not by themselves constitute democracy. Democracy also rests 
on elections and individual rights. "04 
Both the mi croanal yti ca: branch study and the workplace focus 
cl!,, . ",. n'I". and ..,. s .. ", r «". I 
have I C_" i: 3 ý. I, tiC3c1 "ý: I°(ý ... C ý_ '4 ". C. l union 
democracy. týy. ý 
Their respective strengths eý lie in the insights 
gained into the dimensions of participation and in the 
prescription that important decisions should, as far as 
possible, be taken by members. They both, however, share the 
inevitable weakness of being silent about decisions that 
necessarily have to be t&:: en at national and regional level. 
As such, therefore, they provide only a partial solution to 
the p nb em of defining 'inicn (emc;: r? _. °.: y. 
Union democracy: an eclectic approach 
There have been two nctewcrthy attempts to synthmsise 
parliamentary and participatory approaches to union 
democracy. Firstly, Hemingway has argued that union 
government is boat interpr^tcd as Ct process of exerting 
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control. This leads him to postulate a conflict model which 
integrates control through participation, control through 
opposition (the parliamentary approach), along with control 
through satisfaction-111 The process involved is that: 
"when issues arise over which leaders and members 
disagree, the parties must strategically deploy 
resources to secure compliance of the opposition, and 
the outcome of their conflict will demonstrate the 
°ý balance of control. " 
Hemingway's model is flawed, however, in that it 
unrealistically assumes that looking at "who wins" in 
conflict situations is an adequate measure of democracy. 
It also seems simplistic to assert that conflict is the 
obverse of control, other factors may be at work. 
Furthermore, no attempt is made to assess the scale of 
conflict; and there is no analytical framework in the model 
for discussing the importance of non-decisionsa7 or negative 
controlaH as factors influencing union democracy. 
Second, Undy et al, in their study of change in trade unions, 
made three useful distinctions: between union governmental 
channels used for bargaining and non-bargaining isues; 
between the de jure legal position in union constitutions and 
the de facto position in practice; and, most importantly, 
between the vertical and horizontal dispersion of decision- 
making. 
"Two related forms of dispersal are distinguished. 
One concerns the extent to which decisions are 
decentralized downwards from the national level, that 
is, the degree of vertical dispersal; the other relates 
to the extent to which decisions are concentrated or 
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diffused across a given level of union government - for 
example, national, regional or local level. This form 
of dispersal we term 'horizontal dispersal. '09 
This provides a highly useful analytical tool for examining 
trade union government since it embodies both participatory 
and parliamentary approaches and, unlike most of these 
approaches, it is not confined to analysis of one particular 
level of government, but encompasses different levels. As it 
stands, however, this approach is merely descriptive, 
offering no view of the democratic ideal. A prescriptive 
interpretation is hinted at by Undy and Martin who review 
decentralisation of decision-making as one of a number of 
democratic models and comment: "according to this model, the 
lower the level of decision making, the more democratic the 
union. "94 
This prescription is, nevertheless, inadequate within its own 
terms as it ignores the horzontal dispersion of decision- 
making. Can a union in which five people take a decision at 
local level be more democratic than another union where five 
hundred people take the same decision at regional level? It 
is also inadequate in that the level of participation may not 
be important the democratic ethos of union leaders91 and the 
"compulsive pressures"92 for democracy do not guarantee 
informed participation. The following qualification is 
therefore suggested: the lower the level of decision making 
and the wider the level of participation (and the more 
informed the participants) at any given level, the more 
democratic the union. 
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The eclectic approach to union democracy which will form the 
research focus and framework can thus now be identified. 
This approach recognises that parliamentary and participatory 
approaches are complementary not alternatives. It 
synthesises these approaches within the framework of 
examining the vertical and horizontal dispersion of decision 
making at national, regional and local level. Constitutional 
checks and balances, factions, and elections are all seen as 
important intervening variables affecting the horizontal 
dispersion of participation within these levels. Attached to 
this descriptive framework is the prescriptive belief that 
the lower the level of decision making and the wider the 
level. of participation (and the more informed the 
participants) at any given level, the closer a union comes to 
the democratic ideal. 
In positing an ideal type of union democracy, it should be 
emphasised that it is a hypothetical construct for analytical 
purposes and one would never expect to find this in its pure 
farm in real life. Moreover, unlike nation states, trade 
unions are intermediary organisations and some unions are 
inevitably more centralised than others because of the fact 
that they have to bargain nationally. It would be unfair to 
call these unions less democratic. In such circumstances, 
however, the prescription that decision making at that level 
should be informed and dispersed is still applicable and the 
representative structures of parliamentary approaches need 
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the obverse focus, however, has not been examined. It is 
relevant to consider the implications for membership 
participation of situations where factionalism is absent and 
to examine whether factionalism and oligarchy are necessarily 
opposite sides of the same coin. 
The research setting: large general union 
There are two possible choices of research setting for a 
regional analysis: an inter-union study, or a study of 
different regions within a single union. Although the former 
has merits, and potentially offers interesting insights into 
the level of importance different trade unions attach to 
their regional structures, the intra-union approach has been 
preferred. The benefit of this approach is that it enables 
the union rule book to be held constant. It also, to a 
large extent, avoids problems with variations in the 
industrial composition of union memberships. 
The specific research setting, the General Municipal and 
Boilermakers, hereafter the GMB, immediately suggested 
itself as a research focus as a result of contacts that had 
previously been developed in the union. From these contacts 
an interest developed in the democratic practices and 
regional disparities within the union. The opportunity to 
undertake a MA dissertation in the Birmingham region 
high] ighteci the importance of a focus on regional variations 
in the GMB. Although this was almost purely a descriptive 
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study of regional orqanisation, rather than analytical and 
comparative, it provided sufficient grounding for it to he 
use as the basis for a "pilot" study. 
Apart from personal factors, the GMB naturally suggests 
itself as a focus for study since it is well-recognised as 
one of the most regionalised of Britain's trade unions. it 
has also often been remarked that the union's regional 
secretaries are "barons" in their on area, imputing a 
concept of regional oligarchy that has not been examined. 
Two other factors are also apposite. Firstly, it is 
recognised to be largely free from factional activity, 
enabling research to focus on the implications of this for 
union democracy. Second, unlike its great rival the TGWU, it 
has not been a primary research area for over thirty years. 14 
The research focus is concerned with the GMD over the period 
1970-85, enabling study of the organisational changes and 
changes in union character that occurred during this time. 
While examining change at a national level, the focus is 
primarily on the extent to which changes that affect the 
regional and local levels require regional commitment for 
their effective implementation and demonstrate regional 
variations. 
The GMB has ten regions and it has not been possible for all 
these to be examined in sufficient detail in a doctoral 
thesis. Research has, therefore focused on three regions. 
T2 
yý z 
The guiding assumption for choosing these has been that they 
reflect the organisational differences of the union. An 
indication of this is given by the percentage of the 
membership covered in different types of branch. Table 1.1 
shows the regional variations. 
Table 1.1 
Membership coverage by type of branch 
Region Trade/Industry Branches General Branches 
Liverpool 86 14 
Scottish 71 29 
South West 55 45 
Northern 48 52 
Midland 47 53 
Yorkshire 47 53 
London 43 57 
Birmingham 41 59 
Southern 31 69 
Lancashire 9 91 
SOURCE: Executive Council Finance Steering Group Working 
Party an Branch and Workplace Administration. 
The GMB also has significant regional differences in 
membership size, number of branches, and number and type of 
officers. These are illustrated in Table 1.. 
The selection of the Birmingham, Liverpool and Northern 
regions as the research setting was finally made following 
discussions with the GMB's head of research, where it was 
intimated that access would prove difficult in the Lancashire 
region, which was one of the intended areas of study. 
15: 5 
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Table 1.2 
A regional comparison of membership, number of branches, 
and regional and district officer structure. 
Region Membership Branches RD's DO's 
Birmingham 89,000 222 18 10 
Lancashire 93,000 141 15 17 
Liverpool 76,000 362 28 1-3 
London 97,000 249 18 10 
Midland 72,1000 280 11 7 
Northern 109,000 293 26 7 
Scottish 105,000 362 28 13 
Southern 88,000 260 15 12 
South West 49,000 270 10 9 
Yorkshire 87,000 235 15 7 
SOURCE: 1982 Conaress Rnoort. 
The Scottish region, another of the potentially most 
interesting, was not considered as its geographical distance 
would make the detailed fieldwork required impractical. The 
sample, however, covers the GMB's largest and, reputedly, 
best organised region; the region with the most substantially 
different branch structure and a reputation for radical 
politics; and one the union's most centralised regions. 
Research methods 
This study is based on interviews with officers and members 
of the GMB, examination of Union records at head office and 
the three regional offices, and attendance at union meetings 
and annual Congress. 
-S 4 
The research wes conduc ed principally by a series of 
structured interviews in the three regions. A total of 
seventy-six face to face interviews were carried out between 
September 1984 and March 1988. These interviews lasted from 
thirty minutes to over two an a half hours, with an average 
length of one heur. They also varied from being very rich to 
almost non-existent in content. The Birmingham region, as 
the closest, was used to develop research techniques and 
"pilot" the approach adopted in the other regions. Of the 
interviews, thirty-six were in Birmingham, the remainder 
split evenly between the other two regions. Consequently, 
the research data on some issues is richer in Birmingham than 
it is in the other regions. 
In addition to regional secretaries, interviews were 
conducted with eight regional or district officers in the 
Liverpool and Northern regions and twelve in the Birmingham 
region. Interviews with lay members comprised eight lay 
activists and four ordinary lay members in both the Liverpool 
and Northern regions, and fifteen activists and nine ordinary 
members in Birmingham. Lay activists, in this sense, refers 
to members holding office; it, therefore, includes branch 
secretaries, branch chairs, shop stewards, regional council, 
regional committee and Executive Council members. Since a 
number of people interviewed held more than one of these 
offices it is not particularly meaningful to split this 
analysis further. The interviews did, however, provide a 
representative cross-section of offices held and were 
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supplemented by countless informal discussions with members 
and officers at all levels in the union. 
Research also involved examining Congress reports from 1968- 
85; reading regional council and committee minutes and 
financial statements; and a detailed review of the union's 
rules. Recent issues of the GMB's Journal, officers and shop 
stewards handbooks, and a number of other head office 
publications were also examined. 
Outline of thesis 
The research focus and framework, emerging from the eclectic 
approach is examined in five chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 
both focus on the union at the national level and demonstrate 
the vertical concentration of power within the GMB at the 
regional level. Chapters 4,5 and 6 focus on the three 
regions studied, analysing membership participation at branch 
and regional level, and in collective bargaining. 
Chapter 2 examines the union's history up to 1970. It relies 
primarily on secondary sources, particularly the works of 
Clegg, focusing on the importance of the union's 
constitutional arrangements in determining the significant 
organisational features of the union: regional power, the 
block vote system, the full-time lay activist, rule book 
restrictions on branches. It also outlines the distinctive 
themes in the GIiB's character - nepotism, moderation and 
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loyalty to the Labour party, and business unionism - focusing 
on Basnett's inheritance when he became general secretary in 
ti 1974. 
Chapter 3 examines membership participation in the union at a 
national level since Basnett took office. It focuses on the 
GMB's political system; the respective roles of Congress, the 
Executive Council and the general secretary, and the limited 
role of factionalism. It also examines the implications the 
organisational reforms and the changes in union character 
that occurred during the Basnett era have had on lay 
participation in decision making. Further, it illustrates 
how national reform initiatives require regional commitment 
and cooperation if they are to be effective, focusing on the 
implications this has for the power of the GMB's general 
secretary. It also focuses on the recent election of John 
Edmonds. 
Chapter 4 examines membership distribution and participation 
at branch-level in the three regions. It focuses on the 
discretion afforded by the autonomy the union's rules give to 
its regions; the impact that these rules have had on branch 
structure, particularly as a result of the operation of the 
commission system; and the importance of branch structure in 
encouraging or precluding participation. It also highlights 
the relevance of branch structure to regional elections, 
which are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 e>: amznes the scope and nature of regional power and 
its variations between the three regions. It focuses on the 
notion of regional oligarchy, examining the constraints on 
the power of regional secretaries. As part of this focus it 
analyses the distribution of power within regional 
structures. It also focuses on elections to regional 
councils and committees and to regional Congress delegations, 
examining the importance of factionalism and branch structure 
in these elections. Further, it discusses the importance of 
the union's rules in concentrating power at the regional 
level on non-bargaining issues. 
Chapter 6 examines membership participation in decision 
making on bargaining issues. It has two related focuses. 
Firstly, it focuses on the implications for lay participation 
of the union's reform of its regional and local officer 
structure, and the extension and consolidation of its 
industrial conference structure. Second, it focuses on 
membership participation in two sectors, private 
manufacturing and local government, assessing the importance 
of branch structure, and offering a limited analysis of the 
representativeness of shop stewards and the scope for local 
bargaining in these sectors. 
Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of the study and briefly 
summarises the main arguments which have been developed and 
concluded on at the end of each chapter. It aims to offer 
conclusions on the applicability of the eclectic research 
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framework that has been developed to examine union democracy 
and on the specific research focuses that have been 
identified. (rising from the primary research focus it se&:: s 
to emphasise the need for studies to examine the evidence of 
variations in the regional level of government in trade 
unions, and particularly it aims to conclude on the notion of 
regional oligarchy suggested by accounts noting the power of 
the GMB's regional barons. It also seeks to offer 
conclusions on the importance of the second order research 
focuses -- constitutional provisions, factionalism, and branch 
structure - both to the GMB and to studies of democracy in 
trade unions in general. 
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Chapter- 2 
GENERAL UNION 
Every large-scale, dynamic organisation develops formal and 
informal methods of working and structural patterns that are 
peculiar to it alone. Trade unions are no exception. They 
are "historical deposits and repositories of history ... 
every union has a personality of its own. "* This makes 
attempts to categorise unions" of limited value. There is no 
neatness about British trade union organisation. As Cooper, 
one of the GMB's past general secretaries, told the Donovan 
commission "the free trade union is very much like Topsy, it 
has simply grown up and is an untidy structure. "" This all 
means, therefore, that "there is no acceptable alternative to 
examining individual unions in turn"`* 
This chapter describes and analyses the fundamental and 
distinctive features of the National Union of General and 
Municipal Workers which have developed since its formative 
amalgamation in 1924 to around 1970, setting the context for 
the presentation and analysis of the research findings in 
subsequent chapters. It relies largely on secondary sources, 
particularly the works of the union', official historian, 
Hugh Clegg, " but also on selected interviews and a detailed 
analysis of the union's rulebook. Inevitably, attempts to 
provide such a contextual setting reflect an uneasy 
compromise between leaving too many questions unanswered and 
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providing too detailed an analysis. The preference in this 
chapter has been to keep information down to a necessary 
minimum and to omit dotai. l. _ ºhere 
it can be introduced at a 
later date. 
On a stylistic note, the importance of the GMD 's regions in 
its structure is a major theme of the chapter, but it was not 
until 1974 that the union's districts were re-named regions. 
For clarity, the term region has been used throughout. 
The two amalgamations 
The General Municipal and Boilermakers' is Britain's second 
bi. qqe st union and has members in almost every industry and 
occupation. It was formed in September 1982 by the 
amalgamation of the National Union of General and Municipal 
Workers (865,164 members) and the Amalgamated Society of 
Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and Structural Workers 
(119,585 members). Both these constituent unions have had a 
long tradition of membership of the labour- movement. The 
NUGMW itself was formed in 1924 by an amalgamation of the 
National Union of Gasworkers and General Labourers of Great 
Britain and Ireland, the National Amalgamated Union of Labour 
(founded in 1889 as the Tyneside and General Labourers' 
Union) and the Municipal Employees' Association (founded in 
1894). The origins of the ASE; SBSW can be traced back even 
further, starting as a society formed by boilermakers in 
1834, but now covering a range of crafts, including welders, 
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platers, shipwrights, caulkers, burners, drillers, riveters, 
loftsmen, riggers, structural steelwork and flame-cutting 
workers. " This highly-sF iL-led membership contrasted sharply 
with the membership of the NUGMW which was overwhelmingly 
unskilled and manual. In 1.973, when Basnett was elected 
general secretary of the union, over 96% of (3MB members were 
manual workers and nearly two thirds were concentrated in 
four main sectors: engineering and shipbuilding; food, drink 
and tobacco; public utilities; and local government. There 
was also a substantial membership in chemicals, bricks, 
glass, construction, rubber manufacturing, textiles, 
clothing, the National Health Service, hotels and catering, 
distributive trades and other services. 7 
It was certainly, therefore, a major departure from 
established practice for the overwhelmingly manual NUGMW to 
recruit the highly-skilled membership of the ASBSB SW to its 
ranks. Although the 1982 amalgamation is interesting in that 
it represented a definite attempt on the part of the NUGMW 
leadership to change the union's image and to adopt an 
"agqressi ve"O merger strategy, it was the amalgamation nearly 
sixty years previously, and events prior and subsequent to 
it, which developed that image and established the democratic 
and organisational practices of the union. 
The amalgamation which formed the NUGMW in 1924 took place at 
a time of severe economic depression which caused a rapid 
decline in trade union membership cand forced unions into a 
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series of "defensive"" mergers. Not surprisingly, it was the 
general unions. rather than the longer established unions 
with strong craft tradi. tiofls, which suffered most. Table 2.1 
compares the percentage loss in membership of the merging 
partners with that of all unions. 
Table 2.1 
Trade Union Membership 1920-23 
Union 
All unions 
National union of 
General L4ork: Pr- 
Nzationad Amalgamated 
Union of Labour 
Municipal Employees 
Association 
SOURCE: ClEc C, (1964) p. 103. 
143, ()OO 53, OC)O 63 
65 , 000 4t, 000 
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The losses of the National Amalgamated Union of Labour and 
the National Union of Goner<al Workers were catastrophic and 
the NUGW' a loss would have been even greater if the 1920 
membership figures had included the Birmingham 3z workers 
and the Womena Workers' Federation, both of which amalgamated 
with the NUGW in 1921. In contrast the membership of the 
Municipal Employees Association held up better, primarily 
because it predominantly organised local authority workers 
and unemployment was not so severe in the public sector. 
Membership Membership Percentage 
3.920 1923 loss 
8,346,000 3,42£3,000 5 
490 , 000 221,000 55 
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Ineluctable though the financial pressures placed on unions 
by ucn rapid membership ipss were, they viere not the only 
reason that trade unions sought mergers at this time. There 
was a general enthusiasm for greater unity and concentration. 
It has been noted that "the war put an end to discussions for 
a time, but the idea of greater unity had taken a firm hold 
of the imagination of many trade unionists, both leaders and 
rank and f i. le. " 10 The motto of the GME{ until its recent 
transmogrification, "unity is strength, " dates back to these 
clays and it was in this highly charged atmosphere of crisis 
and unity that a number of different schemes for amalgamation 
were proposed. Inter-union jealousy'' played a part in 
determining the final outcome, but a major determining factor 
was the personal rivalry and antipathy between Ernest. F3evi n, 
the leader of the Dockers and Will Thorne, the Gasworkers 
leader. '' It was this rivalry which led to the formation of 
the Transport and General Workers in 1921 and the NUGMW three 
years later, establishing general unionism as "the 
distinctive feature of British Trade Unionism"1m and setting 
the pattern for future development. 
Thorne and C1 yno s, ' ' were the dominant figures in the merger 
talks that formed the NUOMW and, since their union, the 
General Workers, clearly outnumbered the other two, it was 
natural that they retained their positions as general 
secretary and president in the amalgamated union. By then, 
Thorne, a veteran of the "heroic years"'" 1689-92 which saw 
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the birth of the "n-'w Unionism" of unskilled labourers 
strongly influenced by socialist ideas, occupied a pre- 
eminent position in the Lapmur movement. The leaders of the 
other unions were quite happy to defer to him and readily 
accepted that the arrangements for government of the new 
union should be based can those of the General Workers. Trade 
union lead«rship, therefore, played a key role, not only in 
establishing general unionism butt in determining the 
democratic structures of what was then Britain's second 
largest trade union. 
Historical + actors dotermi ni. ng GMB organisation 
There have been many changes since, but, in essence, the 
structuro of the 0MB today does not differ radio 11y from 
that established in 1924. 
linder the amalgamation the branches of the three constituent 
unions retained their identity, but were re-allocated into 
twelve regions. Each region was to have a council of working 
delegates, which would meet every six months, and elect from 
it a committee to run the region between meetings. The 
regional secretary and a 'lay' member of each region would 
sit on the General Council and the four largest regions would 
send an additional lay delegate to ensure that the full-time 
officers were in a minority. The General Council was to meet 
every quarter, and to elect five regional secretaries and 
five of its lay members from regions other- than those of the 
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five elected secretaries, to serve with the general secretary 
and president as an executive committee. The final authority 
of the union was to be theVi enni al Delegate Congress. 
The emphasis an the i mpor-tance of regions in the process of 
union government, enshrined in the now structure, developed 
from the experiences of Thorne's Ga aworker s' union. In 1889, 
when it was founded, all unions faced formidable transport 
and communication problems which made the formation of 
national unions extremely difficult and it was during this 
period that the autonomy of the regions was established. 
From the outset regions were made financially independent g 
paying only five per cent of subscription income to head 
office, and, as early as 1891 , their autonomy was emphasized 
by the union's hesitation over joining a federation proposed 
by the sailors and firemen because the federation did not 
allow the districts to affiliate separately. This led Thorne 
to comment: we give complete autonomy to our regions ... we 
found that the terms of the Federation, which would suit a 
certain region, would not be suitable in another"'6- 
The Gasworkers' union began as, and remained for some time, 
primarily a London union. As the union grew regions were 
tacked an haphazardly and their growth depended on the 
ability and energy of the regional secretary. t7 Initially 
this post was only full-time if the membership warranted it, 
but by the outbreak of the first world war, the position had 
been consolidated into a full-time office and the postholder 
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established as the 'key figure' in the region. The power of 
this office was strengthened in 1909 by an unusual provision 
in the constitution of then union"1° In the nineteenth 
century most national unions, to avoid expense, governed the 
union, between delegate conferences, with an executive 
committee of lay members drawn from near head office and, 
when they were formed, the general unions had followed suit. 
As funds grew a change was made to national executives 
comprised exclusively of lay members elected by the 
membership. When the to . sworkers made 
the change in 1909, 
however, they chose to elect a governing body composed partly 
of working members from the regions and partly of regional 
secretaries, rather than the entirely 'lay' committee of 
other unions. 
Another important structural development, the emergence of 
the full time branch secretary, was established in the 
decade before the 1924 amalgamation. In 1911, a young man, 
Charles Dukes, became secretary of the Warrington branch. His 
reputation as an agitator made it impossible for him to find 
work, forcing him to live off the commission he received from 
collecting membership subscriptions. Through recruiting more 
members to the branch he was able to increase his 'earnings' 
from eight shillings to twenty shillings within a year. 
Clynes, the regional secretary, saw this as an opportunity to 
ease his administrative workload and persuaded the 191.2 
Congress that a full-time branch secretary should be allowed 
where there was "a large branch or a number of branches 
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amalgamated for that purpose". '" This decision quickly had a 
major impact on the organisation of the General Workers as 
the rapid increase in uniao. membership of the "growth" years, 
1.90-1920, gave ambitious branch secretaries ample 
opportunity to make their position full-time. 
The 1924 Amalq<°amati. on Conference, therefore, c: lid little more 
than bodily transfer the structure of the General Workers to 
the nerv union. The tradition of regional autonomy; the 
indirect election of lay members to the two national 
governing bodies, where regional secretaries attended as of 
right; the branch commission system; and the power of the 
full-time branch secretary had been established well before 
and became dominant features of the new union. 
Minor strur_turr: Al changes were introduced in 1930. At the 
Amalgamation Conference it was decided to allow regions to 
send one delegate to Congress for each 3000 financial 
members. Delegate's were elected by the branches, who cast 
their total branch membership for candidates regardless of 
the number attending the branch meeting. In 1930, because of 
dwincil ing member ship numbers, this was altered to one 
delegate for each 2000ä the black-vote system of elections to 
Congress and to the regional council , however, remained 
unchanged. It was also agreed to increase the number of 
places on the national executive from ten to twelve, to give 
each region one place and the equal division between regional 
secretaries r_incI lay members was mai nt-aj npcj. 
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More important during this period was the growing membership 
concern about the age and 'bi li ty of the union's officers. 
The amalgamation rules had required that all officers' posts 
should come up for election every two years and, 
accordingly, the first elections under this rule were held 
in 1926. Nearly all posts were contested and it was evident 
that most of the opposition candidates were associated with 
the National Minority Movement -a Communist-sponsored and 
TUC-condemned Left Wing organisation among trade unionists. 
Although no officer came anywhere close to being defeated 
the leaders of the union took a very strong view of the 
situation. Clyne s, presiding over the 1926 Congress, 
strongly criticized the National. Minority Movement in his 
opening address, claiming "the men who fulminate against 
leaders are always themselves striving for leadership. " When 
the election results were reported his tone was even more 
strident, declaiming that "any person in the Union had the 
right to oppose an old established officer if there was any 
ground for complaint with regard to his fitness as an 
official, but he would deplore the tendency to organise 
opposition ... on other grounds, or that any political. 
motives should direct or influence hostility to officials. "=O 
Following this speech the union's rules were amended so that: 
all officials, once elected, were elected for life, with new 
officers being appointed for a two year probationary period 
before having to submit themselves for election. The effect 
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of this rule change at a time of declining membership, the 
union lost 33"/. of its members between . 
1924 and 1933, was that 
regional and national officers who died or retired were not 
replaced and those who remained could not be challenged. The 
average age of officers, therefore, increased rapidly and the 
union became N "a tired <administration. "f' 
in 1933, . Thorne was seventy-six and had been general 
secretary for forty-four years. Clyne s, at sixty-four, had 
been a full-time officer for over forty years. Both the 
assistant general secretaries, all four national officers 
and seven of the twelve regional secretaries were either in 
their late sixties or in their seventies. "" Up to 1931 
several of these had been Members of Parliament and there 
were complaints that they spent too much time in the House of 
Commons. Members made comparisons with the Transport and 
General. Workers Union, whose general secretary, Bevin, was 
not in Parliament and always seemed to be in the news and 
producing new proposals. Although the 1930 Congress heavily 
defeated a motion on compulsory retirement and a similar 
resolution in 1932 was lost by fifty-eight votes to thirty- 
nine, the volume of support for compulsory retirement was 
building up and the 1934 Congress passed a motion asking that 
the issue be investigated with a report to next Congress. "'' 
This paved the way for Charles Dukes, who had been elected 
general secretary earlier that year, to re-organise and 
modernise the union. 
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Uncicr the 1936 re-argainii---, at ion the number of regions. was 
reduced from twelve to ton and the number of places on the 
national executive reduced accordingly. The office of 
president was allowed to lapse an the retirement of 3. R. 
Clynes and a new rule provided for the election of a chairman 
by Congress. The chairman was to hold office for two years 
and be eligible for re-election. To meet membership demands 
a now generation of officers were appointed who were much 
younger than their predecessors ; head office was transformed 
into a modern efficient machine; and economy measures were 
introduced to make the union more financially viable. 
It was the fundamental overhaul of the union's rulebook, 
however, which has had the greatest lasting significance. 
Apparently, the wording of the new rules owed a great deal to 
Dukes' concern that disputes within the union should be kept 
out of the courts, leading him to take legal advice from 
Stafford Cripps and phrase the rules so that a branch could 
have no legal redress against the action of the region. This 
is still the case today since the union's rules have remained 
basically unchanged. Branches can be established with as few 
as twenty members, but not if "in the opinion of the regionsl 
secretary sufficient branches have already been 
established. " "4 The regional committee has the power to 
close any branch or merge any branches "for any reason which 
it deems good and sufficient, or where, in its judgement, it 
is considered advisable to do so" and it can "suspend or 
remove from office any branch officer ... in cases of 
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incompetency, dishonesty, failure to carry out instructions 
or decisions of the central executive council, the executive 
council or the regional council or the regional committee, or 
for any other reason which it deems goad or sufficient ." 'ýý' 
Branch meetings are confined by rule to the members of the 
branch concerned and members of other branches can only 
attend with "the knowledge and approval" of the regional 
secretary. 26 Branches and their members are similarly 
prevented from communicating to other branches and outside 
bodies by the sweeping scope of Rule 17.11: 
"No address or circular shall be issued by any member 
or branch unless such address or circular has been 
approved by the Regional Council or Regional Committee 
or Executive Council, and no member or members shall 
divulge the business or affairs of the Union to 
unauthorised bodies or unofficial journals, or the 
Press, without such approval. Any member- or members 
of any Branch issuing or distributing any circular or 
divulging the Union's business or affairs or calling 
unauthorised meetings without the approval of the 
Regional Committee, or otherwise committing a breach 
of this Rule will be suspended from all benefits and 
liable to be expelled. "27 
This rule has not been constantly in use. Although regions 
step in from time to time to deal with the misappropriation 
of branch funds; to settle an unofficial dispute; to declare 
an election invalid where there have been irregularities; or 
to discipline branch officers for exceeding their powers or 
failing in their duties, it is still right to recognise that 
"the region depends on its branches, and they are normally 
allowed wide latitude to get on with their own business, so 
long as no trouble comes to its notice. "wo While this is 
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true, however, it is equally the case that the union's rules 
gi. vex the regional secretary and r-r! gional committee 'wide 
latitude' to prevent the emergence of opposition or factions 
L7 - 
which might seek to challenge their authority. 
The 1936 re-orgý. =ýnisation, therefore, did far more than 
simply respond to membership pressure to change the union's 
'tired leadership'. Through reformulating the union's rule 
book, it codified the regional concentration of power within 
the union, giving the regional committee almost absolute 
power over the branch and providing, potentially at least, 
strong disincentives to factional development. 
Attitudes and Pr onal_ 
Analytically =E=parate, but closely related to the structure 
of they union area those features which provide its distinct 
personality. Three such 'attitudes' have been particularly 
prevalent either at certain periods or throughout the GMB's 
history: nepotism; moderation and loyalty to the Labour 
party; and 'business unionism'. 
Before examining thee in more riatai i, however, it should be 
noted that some writers believe it is wrong to say that "the 
union" adopts a particular policy or carriua out an action as 
this in "reification": treating an impersonal abstraction as 
a social agent, when it is really only people who act. ''? 
Whilst accepting this, it must be said that it is little more 
J1 
than a platitude. When it is said that the union's policy 
has always been to support the Labour party, what is meant is 
that Congress and the Executive have always supported the 
r_ 
Labour party, and caili. nq this the union's policy is no more 
than convenient nhort. hand. 
The union's "o+fi. ciai history" commendably, make no attempt 
to hide the fact that nepotism has been a strong featurce of 
the GMF3. It notoll o-f the 1936 re-organi. sationa 
"one feature of the Union which became firmly 
established during the process of re-organisation was 
the prominence of certain 'f tai ]ics in its affairs. 
Regional secretaries had control of the appointment of 
their own office staffs and several of them appointed 
sons or other relatives to clerical posts on their 
staff ... If they had spirit and ability, such lads, 
after some years experience, would run for a full-time 
organisers post""0 
This has led to a number of family traditions within the 
union. At the highest level, Tom Williamson, the general 
secretary from 1946 to 1961, was the nephew of a former 
Liverpool regional secretary. His successor as general 
secretary, Jack Cooper, was the nephew of his predecessor, 
Charles Dukes, while Cooper's successor, David }aasnett, 
general secretary from 1973 to 1984, was the son of a former 
Liverpool regional secretary and had worked for the union 
ever since he left school. At national officer level, Fred 
Hayday and Jack Eccles, both national Officers in the 1960s 
were third generation union employees, while, at regional 
level, it was quite common during the inter-war period for 
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sons or relatives of regional secretaries or senior officers 
to start work as a member of the offir_e staff and eventually 
become full time organi ers_ themsei. ves 
Nepotism in the union can be traced back to the early days 
of the Gasworkers when the staffing of the nascent regional 
offices was regarded as essentially a domestic matter for the 
regional secretaries. In a climate which was often hostile 
to trade unionism they needed people they could trust and, 
not unnaturally, chose members of their -family to work with 
them. During the 1930s nepotism became entrenched at a 
regional level when there were a number of instances of posts 
being found for candidates whose main qualification was their 
relationship with one of the senior officers. "' 
Too much, however, can be made of these family connections. 
Nepotism has certainly been more prevalent in the LIMB than 
its great rival the TGWU or, indeed, most other unions, 
principally because the structure of the union has 
traditionally given great power to the regional secretaries, 
but promotion to national level has always occurred only in 
the face of fierce competition. Since the 1936 re- 
organisation, family ties have also gradually become a less 
significant factor in determining appointments at the 
regional level, though it would be illusory to pretend that 
nepotistic appointments do not still occur. 
Moderation and loyalty to the Labour party has been ý-ý 
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hallmark of the GMB ever since its formation; indeed, these 
twin traditions predate that and were established features of 
the constituent unions which created the National Union of 
General and Municipal Workers. The leaders of the Gasworkers 
union quickly learned the lesson that, among general workers 
at least, unions can rarely build a satisfactory organisation 
without winning the goodwill of the employer. 
This lack of radicalism in the industrial sphere, however, 
did not prevent them from forging close links with the 
socialist sects: Thorne was a member of the SDF, Eleanor 
Marx-Aveling served on the executive of the uni-on for a 
number of years, and the union's expansion over the country 
was helped by local socialist groups. The address of the 
union, the official statement of its aims and policies, was 
an entirely Marxist document drawn up by Marx's son-in-law 
Aveling. It was in stark contrast to the practice of the 
union which emphasised moderation and sought assistance from 
the state. Because the 'new' unions had no monopoly of 
labour supply in any market, they were far more ready to rely 
on political action as well as industrial strength and took a 
large part in the formation of the Labour Representation 
Committee. The Gasworkers were prominent in this respect and 
J. F. Clynes and Will Thorne were elected to Parliament in 
1906, with Pete Curran joining them a year later following a 
by-election at Jarrow. 3-- Clynes, the president of the NUGMW 
and "the union's most famous figure" was a highly influential 
champion of "moderation, avoidance of strikes where possible, 
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the '..; se of all. possiblo moans of conciliation, the 
establishment of good relations with employers, and the 
virtues of pol it ical aeticar: " 
The first Labour Government was formed in the same year that 
the NUGMW was established and was strongly supported by the 
union. Clynes became Lord Privy Seal in the new Government 
and Margaret Bondfield, the union's Chief Woman Officer, was 
appointed parliamentary private secretary to the Minister of 
Labour. Thorne, Dukes and Arthur Hayday were elected to 
Parliament along with nine other members of the union. "" In 
1926, although the NUGMW executive had certain doubts, it 
gave full support to the General Strike and Thorne, Hayday 
and Bondf i Eil d, as members of the General Counci 1 of the TUC, 
shared responsibility for calling it off ten days later. 
Clynes served as Home Secretary and Bondfield as Minister of 
Labour in the second Labour Government from 1929 to 1931. 
Both rejected Ramsay Macdonald's overtures to follow him into 
coalition and after Labour's crushing defeat at the polls in 
1931 the union played a major role in rebuilding the 
shattered Labour party. It provided loyal support, rejecting 
demands for a popular front and supporting the expulsion of 
Stafford Cripps from the Party - Dukes denouncing him as one 
of "a long list of opportunists who have wrought havoc in our 
movement""= - just three years after seeking his advice on 
rewriting the union's rulebook. 
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During the war the 0MB and the other unions were entirely in 
support of the Labour Party's policies on all major issues. 
After some initial doubts, _-_the union accepted Beveridge's 
plan for post-war reconstruction ano they were strong 
advocates of the programme of nationalisation and the 
establishment of the National Health Service pursued by the 
1945-51 Attlee Government, co-operating fully in the gas and 
electricity industries, where they were the major union, and 
in the Health Service, where they organised a considerable 
number of workers. Under Tom Williamson as general 
secretary, the union was "amongst the foremost supporters of 
the policies of the Labour Government and the TUC for 
increasing productivity and for wage restraint. "'' In 195() 
the union even stood behind Sir Stafford Cripps's pay 
restraint policy after the TUC had abandoned it. It was a 
determined opponent of Bevanism and supported German 
rearmament. 
Only once, in 1959, did Congress upset the Labour leadership 
by voting in favour of unilateral disarmament by a narrow 
majority, but Williamson called a special Congress of the 
union within weeks to reverse the decision. Williamson, 
along with Arthur Deakin of the TGWU, formed a "praetorian 
guard" of the Labour party leadership; together they wielded 
roughly one third of the total votes at the Party conferences 
The block votes dominated elections to the national executive 
and the conference arrangements committee, and voting on 
resolutions so much that the leadership won every conference 
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vote with c--)ne minor exception, botwee:., n 1948 sand 1.960-1' 
Apart from its loyal, stal gart backing for every twist and 
turn of Labour orthodoxy the GMB has also developed a 
reputation for 'business unionism. ' The term has been used 
almost synonomousl y with moderation: "it is the business of 
the union to sell labour ... the most. successful businessmen 
keep on good terms with their customers and the union must do 
so too" with it being argued that the general unions have 
"raised the establishment of good relations into a general 
principle. ""O 
More commonly, however l business unionism refers to the 
tendency for ct union to treat its members as clients rather 
than participants: members paying their dues and, in return, 
expecting certain benefits provided, of course, they do as 
they are told. This 'clientelism' has been evident from the 
early years of the union's organisation; it dates I: aack to the 
development of full-time 'lay' branch secretaries pioneered 
by Charles Dukes in the Lancashire region. Inexorably, this 
development led to the formation of large general branches 
which, in turn, diminished membership interest in its 
activities, making them remote from the full-time branch 
secretary and leading him, not unnaturally, to treat them as 
clients who paid his wages and for whom he administered the 
branch efficiently. 
The extent to which these- "I_ainc shir-Ea methods" were 4xdopted 
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in the union varied from region to region. In some areas 
there was concern that a few large branches might try between 
them to rule the affairs of the region and some regions 
chose, periodically, to split up large branches. Discussions 
at national level were more concerned with improving the 
union's recruitment record and debated whether the 
appointment of recruitment officers at regional level would 
be a superior means of increasing membership than the full-- 
time branch secretary. In 1944, however, Lancashire methods 
were introduced into the Southern region with considerable 
success by Jack Cooper, an ex Lancashire official, who had 
become Southern regional secretary and, although all 
regions grew rapidly in the following years, the Southern 
region outpaced the others. This convinced Cooper of the 
efficacy of these methods and when he became general 
secretary of the union in 1962 he used his position to 
establish "business unionism" even more firmly in the union. 
The Basnc tt inheritance 
When }3 snett formally took up office as general secretary 
at the beginning of 1974 he inherited stewardship of a union 
whose organisation was the product of nearly a century's 
history and whose attitudes spanned a similar period. The 
former had remained largely unchanged for fifty years, the 
latter, however, had been strongly shaped and refined by his 
predecessor. 
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The si.;; tios were a time of industrial as well as political 
and social change. Major changes took place in industrial 
relations: trade union membership grew by 1.3 million during 
the decade, "" the number of shop stewards in the UK increased 
dramatically, as did the growth of workplace bargaining. 
Britain, according to one study, became "accustomed to 
consuming strikes with its cornflakes. "`4° Many of these 
strikes were unofficial causing some to argue that unions had 
lost control over their membors. 41 Concern was expressed 
that both strikes and the level of "wage drift" caused by 
workplace bargaining were seriously damaging the economy and 
led to the Government appointing a Royal Commission to 
investigate the role of trade unions and employers 
associations. Its report has become a landmark in the 
industrial relations field, but its immediate result was to 
prompt the Labour Government's controversial and abortive 
attempt at industrial relations legislation, the 1969 White 
paper "In Place of Strife. " While other unions were 
responding to these new circumstances with organisational 
reforms and changes in attitudes, however, the GMB under 
Cooper's leadership almost totally ignored the clamouring 
pressures for change emanating from the membership and from 
society as a whole. Union attitudes not only remained 
intact, they were reinforced at a time when membership 
pressures were going in totally the opposite direction. 
The GMB's moderation and loyalty to the Labour Party was, if 
anything, strengthened during the 1960s, maintaining, as one 
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survey called it, the "tradition of 'establishment' unionism 
that developed after the General Strike in 1926. "4" In many 
ways Cooper's attitudes were very similar to those of JH. 
Clynes. While Clynes stressed the importance of maintaining 
goad relations with employers Cooper, over fifty years later 
in his evidence to the Donovan Commission, took only a 
slightly different line: "it is an elementary requirement of 
our basic purpose that we should do everything possible to 
contribute towards maximising the revenue of a firm or 
industry to increase the prospects of obtaining better wages 
and conditions. "'" Although it is unfair to suggest that 
"every general secretary since Thorne has been so pro- 
establishment that he has been awarded a peerage, "44 it is 
certainly true that the union was particularly loyal to the 
1964-70 Wilson government and much of this was due to 
Cooper's influence, raising again the importance of trade 
union leadership. 
A well respected political commentator has argued that, 
during this period, trade union leaders "realised the 
considerable impotence of their position as they conducted, 
on the one hand, high diplomacy with the Government on behalf 
of the whole trade union movement while, on the other hand, 
they struggled with constituents over whom they had little 
control. "Am It has also been argued that union leaders 
seemed "to lack the determination to push through policies 
that would achieve any serious reform of industrial relations 
and the wage bargaining structure. "'' This was certainly not 
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true of Cooper. Not only did he gc:, t his union to support the 
Government's incomes policy, he also persuaded them to hack 
"In Place of Strife" At kno union's 1969 Congress Cooper 
told dgl ezo& c: 
"trade unions have much to gain from the White Paper. 
The violent opposition voiced by several trade unions, 
and illustrated in their handling of recent disputes, 
stems from two or three controversial proposals. But, 
taking the package as a whole, their opposition appears 
unnecessarily melodramatic and negative. "47 
The result of such a stand, and indeed of the whole Cooper 
era, was to "maroon" the GMB in "right-wing isolation" and 
to increase the estrangement of the leadership from the 
members which had been growing in the union as a result of 
the increasingly "professional" approach that was being 
adopted. 
Cooper's advocation of "business unionism" in the 1960s led 
the union to adopt a benotit-orientated rather than an 
industrial service-oriented approach. Emphasis was placed on 
providing educational facilities, convalescent and holiday 
homes, fatal accident and retirement benefits, rather than 
servicing the membership in the industrial sphere. it also 
led to an exaggerated empha si. s on financial solvency. Almost 
immediately after his election as general secretary, Cooper, 
during the winter of 1962-3 "conducted what must have been 
the most careful campaign of preparation for any vote at 
Congress"47 to ensure that his proposals to boost benefits, 
and sharply increase membership contributions were passed. 
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Even so the union was bitterly divided: of the ten regions 
five supported the leadership, four were opposed, and the 
Birmingham region was so Mlit on the issue it divided its 
votes -- enabling Cooper to secure a narrow majority for his 
proposals by 172 votes to M . "I This attitude 
dominated 
Cooper's thinking and GMB policy throughout his entire tenure 
of office. 
Business unionism had its advantages. The union provided 
excellent benefits; the research department was made into one 
of the most effective in the trade union movements and a 
residential college was opened at Woodstock in Surrey to 
educate shop stewards and other lay activists. The union's 
preoccupation with clientelism and financial stability, 
however, began to alientate it from its members. its 
obsession with financial solvency (union reserves doubled 
between 1965 and 1970) made it extremely reluctant to 
sanction strikes causing some members affected to "vote with 
their feet" and leave the union"' and the high handed 
attitudes s of many of its officers were deeply resented by 
many of its members, causing one left-wing activist to brand 
it as "a scab union. "12 
The Basnctt inheritance did include some minor organisational 
reforms, but they were not initiated by his predecessor. 
Cooper's response to the changing industrial relations 
climate was minimally to adapt the union's organisation only 
when there was no alternative but to do so. As an earlier 
64 
study has noted, "a]. 1 the changes that occurred during Lord 
Cooper's ten years in office, wh: ilo providing the potential 
for fundamental change in the ruturc7, were largely 
cosrnet i C. "'ýý 
This was particularly apparent in Cooper's response to 
membership demands for greater inolvement in collective 
bargaining. Largely based on members comparing their 
opportunities to participate in decision-making with those of 
work colleagues in the TGWU, these demands produced a number 
of Congress resolutions in the mid-1960s asking the union to 
consider introducing a form of trade group structure. 
Cooper's view was that: 
"the best course would be to graft on to what we 
already have such changes as current cirr_t.. unstances 
warrant... 
''While we were carrying out our investigations we 
became even more convinced of the merits of our way of 
organising ourselves. If a union is not to 
disintegrate, it needs central decision-making. On the 
other hand, over-centralisation can lead to rigidity. 
Our structure, in my view, gives us the best of both 
worlds. ""4 
The grudging introduction of a fe-w industrial conferences, 
however, did little to assuage membership demands for more 
fundamental reform. They were given extremely limited powers 
and no clear guidelines for their operation. The result was 
that regional secretaries and national officers were 
responsible for their running and, since many of them were 
hostile to the proposals, interpreting them as a threat to 
their authority, most of them either did not take place or 
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their influence was virtually non-existent. 
The limited reforms of the,. union's officer structure in 1965, 
similarly, did little or nothing to solve the problem, widely 
recognised by both leaders and members, that their perpetual 
rival the TGWU, and increasingly NIUF'E, were Far better 
organised at the local level and were leaping ahead in 
recruiting members. It was felt that the solution to this 
problem was the creation of a new grade of officer, the 
branch administrative officer, to fill the vacuum between the 
membership and the primarily industrially based and of 
necessity remote regional officers. The details of the 
reform were not examined thoroughly, however, and, by not 
specifying any clear role for the new grade of officer, 
created a recipe for confusion. In effect, this gave 
regional secretary's the scope to implement or to ignore 
these reforms as they saw fit. 
The internal union politics of the reform were noticeably 
clearer. It served to restrict the potential for powerful 
lay full-time branch secretaries to exercise influence within 
the union at national level by incorporating them in to the 
union's officer structure. By introducing the new grade the 
leadership cleverly gave full-time branch secretaries a 
difficult choice: they could apply to become branch 
administrative officers and as an employee of the union they 
would have to give up their elected places can the regional 
council, committee or at higher levels of the union; or they 
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could remain in elected Mice and give up their branch 
secretary ships, thereby losing their natural base for 
organising support. Whichever option was chosen, very few 
were allowed to remain full-time lay branch secretaries, and 
the position of the leadership was strengthened. 
The attitudes of Cooper and many of the national officers 
inevitably fostered membership opposition to the leadership 
and by the end of the Sixties the 0MB was showing all the 
characteristics of a worn out and over-heated pressure 
cooker: there was growing shoe floor pressure to have a 
greater say in industrial disputes and in industrial policy 
generally; pressure for reform of the union's outdated 
organisation; and pressure to do something about the union's 
stagnant membership. These pressures were manifested in the 
Pi l ki ngton 's dispute in the early summer of 19700 which was 
the first major strike at the factory for a century. 
The dispute of Pi l ki ngton 's glass workers in St Helens began 
as a small stoppage over the miscalculation of wages. It 
escalated into a strike of over 10,000 workers, nearly all of 
them GMB members. The union branch supported the strike, but 
the union's executive refused to make the strike official and 
a confrontation rapidly developed between the union's 
leadership and the rank-and-file strike committee, which 
totally overshadowed the substantive strike issue. As an 
account written during and immediately after the dispute 
noted. 
67 
"by the third week of the strike Pilkingtons receded 
into the background - the firm was beginning to wonder 
if the strike had anything to do with them at all. As 
regards the union the Rank-and-File Strike Committee 
had no feelings of ambivalence whatever - just 
complete, uncomplicated feelings of betrayal. " 
The s"L-ri ire 1e sted seven wF? ek. s and during all. of that time 
there was open mF., r bvtt, en the RFSC and thr-a union's 
leadership. Cooper accused, incorrectly, the RFSC of "red 
subversion, " claimed the strike was being led by Communists 
and Maoists, and alleged that hooliganism, violence and 
intimidation were rife. Other members of the union's 
executive condemned the strikers in similar terms. 
For their part the RFSC organised a May day procession led by 
pall-bearers carrying a coffin inscribed NUGMW - RIP. '' They 
also tried to bypass union officials completely, attempting 
to negotiate a settlement through the Mayor and two local 
Members of Parliament. The strike ended only after both 
sides accepted the offer of mediation by the TUC and, in its 
final stages, the RFSC distributed forms instructing 
Pi l ki ngton 's to stop deducting union dues from its wages and 
attempted, ultimately unsuccessfully, co establish a 
breakaway union. t 
The Plkington's strike w. -as ee;; tremEaly corrosive to the union's 
public image. It produced banner headlines in the national 
daily press and a particularly acrimonious Granada TV debate 
between the strikers and union ofificials focused public 
opinion on the union's internal problems. The dispute also 
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profoundly influenced David Einsnett, who was the national 
i. nduccrial officer for the glass industry at the time. Whilc-? 
Eisnett had a low opinion of some of the strike leaders, he 
felt the full brunt of membership dissatisfaction with the 
union, suffering the ignominy of being shouted down at a 
mass-meeting. "t3 The experience confirmed his belief that 
reform of the union was essential. 
After Pilkington's it was simply no longer credible to assert 
that all the union needed was to graft on minor changes to 
the union's organisation, though Cooper and the "old guard" 
of national officers and regional secretaries still tried to 
do so. The long term significance of the Pilkington's 
dispute, therefore, was the impetus it gave to those in the 
union who supported reform and the culmination of this was 
the election of David Basnett as general secretary. In this 
sense Pilkington's "acted as a catalyst for other changes not 
immediately related to it""" increasing membership demands 
not only for greater access to the decision-making process on 
bargaining issues, but for industrial conferences and for 
closer contact with full-time officers. 
The GMB in the Cooper era has been summarised as being a 
union in which "a conservative organisational bias 
traditionally complemented an authoritarian (and nepotistic) 
leadership and right-wing politics. "1° It is not an unfair 
description of the union at that time. When Basnett took up 
office, however, in the aftermath of the Pi l ki ngton's 
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dispute, the prevailing mood among the membership was for 
change. Nevertheless, the entrenched conservatism of many of 
the regional secretaries, in a union which has traditionally 
given a great deal of autonomy to its regions, and the 
opposition to any reform o+ a number of national officers, 
presented formidable obstacles to any attempts to 
f undame ri±. al. ly overhaul the union's structure.?. 1"creover , the 
GMB' a business Unionism attitudes and i: b9n«+i. t ni^i entcd 
apprc tc: h had been deeply embedded and would not easily be 
rnmoved. This was Basnntt 's inheritance. 
It provides the base For sýiab Fýcý+ýteýrit_ chapters which sere k: to 
a ssc_s the impact that the change in the GMF3' s organisation 
,. nd attitudes that have occurred since Easnett -took off ä. ce 
have had on membership participation in decision-making. 
This begins by examining the union at. national level.. 
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Chanter-3 
MEMBERSHIP PARTICIPATION AND THE 
NATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 
, 
As Chapter One noted, the Webb `s were the first to apply 
seriously the parliamentary modal of democracy to trade 
unions. In their research at the turn at the century they 
di scover-ed : 
"the appearance in the trade union world of the 
typically modern form of democracy, the elected 
representative assembly, appointing and controlling an 
executive committee under whose discretion the permanent 
official staff perform its work. ' 
This approach was followed by much of the earlier literature 
an trade union organisation" and was, at least in part, 
inspired by the overt importance that most union leaders and 
members attached to the representative structures of their 
annual conferences. This is still apparent in the GMD. As 
the union's chairman told the second conference of the 
amalgamated union in 1983, "Congress is the supreme 
Parliament of the union. "" More recent studies, however, 
have recogni od that power is often wielded through informal 
processes, though these have tended to focus on the local. 
level" with only one or two exceptions. -'s 
The dynamics of the formal and informal processes through 
which power is exercised has been termed the union's 
"political system: " an "institutional framework ... within 
which internal forces co-operate and/or contend and policies 
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are formulated and implemented. ' The scope of this chapter 
is narrower than this definition, since policy implementation 
in the GMB on non-hargai ni psi . admi ni Strat 
i ve issues and many 
bargaining issues is dependent on the co-operation and 
interpretation of regional secretaries, which is examined in 
later chapters. lt focuses on the national political system, 
by which is meant the relationship between Congress, the 
ºgeneral secretary and the Executive Council. 
Since the 1992 amalgamation the GMB has had three Executive 
Councils; a Central Executive Council and separate Executive 
Councils for the GMW and Boilermakers sections. This is a 
temporary measure and the 1987 Congress has agreed that a 
single Executive Council be formed. " For clarity and 
simplicity the term Executive Council has been used 
throughout this study when referring to the principal 
decision-making body at national level, though, since 1982, 
it should, strictly speaking, be called the Central Executive 
Council. 
Inevitably, the highly regionalised nature of the GMB is 
still apparent in discussions of the operation of the union 
at a national level because of the regionalised basis of 
membership of the Executive Council, where regional 
secretaries have traditionally attended as of right. It is 
not, however, the primary focus of this chapter. This is to 
delineate the types of decisions taken at a national level. 
the vc rtica1 dispersion of power - and to examine the scope 
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within the GMB'a national political system for the membership 
to participate in those decisions -- the horizontal dispersion 
of power at the national l vel. The chapter develops the 
theme y of union organisation and union attitudes introduced 
in the previous chapter. 
The national pol i. ti cal item 
They GMB's rules govern the basic relationships between the 
union's annual. Congress, the general secretary and the 
Executive Council. They vest "supreme authority" in 
Congress' where representation is on a regional basis with 
one delegate for each 2,000 member s. 0 The main decision- 
making business of Congress is "the consideration and 
determination of internal questions of policy affecting the 
general, industrial, political or social welfare of the 
members. "" Congress is further given the power to remove any 
member or members of the Executive Council and appoint their 
successors. 10 
Constitutionally, the Executive Council is charged with 
responsibility for the government of the union and the 
conduct of trade disputes. '' It is given powers even beyond 
those explicitly provided for by rule, since the union's 
rules provide that it: 
"may exercise all and any such powers and perform all 
such acts, duties and obligations as may be necessary to 
attain or are incidental to or conducive to the 
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attainment of the objects and genoral interests of 
the 
Union whether such powers, duties and obligations are 
specifically mentioned in these rules or not. " 12 
Any decision reached by the Executive Council is 
constitutionally binding on members' and, if necessary, the 
Executive holds the power to suspend or disband any region or 
regional council.. ' `+ It is also the "supreme authority" over 
all the r3MB'S officers'' including the general secretary. ''''- 
The GtiB's rules give very few formal powers to its general 
secretary. Although he has right to attend and speak at 
Executive Council meetings1 his de jure role is purely 
administrative. The rule hook specifies that: "he shall be 
responsible for the conduct of all correspondence, keeping 
all hooks, documents, papers and accounts, " *O and for 
controlling the finances of the union. '" In reality, 
however, the views of the general secretary, as the de facto 
leader of the union, naturally carry great weight both with 
Executive Council members and delegates to Congress. 
Congress and membership participation 
The main opportunity for the membership to participate in 
decision-making at national level is through Congress, the 
union's representative assembly. This, can be done by 
branches submitting resolutions to be debated at Congress and 
through electing delegates to attend as the region's 
representatives. Regional elections, including those for the 
Congress delegation, are examined in detail in Chapter 5, but 
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it hould be noted at this point that the union's rules, do not. 
facilitate informed decision-making in these elections. 
The rule book specifies that branches "may submit motions on 
any subject" for inclusion in the Congress agenda. The 
procedure is that these proposals have to be forwarded to the 
regional secretary by the and of January who has to send them 
to the general secretary within a wee . "° No limit is placed 
on the number of resolutions that a branch can submit; one 
Militant controlled branch in Liverpool, to take an etreme 
example, sent 27 resolutions to its regional secretary in 
19E35. There is no guarantee, however, that once these 
resolutions appear on the preliminary Congress agenda they 
will be debated at Congress. To stand a chance of this they 
must first be placed on the final Congress agenda published 
in May. This is compiled following individual regional. 
delegation meetings, which comprise the regional secretary, 
the elected delegates and one third of the regions full-time 
officers who attend Congress as ex-officio delegates. "* 
At the ragi. onal delegation stage the Executive Council, the 
regional secretary and the full--time officers all have a 
chance to make their views known. The delegations discuss 
not only whether motions originating from their own region 
should go forward to the final agenda, but also their 
position on the issues contained in resolutions and documents 
from the Executive Council and in important resolutions from 
other regions. Fis far as a region's own resolutions are 
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concerned the delegation can decide to support or withdraw 
motions, or allow them to stand but be moved without the 
support of the region. 
interview evidence and observation at the 1985 Congress 
suggests that the Liverpool and Northern regions tend to 
allow motions to be moved without their support while the 
Birmingham region does not. Nearly all of the Liverpool 
Number 5 branch's 27 resolutions were moved in this way. One 
Birmingham region delegate to the 1985 Congress said he was 
"disgusted" with the way the delegation meeting was run 
claiming "there was no discussion, the regional secretary got 
up and told us how we were going to vote. " Delegates to the 
1982 and 1984 Congresses"" told similar stories about the 
lack of lay participation in delegation meeting. In the 
Northern region delegation meetings decision-making appears 
to be consensual. The views of the regional secretary and 
the officers are very similar to those of the members, 
reflecting the homogenous political culture of Northern trade 
unionism, but it is accepted that it is the members who make 
the final decision. In the Liverpool region, however, 
decision-making is factional and dependent on the political 
balance between the lay delegates. 
The research evidence clearly suggests that lay participation 
in regional delegation meetings varies considerably from 
region to region. It is principally dependent on two 
+actors: the electoral system which produces these 
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de-legation s-, (which will. be examined in a later chapter) ; and 
the di. f+er'ent political attitudes and levels of political 
activity o+ regions (which will be discussed 
later in this 
chapter). Some indication of the different regional 
traditions of political activity, however, can be gained 
from 
the number of motions each submits to Congress and this can 
he identified through content analysis of the Congress final 
agenda. Table 3.1 breaks down the resolutions submitted 
to 
the 1985 Congress into regions. 
-r ., I- I--I 
Motions appearing on the 1986 final Congress 
agenda analysed 
by resgion. 
R(:? qi on 
Bi rmi ngh. -im 
Nlorthprn 
Liverpool 
London 
Southern 
South West 
Lancashire 
Yorkshire 
Midlands °u". E Coast 
Scottish 
Number of motions 
4 
20 
12 
21 
31 
2 
16 
/I" 
24 
21 
SOURCE: 1.985 Preliminary Conc rF. a s Agenda. 
Even if motions reach the final Congress agenda this does not 
mean that they will be debated. This will dopend on the 
standing orders committee which is appointed prior to 
Congress. It has one member per region and Executive Council 
members are excluded from its member ship. =& It is not 
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unusual, however, for senior members of this committee to 
have served on it continuously for ten or more years and have 
close contacts with the qvMral secretary and Executive 
Council members who may offer advice in certain instances. 
Agenda management of the type noted in the Labour party, "''' 
therefore, is possible through the standing orders committee 
which has the power to ask a delegation again to withdraw a 
motion, composite it with others, or not timetable it for 
discussion. The standing orders committee can also 
disqualify motions and it has adopted the practice of 
declaring out of order any motion which would require a rule 
amendment to put into effect, involves joint industrial 
council matters, or could be referred to a national 
industrial conference. 
The GMB 's annual Congress is limited, therefore, to the 
discussion of non-bargaining issues and bargaining issues of 
a very general nature. There are also formidable 
organisational barriers which can prevent controversial or- 
left-wing resolutions from being debated at Congress. The 
result is that the OMB's Congress is sanitised and most of 
its debates uncontroversial. The important resolutions at 
Congress are nearly always those in the name of the Executive 
Council and their recommendation on other resolutions is 
nearly always acct p"ked. 
An interesting comparison can be made with the annual. 
conference of the National Communications Union, which in 
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1985 was held at the same time and place as the UMB's 
Congress. Anyone visiting Blackpool that week could be 
forgiven for thinking that-.. it was the NCU not the GMB that 
was Britain's second largest trade union. Less than a sixth 
of the size of the GMB it had nearly three times more 
delegates to its conference. Members rather than officers 
dominated debates and its Executive was defeated on a number 
of resolutions. Similar findings were discovered when the 
union's political system was studied a decade ago. '"" In 
comparison the GMB appeared staid and boring. Wh il ce the fact 
that the NCU discusses its pay claim at conference explains 
part of the reason for its vitality, so too does its 
factionalism, which is hardly evident in the 0MB. There 
seems particularly : Little : justification for the CMB's 
relatively small number of Congress delegates, one per two 
thousand members, when the larger TGWU manages one per 
thousand members at its jiennia7. Delegate Conferences. 
The eCLAti VE': Council and the general secretary 
'rherc. ý have baef. rn two cie r-i ý: a ans to cli<ýricýr. I7c-_+ r_artýpats: i. -L-. i on of 
-the union's nationý: ýi rcepre nntZAtive in sti. "tutions since : 1.970. 
The first in 1975 saw the di sbzindmcant of the general council 
and the national ex cut i ve and its replacement with a single 
ExecuL"ivf? COLAncil. The second, agreed It the union's 1987 
Congress, has still to be implemented, but involves changing 
the method of election of the F;: ecuti. vp Council and including 
reserved seats for women. 
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delegates at recgional council meetings. Nevertheless, 
Edmonds' voice has been influential in the union agreeing, 
for the first time, to, resw-ve seats on its Executive Council. 
for women. The new Executive Council will comprise 40 
delegates elected by individual ballot rather than this 
customary branch block vote. Each region will elect four 
delegates; one seat is a separate contest for women 
candidates only; in the other three all lay members and the 
regional secretary are eligible to stand. 
The prospect of a regional secretary not sitting on the 
union's main national body, which is possible under the new 
rules, would have been unthinkable even ten years ago. The 
new rules, however, should not be thought to be necessarily a 
further dilution of the power of regional secretaries, even 
though numerically this is the case. The politics of the 
reform proposals evinced the continued influence of the 
regional secretaries. There were three different options on 
how to comply with the 1984 Fact: elect a totally lay EC; 
allow regional secretaries to attend as non-voting members; - 
and allow regional secretaries to stand for election to the 
EC. Ambitious regi. onal secretaries, wanting to maintain 
their influence on the Executive Council, ensured that the 
latter option was adopted. It remains to be seen whether, as 
one regional secretary interviewed said, "no regional 
secretary worth their salt should ever get defeated. '' 
The Executive Council appoints both standing and ad hoc sub- 
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Prior to 1975 the general council was, according to the 
union's rules, the final althori ty of the union between 
Congresses. "" It comprised the chairman, general secretary, 
the ten regional secretaries and fourteen lay members, one 
from each region, plus an extra one from the four largest 
regions to ensure that lay memers were in a majority. 
Most 
national officers used to attend in an advisory capacity. It 
met only every two months, however, and the important 
decision-making body was the national executive which 
comprised ten members, one from each region, split equally 
between regional secretaries and lay members. In 1975 under 
Basnett's guidance this was replaced by a single Executive 
Council comprising the chairman, general secretary, and three 
members from each region, one of which was to be the regional 
secretary. The reform, therefore, although not moving to an 
all lay executive such as in the TGWU, which would have been 
politically unacceptable to the regional secretaries, 
extended the opportunity for lay membership participation in 
national decision-making. 
There i. a parallel between this reform, instituted shortly 
after Gasnett came to office, and the 1987 reform, agreed 
shortly after Edmonds' election as general secretary. In the 
1987 case, however, the initiative for reform has stemmed 
from the legal requirements of the Government's 1984 trade 
union act. This necessitates a directly elected Executive 
Council, instead of the normal GME practice of electing lay 
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delegates at regional council meetings. Nevertheless, 
Edmond".: n' voif. _E? has been ir'1tiLu ntial in the union agreeing, 
for the Ur st time, t0, reserve Seats on its Executive Council 
for women. The new Executive Council will comprise 40 
delegates elected by individual ballot rather than the 
customary branch block vote. Each region will elect +our 
delegates; one seat is a separate contest for women 
candidates only in the other three all lay members and the 
regional secretary are eligible to stand. 
The prospect of a regional secretary not sitting on the 
union's main national body, which is possible under the new 
rules, would have been unthinkable even ton years ago. The 
new rules, however, should not he thought to be necessarily a 
further dilution of the power- of regional secretaries, even 
though numerically this is the case. The politics of the 
reform proposals evinced the continued influence of the 
regional secretaries. There were three different options on 
how to comply with the 1984 Act: elect a totally lay EC; 
allow regional secretaries to attend as non-voting members; 
and allow regional secretaries to stand for election to the 
EC. Ambitious regional secretarieas, wanting to maintain 
their influence on the Executive Council, ensured that the 
latter option was adopted. It remains to be seen whether, as 
one regional secretary interviewed said, "no regional 
secretary worth their salt should ever get defeated. '' 
They Exocutivc.? Council appoints both standing and ad hoc sub- 
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there-Fore, provided va rare opportunity 
for -factional 
activity to r?!? YerCgl? morn. ei will bC? (iI i cLäSed 
C t-i,: kngr? s Under rizasr1E tt 
It is widely felt among (3MB members and officers that the 
union became more democratic under pia snett 's stewardship. 
This general aceptance is a significant testament to 
Basnett's abilities. As Chapter Two showed, he inherited a 
union with an out-dated organisation, right--wing politics, 
and anti-strike and clientelist attitudes with powerfully 
entrenched vested interests opposing reform. Examining all 
the organisational and attitudinal changes that took place 
under E(asnett 's leadership, however, would be an enormous 
task and is not attempted. It would also not bei particularly 
relevant. The purpose of this study is to examine the (MB's 
democracy, not write its history, and its focus:, is on 
decision-making processes, not on the detail of the decisions 
themselves. 
For the record, apart from the 1992 amalgamation, the most 
significant changes that have occurred in the OMB's 
organisation over the past fifteen years have been the 
introduction of the industrial conference structure, changes 
in officer structure, the reform of the general council and 
national executive, the introduction of the equal rights 
Be 
machinery, and the changes required to the Executive Council 
under the i98 Trade Union Act. Since membership 
participation in collectiv bargaining is a major point of 
reference for this study and as pol icy implementation has 
been crucial to officer structure changes, which, in any 
event were largely determined before Fa snett took office, the 
first two of these changes are discussed separately in 
Chapter- Si;:. 
Within the organisational and attitudinal changes that 
Basnett was instrumental in generating, three separate themes 
encouraging membership participation can be identified. 
First, the extension of lay participation in decisions taken 
at national level on bargaining and non-bargaining issues. 
Second, reforms to encourage greater participation in the 
union's structures of over a third of the GMB' s members, 
women. 'Third, the attempts to encourage a higher membership 
involvement in political activities. The first of these 
themes indicates the discretion that the general secretary 
has at national. Level; the other two show the limitations, 
emoh: 'asi vinCj how national initiatives need regional commitment 
and ca-operation. They will he examined in turn. 
Changes at national level 
The reforms of the GMB't; organisation in the B s-anet. t era were 
all debated and approved at Congre a. Asp the e:: arni nati on of 
the operation of the GMB 's.. -, national political system has 
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revealed, however, while these and other major policy issues 
require Congress approval, the GMB 's general secretary 
is in 
a powerful position to make- pol i c_y within the union on non- 
bargaining issues. Nevertheless, there are constraints on 
his position: he has to win the support of enough regions to 
get his proposals through the Executive Council and Congress. 
These constraints are more likely to be apparent in the case 
of administrative issues, which encroach on the -fiefdom of 
the regional secretaries or lay executive members, than they 
are on political issues where there is more likely to be 
agreement. 
The reality of decision-making in the GMB, therefore, is that 
proposals to reform the union's organisation need to secure a 
majority on the Executive council to have any chance of 
success and this requires skilful diplomacy on the part of 
the general secretary. The change from the old general 
council and national executive structure reflects the 
strategies that need to be adopted. The proposals finally 
implemented represented a compromise between the different 
interests. Basnett was able to use the discontent of half of 
they regional secretaries who were excluded from the main 
policy making body, the national executive, to construct a 
majority with independent thinking lay members, which 
produced a single Executive Council with a higher proportion 
of lay membership. 
Membership pre Ct.. ire ha been n important factor in 
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fzicili. ta tinq orgixrn: isation, ý.. x1 chr nge. The catalytic effect of 
the ! -ilkington's dispute was the most obvious manifestation 
of this, but fundamental try later organisational reforms has 
been the practice, cultivated by F3asnett, of extensively 
consulting the membership on change proposals. This opening 
up of the policy--making process was in marked contrast to his 
predecessor and reflected both Basnett's personal preference 
for consensual change and his recognition that grass-roots 
support could be used effectively against intransigent 
elements on the Executive Council. The consolidation of the 
industrial conference structure in 1981 and the Decision 84 
proposals' were carried following a period of consultation 
lasting nearly two years. 
The consultation process, although a significant improvement 
on policy formulation in the Cooper era, nevertheless had its 
limitations. Consultation on policy proposals not policy 
options took place. The scope for membership participation 
in influencing decisions was effectively limited, therefore, 
to suggesting minor improvements or alterations to the 
consultative document rather than making fundamental changes. 
Moreover, while branches received copies of the consultative 
proposals and could codify their comments in resolutions, the 
consultation process on the reform of the industrial 
conference structure revolved round regions forming a 
collective view and expressing it at Congress, making any 
comments easily susceptible to entrenched regional interests. 
Consultation was improved on Decision 84's proposals with 
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branches submitting views to their region, which passed them 
an to head office, as well as being able to submit 
Congress 
resolutions. The importance of this consultation, however, 
is better seen as legitimating difficult decisions that the 
Executive Council were taking than affording members with a 
realistic opportunity to participate in policy formulation. 
At least as significant as the organisational 
partial opening up of policy makinq that occur 
Basnctt era were the changes that occurred in 
attitudes. The principal changes that can be 
were the GMB's moving away from its "business 
attitudes and its shift towards the centre of 
changes and the 
-red during the 
union 
distinguished 
uni on i srn" 
the trade i_urii on 
movement. It is not possible, however, to identify one 
decision, or even .a number of decisions, which produced key 
changes in the union's business unionism attitudes since this 
attitude is as much an impression or image as it is 
substance. This complicates analysis, but four factors 
indicate some of the variations in the scope and in the role 
of membership narticipation in this change. 
First, Biasnett was, central figure in the union's gradual 
movement away from business unionism. His mainagement style 
set the tone for the union. As shown in the organisational 
reforms, this was consensual and tried to involve membership 
participation rather than authoritarian. Second, although a 
model can be set nationally the general secretary cannot 
ensure that it is adopted regionally. A number-W regions 
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c: cDnticlued v: Ito buE-äifl¬s unions S' 31 ttitud Lis s> thr0Ugh Ut hls 
period of office. nt. 'spi. tm t; lsn"'? t. h oncourFaginc the union to 
toov tnward -i a more workp1t: 1cE? -bct ämd 
branch structure which 
would encourage membership participation in the union, the 
Lancashire 
region, in particular, maintained its tradition of 
large general branchr? "-.; and, as the next chapter shows, branch 
structures varied widely in di f ferc2nt regions. 
Third, apart from regional variations in the prevalence of 
business unionism, t. hero are also variations within regions 
and industries. This is because a large part of business 
unionism is concerned with the relationship between of+ice"rc 
and members and varies according to individual national and 
regional officers. Lastly, business unionism attitudes, 
particularly the union's anti-strike image, had been 
increasingly rejected by the membership during the latter 
part of Cooper's leader-ship, w: i. th Pi1. kington's being one of a 
string of examples. It had become increasingly untenable as 
a philosophy for a union which wanted to attract and maintain 
memhhrm. 
The l: rans+ormati. on of the GMB From 4i right-wing to a centrist 
union in the TI. lu and the Labour party can be morF 
straightforwardly attributed to the personal influence of its 
general secretary. While the union's position on major 
political issues is determined at Congress, such as the 
decision to support 1.1ni. l Ater l nuclear disarmament taken at 
the 19S S Congress, the general secretary, with the ExcecLtive 
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Council 
g 
has the Down r to determine policy as issues arise. 
Furt. hFer.. mor""e,, as tho "::: lmbac scador" of one of Britain's largest 
unions he 1.: ': ry more or .1os expected 
to play a major role in 
the wider trade union movement and in the Labour party. The 
general snretar"y thus has considerable discretion to +arm his 
own judgement an the union's attitude to events in this field 
and to use his ability to ensure that:. it is backed up by the 
Executive Counci. l and ultimately Congress. 
Basnett has played a pivotal role in the trade union and 
Labour movement since the mid-1970s. By his own account this 
role has been obsessional 1. y centrist. """ He served 
continuously an the TUC general council from 1966, when he 
succeeded to a national of+i. c: rr- seat, through to his 
retirement at the end of 1965 As the senior member of the 
union side of the National Economic Development Council, the 
"Noddy Six, " he was heavily involved in the t; ri. --part i try 
negotiations during the 1974--79 Labour Government and a 
strong supporter of the Government's social contract pay 
policy. More recently, he led the TUC first out of and then 
back: J. in to i`"11=P. C over- the Gover"nmen"i_ ' ý. w i. thdr aw-aI of trade 
union rights at GCHQ. He Also called for disciplinary action 
to he taken against the PEU and the EETPU for taking 
Government money for postal ballots and was one of the 
leading voices behind the changes in the TUC's structure to 
mate it more representative by automatically a]. ]. ot: i nC] seats 
-t-. o t. trii. mris. -, with over 100, i000 members. 
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In the Labour party, : aasnett was prominent:. not only in 
maintaining the union's tradition of loyal support, but 
played a highly significant part in shaping policy on 
economic and industrial policy after 1979. This was done 
through the TUC-Labour party liaison committee to which 
Basnett 's head of research and close supporter, Larry Whi tty, 
was secretary. The key parts of the 1983 election manifesto 
were little more than ,- compendium of statements issued by 
the committee. F. asnett and Wh: itty were prominent in 
M eloping the central economic policy proposal for a 
"national economic assessment" to agree the overall level of 
wages in the economy, and Bannett played an important role in 
persuading c: )-ther trade unions to support this policy. 
The GMD under i3aünett has also been intimately involved wi. tl°h 
the more mundane areas of Labour party finance and 
administration. I3asnett chaired the party's 1978 committee 
of inquiry into its structure, organisation and finances. I t. 
was also through his initiative as general. - secretary that 
Trade Unionists for a Labour Victory was formed in 1991 to 
provide funds for the party and ; {gasnett acted as its "f i r- st 
chi rp r son . 
Women's participation in decision-making 
IJomr.? rn c-omprisca 34 per cent of thcl C3I1B': s member-chip but have 
traditionally pl ayec1 a very minor part in the union. For the 
first time-, however , the LAMB under T3ý. k is in the 197th began 
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to address itself seriously to the problem of encouraging 
greater women's participation in the union, which has led to 
the recent decision that one quarter of the seats on the 
reformed Executive Council will be reserved for women. 
In many ways, the new proposals for reserved seats for women 
that were controversially agreed at the 1987 Congres's'" turn 
the union full circle. When the main separate women's trade 
union, the National Federation of Women Workers merged with 
the National Union of General Workers in 1921, it did so as a 
separate national "region" and although this changed a year 
later there were still separate women's branches, a women's 
department at head office, and women were to be entitled to 
separate representation at Congress and on the union's 
General. Council. -' After the 1924 amalgamation, however, the 
role of the women's department and women's representation was 
quickly marginalised and Margaret Bondfield, the women's 
officer and a Minister in the first Labour government, had to 
be persuaded not to resign in protest. '" From this point the 
influence of women within the union declined steadily. 
The need to encourage greater women's participation in the 
union was recognised in the 1976 reforms of the Industrial 
Conference structure which also set up regional and national 
equal rights conferences to provide a platform for the 
articulation of issues of special concern to women members. 
A year later the Executive Council, under Basnett 's 
influence, agreed that each region should designate an Equal 
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Rights to i mprovr? r. _ommi. irni cations 
be': tviea¬ n women 
fnembc= rs ; 1nd the 1'lati C? n a11r? vei. y 
Ill-At tE'lc:? '_-m fP. f? asllress wore not 
successful in getting mar*. warnen Participating in the union. L- 
As a result, following : Tiot. i on. a referred to it from the 
1970 
and 1979 Congresses, the E ncut. i. ve Council set up regional. 
equal ri ghts advisory committees 
to encourage greater women''. --, 
involvement in the union believing that the annual regional. 
and national equal rights conferences "might be more 
effective it there was some linkage 
between them and a 
continuous forum for discussion of equal rights as applied 
to 
women v: iorkErs. '-1 
The 1904 regional equal rightm conference in the Birmingham 
region hi ghl. i c, ht ad some of the difficulties in increasing 
women's participation in the union. While there was no 
doubting the enthusiasm of the forty or so delegates present 
and the genuineness of the desire to improve the position of 
women in the union, a lack of procedural awareness, a problem 
in an overwhelmingly manual union and not just related to 
women, tended to prevent suggestions being pursued in the 
most effective m; nnC? r. One of the workshops that were held, 
following prompting from the outside r_hai. r°, reported back 
proposals for the national equal rights conference to be 
allowed to submit resolutions to Congress and to choose 
rembE)rs; who would have reserved s t, ä on thm E: ((:! cL. tti VC.. ' 
Council.. It also argu¬¬2d for the rc: -: gional (.:? qua-. l rights 
confer'enco to f1Ieet cdelegatc } to the regional 7UC and Labour 
P'ar'ty , "aornon's conferences (ad: pr e swrit they are appointed by 
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the regional committee). But the response to these proposals 
'. -)i. i not to c_odifv "l hem in a resal. ut. ion y l. lltý'rtS add rammen±ing 
on the absence of the regipnal secretary during the report 
back stage, the chairperson said "very interesting ... it is 
a shame the c f4er didn't hear it. " Likewise, there were 
very few resolutions submitted to the conference and of 
six tabled three had been written by the regional equal. 
rights officer on behalf of the committee. 
In the Birmingham rc: eq i on : ome members of the oc1pal. rights 
committee have become di si. l1 usi onc-ci ahoL. Lt its lack of 
progress. These feeling have arisen from the failure of 
attempts to reform the r eainn'n sick pay scheme to include 
pregnancy related illnesses and because of the lack of co- 
operation of certain powerful lay branch secretaries and 
district officers who, it was said, had "incredibly sexist'' 
attitudes. There has also been tension between the equal 
rights committee and the regional committee, with the latter 
blocking some of the equal right<s, committee's initiatives, 
refusing to provide money for a women's rally or for a joint 
political education course with the Labour party for women 
only. 
In contrast, the regional committee in the Liverpool region 
appears to hu mores sympathetic to women's issues and con {lic: 
has not arisen; indeed the region also supports an ad hoc 
race relations committee. The Birmingham experience, 
however, has been better than some other regions. By 1994 
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only the FBi. rrn: i. ngh . rr;, Liverpool , NcorthE,, r-n and Midlands and 
East Coast regions had properly functioning equal right: 
committees and, at least, 4he Birmingham region, for the % 
first time, did not have any men on its committee. This is 
still not the case at national level: the 1993 national equal 
rights conference held in December had only 35 delegates of 
whom 15 were men. It did, nevertheless, overwhelmingly pass 
motion:, on reserved suats which were defeated the year 
previously. 
Women's participation in the OMB's decision making bodies at 
national and regional level, despite ihr: equal rights 
structure changes, has been extremely low. There was only 
one woman delegate to the 1983-85 Executive Council and only 
three women have ever served as members.;, As Table 3.2 shows, 
in no region does the proportion of women on the regional 
counci. l reach one quarter; the Scottish region, where women 
total nearly half the GMB's membership, comes closest with 24 
per cent. Arguably the best region for the number of women 
it has can the regional council iss Liverpool , with Birmingham 
the worst, and the Northern region close to bottom. The 
problem, however, seems to be that women are not getting 
nominated to the regional council rather than they are being 
discriminated against in the electoral contest. 
Regional committee vvomE'. rl's rc-, pressen-taticrn is even lY1t7rc 
1imi"ted. Only one womr:: an was nominated for elec: 'tjon to the 
1983--65 regional committee in each a-f the, "t-hr ca ýAudy 
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regions, candidatures being st_tcce : s-fu] in Birmingham and 
Liverpool but not in the Northern region. r 1e situation is 
no better in the other GM£ -region . Only the London and 
Southern regions have two women on their committee, the 
Yorkshire and Midland and East Coast regions have none and 
the rest one. Si. mi. i ar y, women are under-rcpresentated at 
Congress. At the important 1984 Congrnss there was only one 
woman delegate from the Birmingham region and 35 men. In 
total out of the 472 Congress relocates only 50 were women. 
Table 3.2 
Analysis of r oqi ona7. pnr-r_entage of wr3m(F? n m 'rhC? ry and 
percentage of women nominatnd and elected to the M93-23 
regional council. 
izccai can Women % Nomi. n -If. e d% E1 c ctr. d 
Bi rmi ngham 22.0 4.0 5.1. 
I.. 
_c'lncfci`: 
f'1: i r.?? 30.0 8.4 10.3 
Liverpool 34.0 14.0 17.1 
London 13.5 7.3 7.3 
Midland ?<F. . C. 28. 10.9 6.3 
Northern 30.2 8.1 9.1. 
Scottish 47.1 18.4 24.0 
Southern 26.5 U. 0 11.8 
South West 36.4 na 1.4. '. 
York hi. rc 3 6.: 3 8.0 9.6 
SOUJRCE C'. {al. c: º. º1 1-. od -From _EiMEIATU 
(1_9E34c) p l, 3.1. and 
rcýc Icna1 ýýc_reýt: aricý[_a !c r-ii-. -_ 
Women ar' al o under-represented on union training courses, 
particularly on advanced and specialised courses. in 1983, 
20 per cent of i: "3MB members attending the TUC; Stage One Course 
were women, but the proportion on the Stage Two Course was 
only 14 per rent and + or spec_ i <al. i sed courses such as on 
i00 
coci ad socur i. t. y br.. nrt itc,., jh i. ch have been . 
hought to be. 
": 7: ': t ' 'L yI°: i. ca", " : -ý r'7 ý-. tr'. "I {: ) in efiqi. 't'. ! /ý cl 
Gs am- . C7 W r- 
,ä+C: 7 t"l r i: ] or 
cent. 
It was pressure +rom women submitting motions to Congress in 
i983 and 1.994 howr:, ver, .. sunr3or_t ed 
by B; asnei t. , which 
led to the 
Executive Counci. l setting up a working party which produced a 
report "Women in the Union". This was debated at Congress 
in 
1985. It recommended that at least one reserved place per 
region he reserved for women when the Executive 
Council was 
re-constituted to comply with the 1984 Trade Union Act and 
was passed with the support of seven of the ten GM9 r agi Uns 
paving the way for the 1997 Congress decision. The task of 
changing ma]. e attitudes in a tradi"F Tonally male dominated 
manual union, however, is a formidable one and, der spite these 
reforms, achieving a significantly higher level of women*s 
participation in the union is likely to remain a problem. 
Participation in political activity: regional di-f rranc 3 
R acme., {- 's close i nvnI vpmont. with the Labour party was both a 
confirmation and a modification a+ the GMB's traditional. 
stance as a loyalist union. While under Cooper the union's 
attitude was to passively, diligently and unquestioningly 
support the vicissitudes of the Labour party leadership's 
thinking on policy matters, Easnett developed a much more 
pro-active role for the GMB on pol i. ti. cz-. al issues . Part 0-f 
this strategy was to encourage membership participation in 
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01i.. I r_. M. ) i°S UMS At ;.. i '1 o ca I : nd rcagi ona1.1 e ve 1. . 
The -following brig Fi urvoytof political activity and 
orgi f1 ation in three` regions rk V(ý? calr=. S7. gn7. +icant 
di"f"tl:? rE? I'? f.: C.? '. ý. '1 CQn't'i. rfn,::, 'khf' I: ]nini" noted earl i. F_r that 
national atti. tudinC:. l changes are not necessarily re +lectc'd 
regionally aric:: l, in highlighting this regional autonomy, it 
reinforces the validity of the +ocus of subsequent chapters, 
It does, however, also show that regional political activity 
is constrained by national union policy. 
It is widely racogni 5E d within the I3MWt. J that the Northern 
region is the most politically organised. This is partly 
function of the union's dominant position among trade unions 
in the North but it is also a legacy of Cunningham's period 
as regional smcr-etary, which exhibited many of the 
characteristics of a "popular has> Odom" . "4 Cunningham was one 
of "more cal our"f ul political -figures"i n the North, a 
"moderate trade union boss. "41 In addition to being Northern 
regional secretary, Cunningham was not nn]. y a member of the 
natianal executive of the Labour par't'y he was also: chairman 
of the Newcastle airport committee and chairman of the 
Tyneside passenger transport authority; a member of the 
Northern planning council and chairman of Durham county 
council, Durham police authority and the (Northumbrian river 
authority. 
Cunningham US ed -hi a. ct nsi. vi n"f ]. ut. ncca to promote both the 
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union and Labour party policies and encouraged the union's 
regional officers to forge close links with the Labour party, 
particularly in local government, as well as encouraging the 
membership to play an active role in politics generally. 
This strategy of focusing on local politics was the only one 
open as campaigning on national political issues was heavily 
circumscribed by the acquiescent policy advocated by Cooper 
nationally. While other trade unions were campaigning 
against the Labour Government's 1968 White Paper "In Place of 
Strife, " including a May day token strike, the GMB in the 
Northern region was almost silent and, when pushed, indicated 
its support for the Government. The region, similarly played 
virtually no part in trade union campaigns in the North 
against the Conservative Government's 1971 Industrial 
Relations Act, reflecting Cooper's equivocal action to the 
legislation. 
While the scope for a region to develop a positive image for 
the union in its area was seriously limited by the union's 
policies under Cooper, this changed under Basnett. The 
Northern region still has close local government links - as 
one regional officer put it "you've got to be in where it 
counts"- but, particularly since Burlison was elected 
regional secretary, the region has extended its campaigning 
on national political issues and improved its political 
organisation. The Northern regional committee regularly 
invites major political figures to speak to the members; the 
first joint engagement of the newly elected Kinnock- 
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Hattcr 3. F? v 1 C.? GLd 2r ship was 
to speak to 2,500 8MB tnemb rs at a 
rally in N(? Uic_iil:: t. lee Political weekend schools and sc? minars 
L 
are a prominent feature and members are strongly encouraged 
to part. i. cipat, a in campaigns and .. 
ic7i. ri the Labour party. 
An important forum in encouraging membercrip participation 
has been 'hhs regular mi c? t i nqs with branch chairs and 
secretaries held quarterly on a county 
basis that Burl i t=on 
has instituted. increasing political awareness amongst the 
membership and improving level. s of political activity have 
been consistently stressed at these meetings and it is 
generally felt that they have been a major succe sss not only 
in improving communications within the region, but also in 
promoting political activism. One measure of this is that 
over 90 per cent of the region 's branches are affiliated to 
local Labour party constituency management committees. While, 
in some regions, the Child's political fund ballot was the 
first organised political activity that members had seen, in 
the Northern region it merely reinforced the message that the 
region was already putting across. 
The political : attitudes of the region's membership can be 
described as predominantly moderate: Labour, or soli. datristic, 
reflecting the political culture of the North as a whole. 
Consequently, although there are political difference=s 
amongst activists in the region, they are expressed within 
relatively narrow parameters and do not dominate what 
happens. Those few members with extreme political views find 
1. ßl4 
it di. f+i c: u t to get them expressed as the scope +or- 
dl sacireemen't is net by the officers who, almost without 
except on, are on the centre-right of the Labour party. A 
number of regional officers i. ntorviowed said that they were 
not prepared to tolerate 6MB delegates to Labour party bodies 
expressing extremist views; ; ": t typical view was that "there is 
no problem with s: incare left-wing Socialists, but individuals 
who wander to the hard left will have their branches 
di. sa+fi. ]. iated»'' 
The situation in the Liverpool region is completely 
different. Politically it can be divided between Liverpool 
and the rest. Outside Liverpool political attitudes are very 
much the same as anywhere else in the country, but within the 
city there : i. sa tradition of political awareness born out of 
hardship and a close sense of community, influenced by 
Catholicism, that is quite distinctive. In certain areas, 
principally local government, these attitudes have been 
exploited by extreme l. e+t-wing elements which have joined the 
ßME. in 1985 the 6! MB was the only union which supported to 
the hitter end the actions of the Militant dominated 
Liverpool city council in its confrontation with the 
Government over refusing to make a rate. Officers freely 
admitted the existence of a Militant faction" within the 
region, even going as far as saying that "if the region 
speaks with one voice it is a Militant one. '' 
Tr'n the Political climate o+ the CMB in Liverpool any rpr3ic3ni1 
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attempt to stimulate membership political participation would 
be otiose. The political organisation system of the Northern 
region is more than unnecessary in the ' L. i verpool. region; it 
would be highly dangerous, giving Militant activists, 
unrepresentative of the membership as a whole, extra 
opportunities to make public statements and influence 6MB 
policy. In short, the radical traditions of Liverpool mean 
that the regional leadership's problems lie more with 
controlling and channelling political activity than they do 
in stimulating it. The region, however, does provide a clear 
example of factional activity, for and against Militant, 
stimulating membership participation in the region's 
decision-making bodies which is examined in more detail in 
later c_hapterss. 
In contrast, the Birmingham region possesses neither the 
political organisation and solidarity of the Northern region 
nor the political partisanship of Liverpool. Membership 
participation on political issues within the union and the 
Labour party and trade union movement is virtually non- 
existent. While the Northern and Liverpool regions, 
parallelling Ijasnett 's national initiatives, have played 
major roles within their respective regional TUC's and in the 
Labour party, the GMB in Birmingham has had no political. 
profile worth speaking of. 
Since Geoff Wheatl y't appointment as rt: ýgiona1 ! -:, c:. cr atary in 
1979 attrm; ptr; tirývcý bepn made to r e-ictify this In his own 
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words, Wheatley has "tried to open the door for more people 
to get involved, " but this has been slow in materialising. 
L, 
in its absence he sees the union's political role as 
"reflecting adequately and properly the views of the members'' 
through utilising the region= officers, who are expected to 
play an active part in regional politics. While, it has been 
reported, his predecessor used to punish officers he did not 
like by appointing them to the regional Labour party, 
Wheatley has chosen people who have an interest in Labour 
party politics and the GMB's image has improved accordingly. 
It nevertheless retains an essentially passive political 
orientation which makes it appear almost as if it has been in 
a time warp. As far as the Birmingham region is concerned, 
gasnett might never have existed, its political attitudes and 
the level of its membership participation are still locked in 
the Cooper era. 
The election of John Edmonds 
The retirement of Easnett as general secretary provided, 
apart from the union's political fund ballot, the Vrst 
opportunity for the membership to vote at a national level 
since his election twelve years previously. The GMB's 
general secretary has considerable power; it is the most 
important post in the union. The election was, therefore, ý-ý 
rare occasion when the membership could participate in 
deciding the type of union they wanted through choosing the 
person who would lead the union in the 1990s. It is thus of 
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prime concern to any study c: o+ membership participation in the 
, MB. 
The t3MB's electinn of its general secretary in 19B5 was held 
at a time when top level changes were occurring in a number 
of trade unions. The EETPtJ had elected Eric Hammond as Frank 
Chappie's successor the year previously. USD(jW had elected 
Garfield Davies, widely regarded as the centrist in a three- 
cornered contest, as its general secretary in the week before 
the GMB's ballot started. The TBWU had just confirmed Ron 
Todd as its general secretary after a straight left--rieht 
fight in a repeat ballot held following allegations of voting 
irregularities in the previous election. While, in the AL. JEW 
candidates had already emerged for the left-right battle to 
elect Terry Duffy's successor as President which was to take 
place shortly after the GMB's general secretary contest. 
The contest which elected John Edmonds as David Basnett 's 
successor, however, unlike those of the other major unions, 
was not fought on party political lines and none of the three 
main candidates took a markedly political stance. To some 
extent this is traditional in the GMB In the 1973 contest, 
although Easnett was regarded as the candidate for change, 
the election was not party political and nor were the 
elections of Cooper and Williamson before him. The Executive 
Council also took steps to ensure that this tradition was 
followed by ruling that candidates must not discuss the 
general secretary election with the media and, early in the 
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election c_ . xmp,. tjn, 
1 C? il_1ý:: 'c! one. o-F the main C. contC. '. ndc? rs -For 
dainq so. 
The opportunity for political f 7r.. tirna1 activity was thus 
minimal 5nd the L_;: ecutiv, Council. ' actions certainly 
produced 
dissatisfaction amongst (3MB members from the broad 
left who criticised the "non-election of the general 
secrot_ary" taking place. A number of them cited the 
Executive Council 's ruling as being the main factor behind 
the broad left deciding not to put forward a candidate in the 
election. They felt aggrieved that with this and the union's 
rules forbidding inter-branch communication any non- 
establishment candidature would be effectively limited to 
producing an election address for the special election issue 
of the 6MB journal. There was also concern that any such 
candidate woc_c]. d be disqualified from standing by the 
Executive Council. 
The GMB'c rules give they Executive Council the discretion to 
disqualify any candidate nominated -scar any elected officer 
post i+ it fudges them to be unsuitable. Tt is clearly 
stated that 
"No member shall bn eligible for nomination and election 
to the office of Guneral Secretary and Treasurer, unless 
the Central Executive Council, on receiving his or her 
nomination, is sal sied that he or she is capable of 
discharging efficiently the duties of the office. Only 
candidates who have satisfied the Central Executive 
Council as to their 'f i'tne a an oual ifi cati ons shall be 
nominated. " 
0 
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The "1(. ä^ne ai Worker's" acerbic cornrnc'. nt on this was that 
"if the founder of the:? G aaworkor-s' Union, Will Thorne, 
had : 3G: f? n faced with t SL CEC in 1939 he would never have 
cleared the first hur°le to become the first. Gen. Sec. 
because at the time he Nas a Marxist, unable to read or 
write and a member of the Social Democratic 
Federation. ""I' 
This rule was, in fact, enforced by the Executive Council who 
rejected the nominations ot five candidates an these grounds. 
On appeal, however, they were allowed to stand and it appears 
that this was due to the disquiet this caused among certain 
sections of the membership and the fact that the three major 
contenders were quite prepared to accept these other 
candidates. This was different to F3asnett's election twelve 
years before when the only candidate allowed were either 
regional secretaries or, in Elasnett' 3 case, a national 
officer. 
The election of the general secretary is no easy contest; the 
6MB has no automatic successor. It does appear, however, 
in the modern GILB that national officer candidates are better- 
placed in this contest than regional secretary candidates. 
They can draw support from most regions, while regional 
secretaries' support tends to be confined to their own area. 
In the last two contests the impact of regional secretary 
candidates has been effectively to reduce the number of 
regions participating in the election. In the 1.985 election 
Burlison, the Northern regional candidate, polled only a few 
thousand votes more than his regional membership, while, in 
the 1973 election the field comprised Basnett and "f i ve 
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rogi ona]. seer_retari es, all. of whom polled -feat more than their 
regional membership. At least two of these regional 
z: 
- 
secretaries admit now that they were wrong to ]. et their name 
go forward and one stated that they had given Eia ynett "a free 
run. " Despite this, as Table 3.3 shows, the 1973 election 
was -rar closer than the : L985 election. 
Table 3.: 3 
General Secretary Elections 1973 and 1.985 
1985 
Edmonds, John 411 , 875 58.4 
E1uri i son, Tom 148,584 21.0 
Warburton, David 121,839 17.3 
Others 23,199 3.31 
Majority 263,291.37.4 
1973 
Barnett , David 208,025 29.1 
Donnet, Alex 146,421 20.6 
Gl adavi n , Der-r=1":: 132,940 18.6 
Eccles, Jack 102,410 14.3 
Mason, Jim 70,989 9.9 
Unwin, Cyril 54,414 7.6 
Majority 61,604 8.6 
SOURCE: Report of Fifty-Ninth Congress, 1.974, p28 
GMB Journal October 1.98 
Torn Williamson, the general secretary from 1946 to 1961, was 
also a national officer-, ^P but his successor, Jack Cooper, 
although previously a national officer, was a regional 
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secretary. He was also the union's chairman, and h< d been so 
for ton years, and, therefore, had a formidable triple power 
base in the election. While it was common in the past fear a 
regional secretary to become the union's chairman, in recent 
times the post has been held by lay members, thereby removing 
from regional secretaries an opportunity to get them'>el` es 
more widely known in the union. 
By retiring early Basnntt ensured that the (. FMB would not bei 
caught by they balloting provisions of the 19i3! ß trade union 
act and could elect its now general secretary in the 
t. radit. ional manner. At the 'i. 9S5 Congress, Baanett, laying 
down the guidelines for the election, informed members of the 
Executive Council 's decision that voting was to be by show of 
hands. He also told Congress: the system we have is one our 
members chose. It involves our activists - and the election 
takes place where it should do: at the branch. ""° Since the 
branch block:: vote sytem was established prior to the union's 
formative amalgamation in 1924, however, the claim that the 
system has been chosen by the members was rather ' peci ous. 
Furt. hormorc:. c, while evincing an s? tl°tl. ýl7. rt partici. p, -itory model 
of democracy, in preference to the postal ballot systems 
favoured by unions such as the AEU and EETF'U which do not 
require this, the case is still not made for the branch block 
vote system instead of the individual count method favoured 
by the TGWU and ASTMS. "' In the tMIB, at i eas>t , 
MSZ with its.; 
widely varying branch structure, the branch block vote system 
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gi VC? r y ': 1'"- 
1_! '; e ri': """ý t t':.. 'o chapters ß. i1c iir: ! Ivtai. I, a 
di wpropor':: I. mnattf in t-? Iec'HiC7ns to thf: offCan small 
r7i. imber of rc±rnbt"? r! s at-. t. onclinq me? E7"king z of tar gee genoral 
branches , whi c_1"ß nah es i. t. i. ndc -f c ný ýi Fat c- as an t.? i ector'a1 sys tE m. 
The L]robabi l 7. a=y C'1'f Edmond F?. ý E? C 'ý (°il cll. z! _tcc ss was evident at 
an early stage. Of the three main candidates Edmonds 
received by far the best ovation at Congress. More 
substantially, however, the branch nomination process in the 
GMB is a reliable indicator of the final result as the union 
operates the branch Klock vote system. Edmonds, by securing 
547 nominations to Mr1. istun'ss 20? and Ui.? arhurton's 89, clearly 
established hi mss' f no the front-rt'nner early in the 
content. "" His support was in every region apart from the 
Northern region and Lancashire, which made very few 
nominations, but it was particularly strong in the Southern 
region and in Liverpool. k? urlison received only l8 
nominations from outside his own region, while nearly half of 
Warbur-tc: an's nominations came from the Scottish and Birmingham 
regions. Nominations, however, give no indication of branch 
size, which is the crucial factor in actual voting, and the 
campaign was hard-+ouoiht by all sides. 
All three major candidates ran well-organised campaigns with 
Edmonds, in particular, developing a formidable electoral 
machine built around key activists and officers who supported 
him. A great deal of canvassing took place behind the 
scenes. One Congress delegate told how he had breakfast, 
113 
1. urich : nd toi with the thre? e cdi. ffcer-c.? nt c. arldidates in thc2 same 
(:: %ily e 
T!? i'1'? 'ý= 1 ""C .a i'-(:: c i onz F.: °. utj . erJ y 
'. '. ýi i"4orthc. irn req i Oi"f%:. a l 
Mi {';:? r'": i and key lay membWs, not surprisingly, campaigned 
solidly for their regional secretary, but activity was high 
in the other regions, strongly to the benefit of Edmonds in 
t. ho ,... vor pool. region and less obviously so in Birmingham. 
Per°cop't7. ons of the election were diverses. It was widely felt 
amongst senior campaigners in the Northern region that 
Eur. i. I son had "been stabbed in the back as he had been 
promised they support of the Scottish region which had failed 
to materialise and leid other supporters to change candidates 
in mid-atrr. am.. The highly charged campaign atmospherr. -ý 
produc": cd other claims and accusations and counter-accusations 
that are a familiar and inevitable part of the electoral 
process, hut should form no part of objective academic. 
analysis. What is important to r . ucoc n] sse from this, however, 
is the role that canvassing played in helping to inform 
members of the choices available and encourage membership 
participation in the branch election meetings that took 
p1 ace. 
Edmonds' reputation as a negotiator and his spread of 
industrial experience, having served as a national officer 
for local government, the public- services and the electricity 
and gas industries, along with the support provided by key 
members of his electoral machine, were the major factors in 
his election. In comparison, Warburton had serviced a much 
smaller membership, representing the chemical, glass and 
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rubber waorkors since 1.973, and I ý... ýr 1i on hzad no national base 
other than hi t-s sr---A t on the Executive Council , 
Although the GMB 's election to choose Basnett's successor was 
distinctive, compared with the other unions that had elected 
or were just about to elect general secretaries, in that it 
was not contested exclusively, or even primarily, can 
political grounds, perceived political di ff erences, 
nevertheless, did have some impact on the -f i. nal outcome. 
Political categorisation is a subjective and sensitive issue. 
All three main candiates saw themselves as candidates of the 
centre and were strong rupportnr of 1(1nnock. They were not, 
however, all perceived in this way by the mebership. Of the 
three, Warburton had the highest political profile and a 
reputation as a "right-wing fixer"11 in Labour party circles. 
He was also known to have organised Denis Henley's campaign 
for the deputy leadership. Out side the Northern region, 
Eiurlison was pcarcnive:? d, unfairly, as being the heir to the 
tradition of the regional barons. In contrast, Edmonds had 
no political pedigree as such, but was known to respect and 
to have worked closely with David Blunkett and other left- 
wing council leaders on campaigns against rate-capping and 
abolition of the metropolitan counties. It was Edmonds, 
therefore, more than the others, that appeared as the 
candidate for change in the union. 
These pol i. ti, c: 1 d: if-fc- re nccs wt-? rta rc cco ni md at an early stage 
by left-wing c? 1ement in the (3MB. Aware that - he choice 
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would prob<_rb1y ß: 1c:., between Edmonds r: xcnd Warhurt. on "t:. hr editori-cJ. 
Int h"3 ýý f ýt:? Clf-:? Y : '3 ý ýi: 'Cý1 i"`. ( I; 1ý. 
ý C1'ii nci ýýrtSyne ý; ý' :3]. C}I1ca 7. {ýI'l 
"Tt is clear that certain National Industrial Of-Fi rs 
will be standing and members in some o+ the industries 
covered by these officers miqht well vote in such a way 
as to retain 'their-' N. i. i7. This could be a disastrous 
tactic which could well open the door to the election of 
some right-wing candidate. ""''', 
The limited organised left-wing factional activity that 
existed in the GMB, therefore, was used, unenthusiastically, 
to support Edmonds and was an additional, though minor, 
factor encouraging membership participation in the election. 
Mare important was Edmond 's image as the candidate most 
likely to favour- change. 
Co na 1 usi can 
The GMBi'S rules governing the union's national political 
system, the framework within which national policy is 
determined, vest Congress with "supreme authority" over. *"he 
general secretary and Executive Council. They also, however, 
stipulate that the latter is responsible + or the government 
of the union and the conduct of trade di sputesw6 and this, 
potential conflict in roles is, in practice, resolved in 
favour of the Executive. 
As has ber". ". 2n noted el ewhere, -, 7 this is not excepti. canal, but 
116 
the GMB's Congress appears more docile than most. It is 
relatively small in :: zize2 its membership basis is half 
that 
of the TGWU.. and the NCU hys roughly three times as many 
delegates although it has only approximately one sixth of the 
GMB's membership. Delegates are representatives z of regions 
not branches and are accountable to no-one but their own 
delegation. This forms the region's stance on policy mattrrs 
and gives very little scope for the expression of alternative 
views at Congress which is primarily structured to hear 
regional Views. Resolutions from branches are submitted to a 
preliminary Congress agenda, but before Congress is held the 
regional delegation meets to decide whether they should be 
supported or withdrawn. The views of the regional secretary, 
the Executive Council and the third of the region's officers 
attending Congress are all expressed at this point and can be 
influential. Regional delegations may allow one of their 
number to move a resolution without regional support, but 
they are not compelled to do so. 
It is difficult, therefore, for controversial resolutions to 
get on the F. n t1 Congress agenda. Even iF they do sia g 
however, there is no g"arante e that they will be debated. The 
Congress : standing orders committee has wide powers to 
composite motions, not timetable: them for discussion, or 
declare them out of order. In this it bears resemblance to 
the Labour's conference arrangements committee, not 
surprisingly since the OMB's Southern regional secretary has 
been chairman of the latter for a decade, and has a similar 
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capacity, when required, for manipulating the Congress agenda 
that has been recogni. used at. Labour party conference. "O The 
practice of the standing orders committee has been to declare 
out of order any resolution which can be referred to national 
industrial conferences or relates to joint industrial council 
matters, which in of fc ct , has further limited Congress to the 
di SCLAS Sion of non--barga: i ni. nrj is suers. 
In the Cooper era, membership participation in the GMB's 
national political system was principally limited to this 
unsatisfactory participation at Congress and to the lay 
members indirectly elected, from regional councils, to the 
union's general council, where they were in a bare majority, 
and to the more important national executive, where they only 
had parity of representation with the regional secretaries. 
Membership participation was extended under Basnett, notably 
by the 1975 reform proposals. The role of industrial 
conferences was strengthened to extend membership 
participation in bargaining issues and the national executive 
structure awtas, replaced with a single Executive Council with a 
higher proportion of lay members than before. Industrial 
conferences, as Chapter 6 shows in more detail, were 
formalised and further extended in 1981. Attempts were also 
made to reform the union's organisation to increase women's 
participation, leading to the 1987 Congress agreeing to 
reserve seats for women on the Executive. 
It is easy to criticise the extent to which these 
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organisational reforms have improved membership 
oarticip. ti nq"m but it is important to recognise the 
constraints imposed on theLSMB' s general secretary by the 
autonomy it gives to its regions. To effect these limited 
reforms required adroit brokerage on B{a anett's part. As a 
comparative study of a number of union's noted, the general 
secretary of the GMB is in a weaker position than his 
counterpart in the TGWU or ASTMS since in the GMB 
"government at the national level is therefore mainly 
dependent on one major and a number of 'mini-general 
secretaries. ' The major figure is the general secretary 
and the mini-generals are the regional secretaries... 
Power is not concentrated nationally as in the TGWU or 
ASTMS, but it is still spread over individuals rather 
than + actions or parties. The general secretary's job 
is thus primarily one of balancing the small number 
of regional interests rather than unifying a large 
number of fragmented, non--factionalized, and hence 
relatively powerless interests of the TGWU and ASTMS. ""? 
Basnott's position, initially, was -Further- weakener*d by the 
narrowness of his election. Securing 29 per cent of the 
votes cyst limited not the validity but the importance of the 
claim that he had been elected on a "reform ticket" and 
necessitated the careful construction of alliances and 
exploitation of grievances to get the 1975 proposals passed. 
This task became only marginally easier as his standing in 
the (MB and the wider union movement was enhanced. 
Integral to Easnc tt'_s brokerage role was his utilisation of 
membership pressure for reform. Executive Council members 
could hardly object to asking the membership for their views 
on proposed organisational changes and, by instituting 
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consultative procedures, Basnc? tt was not only able to open up 
;: 7ol :1 c`; / making an the so i n<Yt.. IC? s in a limited manner, but q mors? 
importantly, ne was able tp use membership opinion as a lever 
to pass reforms through the L; " ecutiv . 
Assisting this was 
the lack of any significant organised political factional 
activity which might challenge his position. 
the organisational changes during the Basnott era, and the 
manner- : 1. n which thmy occur- r- ed, r°c; 1. c c"ted 4: he di "fer-rent vaIuea 
of Cooper and Basnett, which, in turn, influenced union 
attitudes, as Basnett, like his predecessor, stamped his 
personality on the union. gasnett's centrist political views 
and consensual i? poro. ' ch to I si =uns were totally different to 
Cooper's right-wing politics, and the authoritarian, touching 
on the militaristic, way that he chose to run the union. 
While Basnett's more democratic attitudes and opposition to 
"business unionism" set the tone for the replacement of 
retiring national officials with officers who had less 
authoritarian attitudes and altered the ethos of Congress, 
his capacity to make more fundamental changes was again 
limited by the regionalism of the OMB's structures. Regions 
have varied widely in the degree to which they have moved 
away from business. unionism and encouraged membership 
participation. 
There is also wide variation in regional political. 
activity and or-gani ss-ation. The r-egion, Al r-espran mA to 
13ass"1"iet%. 's Init. iil tiVC".? s ß"1t c1 naticncl t}'VEi i: C7 f)t_llZCl cI. oser 
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lints and hecc me more active in the trade union movement and 
the Labour pa t y, ' 
has been disparate. The Northern region is 
politically organised and solidaristi. c_; Liverpool, not 
offIr1ally organi. sod but radical and factional.; and 
the 
Birmingham region unorriani sed and politically apathetic:.. 
R^cion l autonomy is 0+ less relevance in the sphere of 
policy f ormul a't ion on political issues, however' where 
the 
R MB gives great autonomy to its general secretary. Congress 
is the final arbi for of policy, but the ccner-al secretary, as. 
't-. he head of the uni en y is expected 
to respond to issues as 
they arise. The broad political consensus and lack of 
factionalism within the Executive, therefore, places the 
general secretary in a strong position to commit the union to 
certain political courses of action. This discretion was used 
by Basnet. i_ on such issues as the formulation of Labour's 1983 
economic policy, where his views were agreed by the TIJC- 
Labour party liaison committee and then approved by Congress; 
and on political strategy, where he was responsible for 
leading the TtJC in and out of NEDC over the GCHQ affair. 
9: 1rnYtt' "s r: on'tri. but cn to (: 3}; trnndi. ng member-shin ipartAcipati(-in 
:1nc E'_C_ i. '. M"i. on-mal": z ng in the GMB has bonn generally recognised 
in the union, even by left-wing elements who would not 
normally he associated with giving credit to union 
leadership's. Their view was: 
"whit the Broad Le+t is critical o-f just how Mmocratic 
the GMD really is, we acknowledge that there have been 
some reforms since Pl l ki ngtons. "'" 
121 
This extremely limited factional activity was used to support 
Edmonds 1. n the r: 3ME; 's election of r3asnett 's successor. The 
election was, however, dif-erent from the TGWU and AEU 
Leadership elections which preceeded it and succeeded it 
repectively, in that it was not essentially a political 
contest. The campaign groupings which emerged to support the 
candidates, nevertheless, acted like factions in many 
respects. They provided information and canvassed members, 
informing debate and encouraging member ship participation. 
The scale of Edmonds' victory puts him in a stronger initial 
position in the GMB than his predecessor as he clearly has 
majority backing within the union. Decision-making at 
national level in the GMB will, however, still depend on 
balancing the interests of the regions and of the union's 
influential lay members. It is these interests which are 
examined in the following regional studies. 
This chapter has stressed both the increase in membership 
participation that has occurred in the union at national 
level over the past decade and the influence that Basnett had 
in promoting change in the GMB. This is not contradictory. 
As has been perceptively noted: 
"trade union leaders must lead or they are a failure. 
By and large they cannot get their own way by commands, 
orders or coercion. They are not without power and have 
to be ready to use it on occasions. If they are good, 
they certainly have a strong personal influence on 
policy decision. Only a very naive view of democracy 
sees it as incompatible with strong leadership. "'' 
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Chapter 4 
MEMBERSHIP PARTICIPATION AND BRANCH STRUCTURE 
L 
The primary focus of industrial relations research over the 
last twenty five years has been the workplace. While this 
has rectified a serious omission in the literature, it has 
become an almost obsessive preoccupation for many 
practitioners. In the field of trade union democracy this 
overemphasis has led many studies to completely ignore the 
arrangements, rules and procedures that determine the 
structure which regulates the internal government of trade 
unions. It has also meant that research at the micro- 
analytical. level into the activities and decision-making 
processes of individual union branches has been concerned 
almost exclusively with workplace branches and completely 
neglected general branches as an area of study. 
Certainly the growth in workplace bargaining, noted by 
Donovan and more recent studies, ' has necessitated a 
reassessment and refinement of the approach taken to the 
analysis of democracy in trade unions, but it I . F,. simplistic 
to see it as the "key" to trade union democracy2 and wrnng to 
conclude that establishing a workplace branch system is all 
that is required to make a trade union democratic. " As 
Chapter One argued the decentralisation of decision-making on 
bargaining issues is only part of the framework of trade 
union democracy: the other part is the way that unions 
determine their policy on non-bargaining issues. Moreover, 
1^? i.. S 
equally important to the level of dec. i5i. on-ma4 ing is the 
union's horizontal dispersion - the number o+ people involved 
in making decisions at that level. This is particularly 
crucial in general unions whose occupational and industrial 
heterogeneity presents special problems` and, at the 
membership level, it is especially important in large general 
branches which have di. ffEerent democratic problems to company 
or one industry branches and require different organisational 
solutions. 
This chapter compares patterns of membership growth and 
decline in three of the f3MB's regions. It examines how these 
regions have chosen to organise their members into branches; 
describes the strong central tendencies encouraging the 
growth of large general branches;, and analyses how each 
region has reacted to these tendencies. It assesses the 
implications of this for member=hip participation and 
di acumses regional variations in membership characteristics. 
Apart from looking at the horizontal dispersion of power at 
branch level on bargaining issues, however-, it also provides, 
the necessary organisational core for the study of regional 
electoral processes and of the workplace in the two 
subsequent chapters. 
Regional variations in membership growth and decline 
The academic literature on the dimensions and determinants of 
union growth 153 extensive, comple}t arld involves a substanti l 
1.24 
amount n+ quantitative analysis. The -Facts are not seriously 
in dispute: in the post-war `Dears, three periods can be 
identified. First, between 194Q and i968, the level of 
unionisation as a oercentage of potential union membership in 
the UK declined very slightly but remained roughly stable. 
Second, between 1969 and 1979, it increased dramatically, by 
: 13.2% for manual workers and by 11.. 4"% for white collar 
workers. In the third period, 1930-86, the trade union 
movement lost 1.3 million workers, almost 40% of the number 
it gained during 1969 - 1979 in the first two years. ', 
r"1 number n-F different theories have emerged which purport to 
explain these taar_t. s% and the debate has centred around two 
camps: those who argue that socio-economic forces are the 
primary determinant of aggregate union growth" and those who 
stress the importance of union leadership, making selective 
recruitment efforts in areas of non-unionism, as a major 
determinant of aggregate union growth. ' But since this 
debate i? about aggregate union growth, rather than about the 
growth of individual trade unions, it is not of direct 
relevance to this study - indeed even those who argue for the 
primacy of socio-economic forces accept that union leadership 
and policies can have a significant impact on the membership 
levels of individual unions. 10 What is relevant from this 
debate is the fact that just over two-thirds of total union 
growth during the 1969-79 period was amongst white collar 
workers - not traditionally an area of recruitment for the 
GivtWtJ. and the distinction that has been made between 
12 
"fleh-lraI" acid I' (r ? I"qE? r (rowt_h. 11 
L 
The inability of the 6MB to fi. nd suitable merger partners 
during the 1960s and 19709 limited its growth potential but 
the uni nn also found difficulty in attracting new members at 
a time when other unions were achieving a substantial natural 
growth in membership. '" In the "golden age" of union 
recruitment between 1969 and 1979, although the GMWU's 
membership rose steadily, it lost ground in comparison with 
its main rivals whose membership soared during this period. 
This problem was not lost on either the union's leadership, 
officers or members. The GMB's poor recruitment performance 
was a frequent topic of debate at Congress throughout the 
A70' s. The need to compete arganisationally in the 
recruitment field with NUPE and TGWU produced the belated 
introduction of the non-manual section MAT SA in 1972 and was 
the principal reason for the introduction of the district 
officer grade in 1974. In addition, one of the reasons for 
the GMWU's introduction of industrial conferences in 1969 was 
to make the union more attractive to potential members whose 
alternative was to join the TGWU with its clearly defined 
trade group representational structure. 
Despite thus organisational changes the recruitment and 
retention performance of the different regions has varied 
greatly. The next three sections examine the reasons for 
differences in membership growth and decline in three 
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r-Eacjicirnss. 
The Birmingham and Weist Midlands Region 
The Birmingham region organises workers over a remarkably 
large area. T. ts boundaries have not changed significantly 
since the 1936 reorganisation. in the north it extends as 
far as Newcastle--under-Lyme and Stoke;, to the west it reaches 
the very borders of Wales, covering Shrewsbury and Hereford; 
its southern boundary runs through Gloucester, Stroud, 
Cirencester and Oxford, where it runs north, it includes 
Northampton as its easternmost outpost before returning to 
Stoke via Rugby, Nuneaton and Burton. 
Although the region covers such a wide area the bulk of its 
membership is concentrated in and around Birmingham and 
reflects the traditional heavy engineering bias of the area: 
the Birmingham region has a higher proportion of its members 
in the engineering industry than any of the other ten GMB 
regions. It does not, however, have as many members in the 
engineering industry as the AUEW; nor is it, unlike the 
Liverpool and Northern regions, the major union in local 
government - that position is occupied by NUF'E which is in a 
large part due to the organising ability of Alan Fisher *2 who 
gras a NUPE official for the Birmingham region before he 
became their general secretary. 
Like the GMB nationally, the region's total membership 
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remained virtually static_ in the twenty years following the 
second World War, only beginning to rise i: f1". eil" 1963 when 
trade union membership was 
L 
t, rowing rapidly in almost every 
union. The total membership figures for the years 1970 to 
1985 are river, in Table 4.1. According to union rules only 
members whose contributions ar"e less than six weeks in 
arr[ ar"E3 are "J. n I-nenn-. fii: " and consequent ;J tin region'i: 
fi f1ctnc :L al r ii{":? nbc rE: ihi p ha'.. -. been i:: tppra> if latel y 2,000 less than 
ttatr:. xI membership thr-aUcgIhho1. ct this pesri. r. d. 
T- h9 - LI I 
BIRMINGHAM AND WEST MIDLANDS REGION 
Total membership at 31 December-; proportion oi members 
paying check.. -cad+; and the number of women members for the 
period 1970 - 1985. 
Year- Total Paayi ng Wc3rnen 
Membership Check:: -ref f Members 
1985 67,309 98.3% 15,083 
1994 701320 90.5% 1.51171 
1903 72 , 968 88.47. 16,074 
1982 79,487 84.9% 21,5c'30 
1981. B9,172 86.37, 26115-7. 
1980 97,174 07.4% 27,96A 
1979 106,340 ea. f-. )% -. 'q Ia 10 1.9170 1.09,8^0 87.2.. 7 77,211.0 
1.977 1. (03,1.08 85.9/ 1. , 746 
4.976 104 ,0 ý9 92.9% 31 , 950 1975 98,000 na na 
1.974 100,000 n<"t na 
1973 95 , 162 70.07. 28116-3 
: 1972 93.243 5: 3.6% 25,239 
1.971 91 , 000 44.0"%. 22,500 
1970 91 , 000 na na 
SOURCE: GMWU Annual. Congress Reports 
They fi. qu" ess Esshow quite clearly both the growth in membership 
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that took place up to 1979 and the dramatic decline si nce 
Ven. During tr e period 1969-79 total membership grew by 
37.3 per cent while women membership grew slightly ? aster, 
rising by 4t. 7 per cent,, re-Flecti. ng national ratatittice which 
showed an increasing proportion o4 women in the country's 
total : ork: forc_rý. 
More than two thirds of the growth in members hip took place 
in the first half of this period with recruitment rising 
during the latter half by only 9. P per cent to its post-war 
peak of 109,820 in 1978. Since that time membership has 
declined dramatically as the West Midlands and.. in 
particular, its manufacturing industry has borne the brunt 
of the economic recession since 1979. Registered 
unemployment in the West Midlands rose by 187.4% between 1979 
and 1994; from 5.2 per cent to 15. Z per cent of the region's 
workforce. '" The CMB's Birmingham and West Midlands region 
with its heavy preponderance of members in the engineering 
industry has suffered badly as a result. It lost 36% of its 
total membership, nearly forty thousand members, during this 
period. Despite an active attempt to keep members on its 
books, by charging only 2p per week for the unemployed, the 
regional secretary admitted that for every 1,000 jobs lost 
the union has lost 950 members and "everything in the region 
is geared up to saving money. '' 
The r ecr-ui tment and retention per-f ormance: "a of the Birmingham 
reegi oil during the 1970s viii-is al most an exact microcosm of the 
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union ' -- n<a"t_: t onal p(: r ýarmarir: -, ; hut.., si nce 1.979, the 
haemor""hF: igt? of membership that has taken place 
in the region 
has been for worse than that suffered by any other region. 
Desoite the formation of a MATGA section and the introduction 
of the district officer in the region, whose role was inter 
al ia to VCp up recruitment, the : Birmingham region still. 
compared badly with the recruitment and retention performance 
in the closest equivalent regions of two of its main rivals 
between 196 and 19f34 as Table 4.2 shows. 
Table 4.2 
BIRMINGHAM AND WEST MIDLANDS REGION 
Changes in membership: GMWI. J Birmingham and West 
Midlands Region; NALGO West Midlands District; NUPE 
West Midlands Division. 
Year GMWU NALGO NUPE 
1968 80,013 35,967 28,257 
1979 109,820 72,197 67,942 
chreinge +37.3 +100.7 +140.1 
1978 t09,820 72,197 67,042 
1984 70,120 75,026 63,269 
% chance -36.0 +5.0 -6.7 
SOURCE: GMWAnnual Canrw, ress Reports 
NALGO Audited Membership Returns 
NUPE f]t^gani Fat. i. on Department 
Trade Un ion membership in the United Kingdom grew by 28.5% 
between 1963 and 1972.14 Comp ared with thi the Birmingham 
rc:? gicon' . growth of 77.3% looks more than respectable, 
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NALGO membership in the West Midlands doubled during this 
period and membership of NUPE rose by a massive 140.1%. 
Similarly, between 1979 and 1984, while GMB membership 
declined by 36%, NUPE membership declined by only 6.7% and 
membership of NALGO was 5% higher in 1984 than in 1978. 
Such comparisons can never be exact for a number of reasons: 
regional boundaries vary between unions: different unions 
recruit in different occupations and industrial sectors; and 
because of the problems in distinguishing between natural and 
merger growth. It is this latter reason which makes 
comparisons with the TGWU's No. 5 [Midlands] region 
impractical (the TGWU had twenty four amalgamations or 
transfers of engagements between 1,968 and 1982) and it also 
precludes comparisons with the AF_LJ. It does not, however, 
apply to NALGO or INUF'E but NALGO, the largest white collar 
union in Britain, recruits mainly in different areas to the 
GMFi and benefitted from the disproportionate growth in 
unionisation of white-collar workers in the 1970s and the 
relative stability of local government employment since 1979. 
For this reason comparisons with NALGO can only be 
indicative, showing the failure of the GMB's MATSA section to 
make any significant inroads into the recruitment of white- 
collar members. 
The better comparison is with NUPE which is in open 
competition with GMF+ATU in Local Government, large areas of 
the National Health Service, and the Water industry although 
1ü1 
admittedly not in the private sector which has seen the worst 
... )i` :: 
L'iea recession. et s : "} r. """; V[ y. 1't: M°ý "I ... 
"ý 
, 
rya''" e can .1f 
be aw O 
.!.. (? 
1'... 
_r: _. 
htýto.., i.. . 
no 
doubt that an the figures the rocruitment and retention 
performance of the GMB in the West Midlands period during the 
19(8 to 1984 puri. Cad was significantly worse than its major 
competitors. 
It ' ouid bE wrong to blame the region's leadership for its 
relative failure to recrt_l?. t and retain members compared with 
other unions. The., inability of the GMB nationally to attract 
mor""nor- partners and to sufficiently update its organisation 
to compete in the recruitment "fIeid with rival unions most &. 2. 
major explanatory variables. Nevertheless, , a' : Lon ä do have 
some discretion over their actions and the research found 
that-, in f ot.. ir- ways, all of them avoidable to a gr=eater or 
a. fr? £=: 3C? 1' extent g 
the region has made its task more difficult.. 
First, : i. -t:. wes clear that there was no discernable recruitment 
strategy within the region. During the period of rapid 
membership growth between 1968 and 1978, regional officers 
who r +"c-r t. ii. t c:, ci new members could virtually pick which brancin 
administrative e4fic. ers or full-time lay branch secretaries 
they gave their members to and, not surprisingly, they tended 
to distribute this 1 arcaosssse more an the grounds of personal 
friendship rather- than economic or geographical rationality. 
As a result many of the larger branches have pockets of 
workers in factories dotted all over the region: the Fort 
Duni op and Erdinyton branch includes workers on the borders 
7ý 
of Wales, the 1"rii.. 
. 
'i? "". rl. A] i: 1t: ", cn warkmrs an contract in 
EdLnburgh"tg North? r-r ! -V;? nd and Ahtt Uh f::? 't. as wmll as workers 
in a number of other towns in and around the region. While, 
": s1. nC: m 1979, spar- . f-am li.: t? 44Lng branches to spend money to 
attract now {'qC? mbars and some attempt to recruit poople on 
Youth "I'`R1. "11. ilr::! 9C'Flerrie`°u there äd 
. 
ij ei"i1'-=.: ý °::. (::; h ; -fit-} significant 
regional recruitment i ni tiatiV'TE. 
Second, allied to this lack of a recruitment strategy, is an 
absence of any form c+ recruitment organisation. The region 
has ar ncrui. tment officer, bbut the post is regarded as beirifj 
j'! n: 1 or 9 
having been °': i1 Vii. cd in the past by appointed officers, 
'. ^di'lf7 g when 
they had proved themselves competent y went on 
to a 
"proper" negotiating job. indicative of the importance 
attached to recruitment was the 4'eC: t that interviews revealed 
that the recruitment officer im expected to take over the 
casework of regional officers who irre ill or on holiday and, 
consequently, gets to spend little time on recruitment. 
Thn t. h '-t way in which the p^E. ag: l. f]n ham made its recruitment 
task more difficult is through the attitudes of some (:: )'f its 
officers. Many n¢f .cc r' , and 6h'! [ß officers are not the only 
union officers guilty of this, still perceive their role as 
being primarI1yy, or in extreme cases exclusively, involved in 
negotiating with employers, rather than as encompassing a 
wide range of orgcanSs: tnq duties, of which recruitment is 
one. "; 
1;: 
Lastly, the region's branch tr'1_tctui C"_' is also an impediment 
-o r acr"uUmen: -.. More than one official mentioned : lai:. (''any 
omploye%"s wishing to join trade unions nowadays tended to 
"shop around" and, when they did so chose to join either 
NUPE, with its strong workp1 ar:: e branch system, or the T" WU, 
with ; h... trade gr- :.! up structure, in preference 
to the GMB. ih 
Al the uqh the Birmingham and West. Midlands region did badly in 
external comparison with other trade unions, its performance 
in internal comparisons with other GMB regions iss perhaps 
more relevant, and the Liverpool and Northern regions will 
now ý: ]f? F::? xamined r: -, o . hat cnmparieon ä can be made. 
The Uvi rpoa1 y North Wales and Northern Ireland Region 
As its full. title implies, the Liverpool region covers a 
an onormou!: a3y varied area. From the regional headquarters, 
situated in l.. iverpoo]. just o"f+ the Ml62 near to Tox"toth, the 
region extends northwards as far as Southport -and eastwards 
to include St Helens, Runcorn and Widnes. It then includes 
ha). f o Cries-hirr. ý, extending down to near Stoke-on--Tr-, nm 
before tl; rn: Gncj wC? stbJE: lr-ds to include all of North Waales: from 
Wrexham to PorthmAdoq and then, 4i. na1'. y, Northern Irc1iand 
In 1983 it was calculated that 73 per cant of its membership 
was in England; 21 per cent in Northern Ireland and only 
per rent in North Wales. Two thirds of the region's 
membership comes from the Greater Merseyside area, the 
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l arcJf? st 1cirt (: 'f it being 
is the dominant union in 
substantial membership i 
ssof_icited B1scuit1, arnd 
ä. ndltSti"': 1. e : at ICI and at 
in local government, where the GMB 
the North West, but there is also . 
L- 
n the food industry, at Nabisco and 
in the chemicals and glass 
F'i. l ki. ncjtons., 
The pattern of membership growth and decline in the region is 
summarised in Table 4.3 and shows certain similarities, but 
also some key differences with the other regions. Membership 
in the Li. verpool. region, like the Birmingham and Northern 
regions, reached its peak in 1979-79, reflecting the economic 
trends prevailing in the U. K. at that time. But while the 
Birmingham region grow by 37.3 per cent between 1969 And 
1978, with over two-thirds of its growth occurring in the 
first half of this period, the Liverpool region grew by 51.3 
per cent with a substantial amount of this growth occurring 
in the latter period. 
Registered unemployment in the North West Department of 
Employment standard region increased from 6.. per rent to 
15.9 per cent of the workforce between 1978 and 1984, a rise 
of 1: 3 . 8% - less than the 187.4% rise that occurred in the 
West Midlands during the same period, but unemployment in the 
Liverpool area itself rose by a much faster rate making the 
regions roughly comparable in this respect. Despite this, as 
Table 4.4 shows, the GMB's Liverpool region lost only 22.7% 
of its members compared with the Birmingham region's 6"/. 
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T "".., 9 ., 
LIVERPOOL REGION 
I oti. 3. (`k? rbt? rsll-ii. 't at '., Dr? cember, . '"I'-o onion 
of members paying ch cwk-o' f ., and the number 
of women members for the per:! od 'ß. Q70 - ., 
985. 
Ycza1" Total. i=', "ay j. n! j Women 
ýýä? mb ýl" `.. ý)I p Chec--k-r. ]F M` eembe rs: i 
19,95 71.1667 83.9% 24 , 545 
, . 19fin. 773,73773,730 
ý1". 1. f % .. 
25,527 
19 13.3 71"? 167E3 84. i.:. 26,1.04 
: 199" 71.411-17 91.1% 28,187 
. I. 9R'1 
75,92 6 91.5% 2ü, ä23 
19C30 81,813 91.8% 301010 
1.979 90 '80 91.7 34,2.89 
1-978 90,9.5` 9Lu -"'i : 4 3,6 9 
9.977 90,231 90.2% 34,242 
? 7e: 7 737 9 
ti. i96 i }! 7 
. 
4'/ 
-Y 
tom}r J 
: 1.975 70,976 i7.4"11 t) ý 
"'. 7 
9741 I-) Cst na n ax 
1.977 net na na 
1.972. 71 , 944 72.0% na 
1.971 71,149 68 2% nia 
1.970 7^ 006 50.1.3% na 
SOURCE GMWU Annual Congress Repor--t 
Wh The -figurer-. -from M-33 : incJ. L. idL-? }3MS section 
members- 9,290 in 1983. 
member-l. hi. iý f1. cjurcny 1-hOUgh again :it c_,.. n"3 b¬ zMF: ýr n that 
romp: re.? d vii. t. h other union-51, ,:. 111v 0M B d-i. d 
not cl, a very WC?. 1.. i. . 
Analytically, explanations for 
growth and decline between the 
regions can be attributed eith 
of exogenous constraints, such 
culture, industrial structure; 
the variation in membership 
Liverpool and Birmingham 
er- to than di-f-ferential impact 
a% the ecorio(ny, 
9 pol 
i t:. I cal 
to di. ffE, r-er"nt rt:? gional 
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strategies and strur_turer; or to some combination of these 
+actor s. 
LIVERPOOL REGION 
Changes in memberships GMWU Liverpool Region; NCLGO 
North Western and N Wales District; NUPE North 
West Division. 
Year GMWU NALGO NUPE 
1968 60,132 57 , 557 26 , 444 
1978 90 , 953 111,155 100 , 274 
% Change +51.6 +93.1 +279.2 
1978 90,953 111,155 100,274 
1984b 64,898 115,475 97,164 
% Change -28.6 +3.9 -3.1 
SOURCE: GMWU Annual Congress Reports 
NALGO Audited Membership Returns 
NUPE Organi stai on Department 
For comparative purposes the figures exclude BMS 
section members. 
In the growth years, 1968-78, exogenous +actor 7 were 
relatively constant. Certainly, there was some iifforcence in 
regional. economic growth patterns, while the different 
industrial bases of the regions has already been noted. Also 
a number of people in the Liverpool region have argued that 
Liverpool has always been more politically aware than other 
cities and its inhabitants more receptive to the values 
associi ted with trade unionism. Nevertheless, these factors 
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appear to have very limited explanatory power in 
'_lndr? rritandi itq the overall variation in membership recruitment 
during this period and the'. ME=r no explanation why 
membership growth in Liverpool should be concentrated in the 
latter half of the period when more than two-thirds of the 
D: irminäham regiran'ýy yro itl--i nccurrec: l during the first half. 
Marc? compelling in both these respects are regional 
explanations, however, three of the four factors found to be 
impeding membership recruitment in the Birmingham region are 
also to be found In its s Liverpool neighbour. Research found 
a similar lack of any defined recruitment strategy or 
recruitment organisation (though attempts were made to 
concentrate efforts in the public sector) and a similar 
narrow perception of their role by many regional officers 
While, the ability of the Liverpool region to recruit more 
easily in the public sector than the Birmingham region, 
because of its historically dominant position, is one of the 
explanations for its better recruitment record, differences; 
in the regions' branch structures, the fourth +actor in the 
Birmingham study, are an important explanatory variable. 
As Chapter 2 noted, the F'i. lkincjton's dispute had ac ittlyt. ic 
affect on the national union, heralding changes in 
orCaclni <1t]. on and ahtitudf? . 
But nowhere were it P. f+'ec: trx 
more fully felt than in the region in which the ciiSpute was 
located. From being a region dominated by a =mall number of 
1 Parcae general branches, the region quickly d vel aped r-i 
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network of workplace branches. Following the report of the 
sonnet Committee into Pi. l <ingtons, which recommended the 
splitting up of the massiv_e St Helen's branch and the 
formation of eight new branches, 10 this practice was extended 
to other" branches in the region. 
The demand for these changes care from the membership at the 
grass-roots and was translated into a majority on the 
regional council and committee in favour of establishing what 
was perceived as being a more relevant workplace branch 
structure. Indicative of this process, which was confirmed 
in a number of interviews, is the evidence that between 1976 
and 1979 a total of 150 new branches were formed in the 
Liverpool region compared with 40 in the Northern and only 27 
in they Birmingham regions. '" It was this new political ethos 
and the willingness to form new branches in areas of new 
recruitment, rather than allocate new members to existing 
branches, which distinguishes the growth record of the 
Liverpool region from the Birmingham region in the period up 
to 1978. Following the after-shock of the dispute, as a 
result of the post-F'i. lkington's changes, potential new 
members saw the CMW in Liverpool as offering them a structure 
of workplace representation and officer support that, at 
least, matched if not bettered what other trade unions in the 
area could offer and their recruitment to the ranks boosted 
membership in Liverpool at a time when membership in the 
Birmingham region was growing only slightly. Important also 
in this process of change was the growing recognition of shop 
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stewards by the new regional. leadership and their utilisation 
a rc crLi ti ng agents. 
L 
Explanations for the Liverpool region's better performance in 
recruiting and retaining members since 1979 are perhaps more 
clear-cut. Although the region's branch structure is sti. ll a 
Positive "factor, a large part of the reason " or the Liverpool 
regions eight per cent higher retention figure, given a very 
similar level of commitment to recruitment and roughly 
comparable increases in overall unemployment levels, is the 
different industrial composition of the two regions. Job 
losses in the local government sector and other areas of the 
public sector, where the GMWU in Liverpool is particularly 
strong, have been 12SS severe than the losses suffered by 
manufacturing industry, which makes up the bulk of the GMW' s 
Birmingham and West Midlands membership. Membership 
retention figures for the Northern region, however, show more 
fundamentally different variations which cannot be explained 
in this manner. 
They Northern Region 
They GMD has more than twice a many members than any other 
union in the North. It covers the five northernmost English 
counties: Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear, Cleveland 
and Co. Durham. Nowhere is the description general union 
more apt than it is in the North. The Northern region 
represents workers in virtually every type of industry. From 
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the two thousand employees at the S 1lafield Nuclear plant in 
Cumbria to home helps in every local authority; from 
thousands of shipyard workers on the rivers Tyne and Wear 
through to the ancillary and nursing staff '.. rho run the 
region's hospitals. 
Although the region covers such al Barge geographical area and 
has an occupationally diverse membership, the bulk of its 
membership is to be found in the Tyne and Wear conurbation. 
Officers estimate that nearly three-quarters of the union's 
membership in located in this area with the GMB occupying a 
dominant position in local government and in the shipbuilding 
and ship-repairing industry. It. is these strengths which 
have enabled the Northern region to be consistently the 
largest of al 1 the GMB regions as the membership figures 
summarised in Table 4.5 indicate. 
Since i. 970 the Northern region has had well over 100,000 
members, though this figure has been sustained in recent 
years only because of the amalgamation with the ASBSB; ; lid. The 
GMB t: _ recruitment and retention performance in the North, as 
Table 4.6 demonstrates, compares badly with the nearest 
equivalent NUPE and NALGO areas" but it also shows quite 
substantial differences from the GMW's Birmingham and 
Liverpool regions. 
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NORTHERN REGION 
Total membership al :: -3i December 5 proportion 
of members paying check-o++5 and the number 
of women members for the period 1970 -- 1985. 
Year TC)tre]. 1-' yi. ng Women 
Mtemht rshi. p Check-o Members 
1985 1.18, "48 72.0% 35,972 
1994 121 , 23 72.9% 37,010 
1.983 1 23,67,6 96.4 3 7, ''57 
1982 104.1 "+41. 92.5% 38,214 
1981 109 , 448 82.. 7% 39 , 275 
1980 113,742 75.2% 39 , 982 
1979 1 20 , 033 433.8". '. 429419 
1978 1 20 , 045 89.5% 41,7121 
1.977 116,07.1. 86.7% 29 , 790 
1.976 : 1.1.4 , 907 37.7 7. 40,507 
1. '-ý75 112,444 84.0% na 
974 1.1.4, E+74 32. C>i: nrý 
1.973 108 ,25 78.5 7,4 , 71.5 
1972 105,849 72.8/ na 
1971. 104 , 745 61.0% na 
1970 109,229 na 31 , 361 
SOURCE GMWU Annual. Cong. re 3 Reports 
The -figures from 193ä include BMS section 
members, 23,655 in 1983. 
Membership growth in the Northern region during the 1968-79 
period, at . 3.7 per went, was nearly 14 per cent lower than 
the Birmingham region and less than half that of the 
Liverpool region. Since that time unemployment in the North 
has increased by ten percentage points from 8.3 per cent in 
1.979 to 13.3 per cent in 198411 - an increase of just over 
one hundred per cent, less than the increase suffered by 
either the Liverpool or Birmingham regions, though officers 
in the Northern region rightly point out that the level of 
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Z: -NORTHERN 
REGION 
Changes in membership GMWU Northern Region; NALCO 
North Eastern and Yorkshire & Humberside districts; 
NUJPE Northern Division. 
Year (3MWWIJ NALGO NUPE 
19-ISS 97 , 026 51 , 202 201875 
1.978 120,045 1099320 477517 
% Chang +23.7 +1: 13.5 +127.6 
1.97; 3 120,045 109,20 47,517 
19641. ° 98,368 112,71.5 45,748 
% Change -18.1 +7.. 1 - 3.7 
SOURCE: GMWtJ Annual Congress 2eports 
NALGO Audited MPmb¬ rtahi. p Returns 
NUF'E Organic ati. on Department 
k3 For comparative purpose the +igures exclude DIM 
section members 
unemployment is higher in aggregate terms than any other- 
regi can; it is especially high on Tyneside where the bulk of 
the union's membership is concentrated. But even allowing 
for some differences in unemployment rates, the Northarn 
region appears to have done particularly well to lose over 
ten per cent fewer members than the Liverpool region, and 
half the percentage loss of the Birmingham region. 
On the f race of it, the Northern region's recruitment and 
retention performance between 19Gß and 1978 look= distinctly 
unirisp1rinq. To some extent, however, this is mi, s1c: 2Ading 
14 
since the region had experienced rapid growth earlier. 
study of change in ri number of made unions since 1960 
found that in the GMB "unlike= other regions, which either 
stagnated or came into life in the latter part of the period 
examined, the Scottish and Northern regions . uccesMully 
pursued growth policies from the early W60s. "2 = It argued 
that i-h was due to the Scottish and Northern regional. 
secretaries using their power to hreak away From the union's 
passive approach to membership recruitment and hostility to 
industrial acti. onr, to involve shop stewards in negotiations; 
introduce changes in branch structure; and to treat 
recruitment as a regional priority and actively involve 
themselves with it. =::!, r 
Undoubtedly, the Northern region's recruitment successes 
during 1960-68 tempered their performance in following years, 
when other regions still had the capacity to "catch-up" by 
pursuing similar policies, but the reforming zeal that 
brought the changes in the Northern region during the early 
sixties was not nearly so evident in the early to middle 
seventies. Regional membership grew by less than ten per 
cent between* 1970 and 197R. There was still some attempt to 
break up large branches. In 1971, on the retirement of a 
well-known lay branch secretary and national executive 
member, a branch of over 4,000 members was subdivided into 
twelve; but, in comparison with the Liverpool region, there 
was no concerted attempt to create new branches. The region 
also slipped back into some of its old ways, becoming 
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i. denti. fi d asp Iýýýo-c=4 t ýlý: l. i. <.: hmPnt and anti--<st. ri l.:: , nd the 
e. ]. mcD st, d ytfr_lct?. '_" pUb I. 
is 1. M. presented made it apocar l' SSS 
attractive to me nT potential members. 
The Nort. h'er"n r"f'f i ('7n S: i membership performance since 1978- 
confirms the e bl i ty of regional secretaries to use their 
discretion to significantly affect the level of recrui. tment. 
Differential unemployment rates can only explain part of the 
variation in membership between the three regions and the 
Northern region's relatively good performance owes a great 
deal to the work of Tom Burl i son who was appointed as 
regional secretary in the middle of that year. 
Under his leadership the region has developed an active 
recruitment strategy and organisation. Since 1980 there has 
been a recruitment team, co-ordinated by an officer from hear] 
office, and this team has developed separate county campaign 
teams, involving shop stewards and other local activists 
directly in recruitment. Recruitment has also been stressed 
aa priority at the three-month]y Conferences of branch 
representatives that have been instituted to improve 
communications within the union. New members have also been 
attracted to the union as a result of the high media profile 
that Euriison has developed for the union. In addition, 
there have been efforts to retain and recruit the unemployed 
as union members, with the introduction in 1982 of an advice 
and counselling service for the unemployed, and the union 
taking the lead in trade union campaigns on unemployment. 
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The study shows the significant discretion that regions have 
over their membership growth. It builds on a recent study of 
growth in the GMB, `which emphasised the key role of 
regional secretaries acting as agents of change. It adds to 
this by suggesting that regional lay leadership and, in 
e>: ceptional circumstances, membership pressure may also act 
as a change agent. Further it outlines the scope for changes 
to facilitate growth, confirming the importance of 
recruitment being made a priority and involving shop stewards 
and local activists in the recruitment process, stressing the 
need for the region to present a good public image, and 
emphasising not. only the need to break up large branches but 
to establish branches that are perceived cis being relevant 
forums for potential new members. 
Regional variations in branch structure and participation 
While the region's branch structure is only one factor 
impacting on a region's ability to recruit and retain 
members, it is a major factor deter-mining the level of 
democratic activity within the union. The branch structure 
that exists in a particular region is a function of a number 
of different variables, many of them inter-dependents union 
history, industrial structure, the rule book and its local 
interpretation, membership attitudes and abilities, 
bargaining structure, and national and regional leadership 
attitudes. 
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As Chapter 2 noted, British trade unions, "are historical 
deposits and repositories of history ... every union 
possess a personality of its own. """ They have to be seen 
not only in relation to the historical development of trade 
unionism, but in terms of their on specific history. This 
is particularly true in respect of the GMWU and the evolution 
of its branch structure. 
There have been general branches and specialised branches in 
the union since the earliest days of the Gasworkers. At that 
time trade unionism was a precarious activity and to feel 
more secure union members tended to organise themselves into 
large general or single-industry branches. With the gradual 
recognition and legitimation of trade unions most unions 
began to move away from large general, branches and towards 
company branches. Although such a trend has been apparent in 
the NUGMW at certain times and in certain areas, the GMB 
today is distinctive in that it has a higher proportion of 
its members in general branches than any other major- union. 
The rationale typically given or this structure is that 
cuneral branches are particularly suited to rural areas, 
where union membership in individual companies is usually 
low; a branch can be centred on the main town in the area, 
which probably has adequate transport services to enable 
members to attend meetings. Specialised branches, in 
contrast, are best suited to industrial areas where one 
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l... 
rff? gi. ona{. `ý{. iY'7. i: ti:. 7. f. ]. 1 :: " 
?ia i'! t il:: x'ýý: C'! !1 cf branch 'ýh o- 
1`311B. 
can t c-, a" ' : ýý"ý ! _Iti? : _". -. tzab '.. ; i. i=hmk: t" t. i'1ä 
"ý!. t ý. _ ;»:.. i"1(a !:: )r, f"t": h ncr i:.. t"1r?. es tnIiý.! (:. o f+ t7 (7ornnl -. 7. on 
they 
r{.:! -f. vc r1 from c011Pf: ting membership suhscri. ptif'ns9r^' led 
inexorably to the spread of rgener'al branches at the expenc_"(a 
of specialised ores at a time when most other unions were 
moving in the opposite direction. Under the logic of the 
commission system, no ambitious branch '_. ec: r ct1. r'y i nte'r^oc '%("'xd 
in ii rlcr"Rasi nf"j his on ' , 1r of7e wanted to he confined hrorganising 
members in a single -Factory and ne. N ! 'lra(Tlh; )P'r^r. 
recruited from other workplaces quickly found themselves 
subsumed into r: largo general branch. 
Thr- f'_l7. "t. r inrj 'f]. "4'(., / years firmly entrenched this s"t: r"uctur"{: - 
When a full-time branch secretary retired there was no 
whom. je of candidates to replace him and maintain the 
tradition. Nor did the replacement of +M-time hranch 
secretaries by branch administrative off: I ce'r"sy which began in 
1.965, ;. 7. ter this eai. tt_tati can. On the contrary it. can hr? 
regarded as formally recognising 1 he importance of 1. arge 
genE? rRi branches in the union's structure. MoreC7ve? r t since 
under the rule change i: t proportion n+ the EAO'sä salary was 
related to the size of the aiembet^ shi. p that he or cmhf. - 
serviced, Chore was a similar incentive. for F1Afl' s to recruit 
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members regc? rdl e5s of whF. °re they ' 'I. v4'? d or wcJrk. rd. Yet g 
Anc-p'1. 'i'. F. t k: 1' me::. T., r rq r"r.. mm n cmntral twdencies encouraging 
general h'- ric hef_s, as the prewous section noted y 
branch 
'.. rlA!... ý_ _"l.. ll^f-_'? r has developed d'.. ": -"rt-? rnfl'%7. '/ in different I^t? fjl C7ils and 
this is described and analysed be]. oi"J. 
Regional vririiiitiC: 1C'1liii in branch stucturC". "? 
The Birmingham region's membership is contained in roughly 
220 branches_ The average size of the branch is between 710 
and 320 members and the median branch has around QO members; 
Hotte 
y 
however, jive e ';. i se "i. m[: lres s'1. or of the f: i"" st. ri. buti on of 
branch f":; emborshi. p. Large branches dominate the region.. Over- 
half of the t. ot. al membership is in branches with more than 
300 members, with 79 per cent of the members being in the 
five per cent of branches which have over 1,000 members and 
which had full-time officers of the union a<. "_, branch 
secretaries until Decision 24 came into effect. Tn contrast 
there are a large number of small branches; over a third N' 
all the r'"-. _. 
i on 'e branches have less 'ý than a hundred members 
hut they account for only ei gh1_ per cent of the . tot. a 
membership. The figures are summarised in Table d. 7 whicl---, 
shows the distribution of branches and membership in the 
region. 
U- arge branches i3r not n f. 3C_essim-i iy t]!: 'I"14:? ral branirhec.. They 
may cover vorI., pr-7a ýA -t: only onr. - Iatrg e +factory. ?n th , 
Birmingham I°t":? c ion g 
ht)wever- 
a many 
bircinches3 which started o-+ 
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as large company branches have developed into general 
r anc_; h*., . 7-1- rF..? Cj i on ' ri largest branch, Fort Dunlop and 
.a 
f=r°clingtony with nearly 63n 500 members, was .. ý (71^7. [j3. t'i:: i. i.. i. y, r"3 .a 
ý'. as " hC.. 
T :: ah 1 F. ý L7 
13URMINGHAM AND WEST MIDLANDS REGION 
Anai ys_. i. v of Branch size by total number of branches 
and by total membership as at end o June 19 34., 
Branch Number of % Total % Total 
Size Branches Branches Membership 
Under 30 36 17 
_ 51 - 100 42 20 r 
101 -- 50 62 30 15 
251 - ¶00 41. 20 22 
501 -- 1000 16 , 17 
1001 "- 7000 2 i 5 
2001. - 3000 2 1 7 
30(". )l -- 4000 4 2 is 
4001 - 5000 0 0 0 
5(D01. - 6000 C) 0 0 
6001 - 7o00 1 0.5 9 
SOURCE: Branch Incomes and Exp enditure Com puter 
P'ri n't-Ot.. tt_ Sheets; for the quarter ending 
JL_tne '1984 
name implies, a company branch 
g 
but has now extended to cover 
rrdi. ngtor} :: n!, 1. ý1iJr ?r ýä dotted all around the region and even 
outside it. For a long time the Banbury branch was called 
the North Aluminium Company Branch before changing into a 
general branch. Consequently, as Table 4.8 indicates only 1s 
per cent of the region's total membership are to be found in 
company branches. 
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Table= . 4.. 8 
BIRMINGHAM AND WEST MIDLANDS REGION 
Number r.. r h"hr archer -tnrj r1-ýýýr-ýan'L.. a of hranr. hcs 
and tP. C'f(lber categorised as company, one-industry 
or general branches at 
December 1? 82,, 
Category tat. Lm10r, r f: Total. 7. Total. 
Branch¬ Membersh ip 
Company 59 . 26 
is 
Clnta 4ndu try 96 43 n: ' 
fir, nf: ¬? r- 1 69 ?1 59 
SOURCE. E. xcsr_tAti ve Counci 1. n< nar_.? Ctciear i ng Group 
Working Party on Branch and Workplace 
Administration. 
The metamorphosis of large company branches into general 
branches in the Birmingham region can, up to 1974, be 
attributed almost solely to the compelling f nanc ia. logic 
that the union's rule hook exerts on lay full-time branch 
secretaries through the commission system. This logic 
depends on either greed or need for its operation and shows 
the fine dividing line between providing incentives to 
recruit new members into the union and providing a 1. i. cense 
far use Greed has ,.: ertai my been a factor in lay full- 
time secretaries of large company branches recruiting new 
members from totally different industries and gradually 
transforming their branchc:? s into general branches and, 
although it is understandable that branch secretaries on low 
incomes would want to try to better their positions, 
relatively wealthy lay branch secretaries and salaried branch 
1.51 
admini. -tr i. ivc of-fl--mr, n-ave chosen to do the same, often 
with '7ic, -%nt rrgardi for whether t'hr rT 
mbE-r- thcay recruit can bin. 
r ,? p rasen %% CW' Gi e -F- -F o2 ct7. ve1. y. 
Qualitatively different, Out producing the same end result, 
has been the impetus for change stemming from tho desire of a 
full-time zr-cr-ctary to maintain his or her income when 
exogenous factors, such as rising unemployment or industrial 
re-location, significantly rc due? the size V the company's 
workforce. in these circumstances it would be unreasonable 
not to expect the branch secrotrxry, who had given up a 
previous lob to work for the union, to do everything pci»ibio 
to recruit now mombmrs, even i? this meant that the branch 
was changed to beccrn a general branch. This has been a long 
term factor altering the region's branch structure. 
While the financial logic of the commission system was 
reinforced in the Cooper era by the deliberate national 
encouragement of large general branches and their ready 
acceptance by the leadership in the Birmingham region, the 
election 0+ Brasr,.: tt as general 3ocretary in 1973 signalled a 
move away from these "Lancashire methods" and gave fresh 
stimulus to the demands for a workplace branch structure that 
arose throughout the union after the Pilkingtons dispute. 
With the gradual replacement of BAR'S as branph secretaries 
by district officers, who had no incentive to increase or 
maintain their branch size, that occurred in the Birmingham 
region from 1974, the region had an opportunity to make the 
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sort of ch ngc-ýs im it brva: nch structure that the national. 
leadership vl s st..; pprrtinq. 
The regional leadership, however, struthiously +ailed to do 
so. Any pretence that the region was moving in this 
direction camp to an abrupt halt in 1979 with the onset of 
the recession. As one regional official interviewed bluntly 
put it: "if we're moving towards workplace branches it's news 
to me - in fact we're doing just the opposite. " The reason 
for this move in the opposite di. rect: Lcn, paradoxically, since 
developing a workplace branch structure increased recruitment 
in the Liverpool : -c gi. on, is the financial crisis in the 
region that been triggered by the 1n s'- .f has t .. r-ic' ý, ý., " membership 
during the recession. Branches of less than eighty members 
are regarded as uneconomic and there has been pressure to 
merge smaller branches or allocate their membership to larger 
ones. Even greater savings were achieved by merging branches 
with those staffed by a district officer since they were not 
eligible for commission, but Decision 84 has removed this 
avenue for making economies. 
The Liverpool region, in direct contrast to Birmingham, 
seized the opportunities for chancre that were available under 
the new Easnett leadership and enthusiastically responded to 
the demands for chanq; emanating from the region's grass- 
roots. The region has roughly the same number of members as 
the Birmingham region, slightly less if the Boilermakers' 
section in excluded, and this membership is distributed into 
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390 branches, 360 excluding BMS branches. This means that 
the Liverpool region has over 75 per cent more branches than 
the Birmingham region covering the same membership. The 
average branch size is between 200 and 210, but more relevant 
is the median branch which has 89 members, reflecting the 
importance 4- tt<ached to establishing small branches 
in the 
region. A brc akdown of branch size is given in Table 4.9 
below. 
-r-I'l -Q 
LIVERPOOL REGION 
Analysis of branch size by total number of branches 
and by total membership as at end of June 1984. 
Branch Number of % Total % Total 
Size Branches Branches Membership 
Under 50 71 29 3 
51 - 100 66 27 10 
101 - 250 48 20 13 
251 - 500 3-8 16 28 
501 - 1000 15 6 22 
1001 - 2000 4 2 10 
2001 - 3000 1 0.5 5 
3001 - 4000 1 0.5 8 
SOURCE: Branch Income and Membership Sheets for 
the quarter ending June t984.7-20 
The post-Pilkingtons practice of splitting up large branches 
was continued throughout the 1970s and, as a result, only six 
branches on Merseyside have more than one thousand members. 
These six branches cover 23 per cant of the membership 
compared with the Birmingham region which has 39 per cent of 
its membership in branches with over a thousand members. 
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Moreover, unlike the Birmingham region, none of them can he 
C1 a5 .iFi od as general 
branches. 1hrPe are company branches, 
serving the region's two large biscuit factories and the ICI 
chemical plant at Runcorn, and three are one-industry 
branches, a3 l of these covering local authority workers in 
Li verpool . 
A. Table . 4 1c_ß shows, only 14 per cent of the region's 
membership is in general branches. This is the lowest of all 
the GMB's regions by far and in stark contrast to Birmingham 
which has nearly 60 per cent of its members in general 
branches. The region, as might he a" ectcd, also has the 
highest proportion of its members in company branches of all 
Table 4.10 
LIVERPOOL REGION 
Number of branches and percentage of total branches 
and members categorised as company, one-industry or 
general branches at December 1982 
Category Number 1 Total "/. Total 
Branches Membership 
Company 168 48 40 
Om. -Industry 151 43 4.6 
General 3: 23 9 14 
SOURCE: Executive Council f=inance 3teeri. n Grou) Working Party on Branch and Workplace 
Administration. 
the GMB's regions. At 40 per cent this is more than double 
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, -ither thn Birmingham rmni. on (19 per cent) or the union as a 
whole (19 per cent). '".. n total, % per tont M the region's 
r_ _ 
membership is in eitr r company or one-industry branches. 
The Ncýrthc:. arn r' a 1. crn o-ý thr"? (7:: C1B has evolved :a branch structure? 
that closely ryf 1cryr_to the 9MB nationally, and has much more 
in common with the Birmingham than r_hc Liverpool region. The 
region has roughly 350 branches and the average branch size 
is between 750 and 360, higher than both the other regions, 
as is the figure for the median branch which contains about 
220 members. Table 4,11 sets out the relevant figures. 
T , --il: ) 1 
4.1 1 
NORTHERN REGION 
Analysis oT branch size by total number of branches 
and by total membership as at end of June 1984. 
Eiranch Number of . Total. / Total 
size Branches Branches Membership 
Under O Y8 14 1 
51 - 1.00 53 20 4 
101 - 250 65 24 17. 
251 -- 500 57 21 ''" 
01 - : 1000 7%~' 14 3ý. 1 
1001 - 2000 14 5 20 
? 001 '-ý Yf10t) 3 1 S 
SOURCE: Branch Annual Census of Me brr=hip Sheets, 
figures for the quarter ending June 1984. 
With 20 ptýr cent of the membership in branches with over one 
thousand members, the rngi on is not as dominated by large 
branches as the Birmingham region, whose equivalent figure is 
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39 pccr- rc. 'nt, and J.. nrnar er Liverpcol. 's 2 per cant. With only 
?' rmbfer-ý--, in branches of 1 Gms than one 
hundred r('mbberr3, however, the Northern region : '., s very 
r!: i-F4errnnt to the Liverpool rn- gion +,, ih"i. ch has nearly three 
'r] in .0, as many m(:? mbFIrs 
in vmcaI I branchc, s. 
The consistent rc jection of very large branches by the region 
is evidenced by the f< ct that the region's kargest branch had 
2,372 members in the mi. ddIn of 1984 and thirteen of the 
seventeen largest branches in the region had less than 1,500 
members. Of the branches over one thousand members about 
heal. f are general branches, the remainder tending to he one- 
industry hr. anche<. "a, rather than company branches. Table 4.1.2 
break down the figures for the whole region into these 
categories. 
Trab 1e4.1 
NORTHERN REGION 
Number of branches and percentage of total branches 
and member" s r_atecjori. . ed as company, one-industry or 
OenF? rail branches as at December 1982. 
C<: ttegory (Number % Totai 7. Total 
Branches Membership 
C0mpia ny Be 30 20 
One-Industry 7? 25 28 
General 129 45 2 
SOURCE: Executive Council Finance Steering Group 
Working Party on Branch and Workplace 
Administration. 
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The figures show how pr oval enf "anerai branches are in the 
rF?? r1ion. Npar-: y one in every two branches is a general 
hr anr_h , compared with one in three 
for the GMWU nationally. 
Because of the relative absence of large general branches in 
the region however, at 52 per cent, the region has one per- 
cent less of its members in general branches than the union 
as a whole. With 29 per cent of its members in one-industry 
branches and 20 per cent in company branches it has, 
respectively, exactly the same proportion of members and one 
per cent more in these type of branches than the GMWU 
nationally, reflecting its striking similarity. 
Having described and analysed the different branch structures 
that exist in the three regions, it is time to return to the 
possible explanations for these differences noted at the 
beginning of this section and to make explicit the link 
between branch structure and the level of membership 
participation in a region. 
Factors i of l uenri ncg branch structure 
Exocaenou factors need little elucidation. Industrial. 
structure obviously has some bearing on branch structure. 
For instance, there is a certain logic in organising workers 
in the gas or water industries s into one-industry branches, 
while workers in large manufacturing and retailing companies 
may be best represented in company branches. Too much, 
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however, can be made rf this as an explanation -(-or varioations 
in regional branch structures. Although, ceteris pari 
buy, 
differences in a region's nLit_l£: tri al structure could 
be 
expected to produce dif*erences in hr-: anr. _h structure, other 
thing are very rarely equal and rec i ons 
have a' arge. amount 
of discretion in determining 
thai r branch' at. rt'sture. 
Tn the 
L: i `! erpoo]. region, _. ßn"1 
Ii. e the others, a number of large 
cnrnpani. o have more than one GMB branch within 
them, 
reprosenting different sections of the company's Work+orra - 
Plik: ingtons is the best known, hut far from the only example 
- rather "I: han having one large branch for 
the company an a 
whxol e. "" 
Closely related to industrial structure has been the change 
in the structure of bargaining that have taken place over the- 
past thirty years and which, arguably, have a more important 
impact an branch structure. The increase in workplace 
bargaining has increased membership pressure in the union for 
it to develop more relevant structures o+ membership 
representation. However, again, as has been shown, that 
pressure, by it=elf, is not su++,. c1ent to produce c: 
hangn. 
Despite such pressures, and even national encouragement 0--i 
the post-1974 period, the Birmingham region did little !+ 
anything to move towards a more workplace-based branch system 
during the 1970s, emphasising the importance o+ the role of 
regional leadership in either blocking or promoting change? 
within its boundaries. 
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The import""1. nce n* i"oginnal leadership in determining its 
hranch shruoture is similarly evident from an examination of 
internal factors. ^+1 thour`<., the history of the GMB has been 
distinguished by the prevalence of general branches, which 
give the union its d?. stinct: i .e character, and although 
this 
historical tendency has been reinforced through rule, by the 
logic of the commission system, and even positively advocated 
as a policy by the national leadership for much of the 
union's history, such is the iutanomy that the GMB nationally 
gives to its regions that they can, if they =n wish, choose 
to transcend these constraints sand pressures and act 
indepenciant. ly to "fu. nciamentally change the branch structure of 
a r"'-i'; i.: ", n, an in this becLausC3q uni: '. kI'd most other 
trade t.. tnions, the branch structure of the GMrt's regions is 
not laid down centrally. It is, therefore, up to regions to 
decide whether to change or maintain their own branch 
structure and not just a matter of accepting the status qua: 
non--decisions are equally as important as decisions. "' The 
initiation n" change in the branch structure of the Liverpool 
region, the partial change in the Northern region and the 
. bspnr_y ,...,; ; 'han'd; - in the Birmingham re ion have already been 
partly examined in referring to membership growth and need 
not be repeated. The motivations of the change agents, 
however, and, indeed, the non-cnange agents need to be 
expanded on further. 
The pack. -age of rc=forms introduced by Cunningham into the 
Northern region during the early 9 (D wa > primarily aimed at 
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improving recruitment and establishing a new image for th=? 
ýmlon in the NorthNever heiew  
in a per". ^., d when trade 
tni. can democracy was not a pplitical issue, involving the 
mambers"h1. p and making the region more representative of its 
: nembore"' emerged as mit or rubs:. id. ary themes 7he integration 
nf shop '-i"t:. ewar! n into the b: irCjz1.1n: LnC. j j7Y'Q(ýC? r<,?.: ý lC? 
introduction of changes in the method of election of the 
re i rin :: tl counc: i l and congress del ega"t°.: i on to ensure fairer 
! '"{"? presen1_a'F i on F "" and the break up of very large branches.; 
all, had on impact on the level o democracy within the 
region. But, while improving democracy in the union was only 
A subsidiary reason behind changes in branch structure in the 
Northern region, it was rF 0rp r less :? > m1. i ri1: !y stated as c 
primary roason -or the post-1970 branch structure reforms in 
the Li. verpoo]. region. 
Once again, the F i1. I:: i. ncjton explosion critically influenced 
-future events. The di sputa w essentially a strike against 
the GMB by its own membercm±p. Members objected to their 
alienation from the channols of decision-making within the 
anion, and their demands for involvemnnt in the collective 
bargaining process and the union's democratic structure""' 
found acceptance and articulation among tho new -ragi onl: 11 lay 
leadership which came to power. The leadership then 
implemented these demands on a much wider scale in a 
conscioc.. ts attempt to democratise the region. 
In contrast, the lack of any changes in branch structure in 
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the Birmingham region during the 1970s was wholly due to the 
motivation that, I he regional lay i. f? i: 1deroh'. p had to maintain 
the status: quo. Since many of them were full-time branch 
secretaries of large branches, the commission system gave 
them a strnn vested interest in blocking any change which 
they were able to exercise successfully, in the absence o 
any significant pressures fr change from either 
the regional 
s2cratar-y or the membership. 
Two interr.. stinc2 points emerge from this analysis. The first, 
the potential for conflict between change agents . - 
pri ncipal l ,r between the regional secretary and the regional 
18y leadership - will have to wait until the next chapter nn 
regional power. The second can be raised now since it 
relates to branch structure. Tt suggests the necessity of 
any analysis of democracy within the GMB distinguishing 
between changes in branch structure which integrate the 
branch with the bargaining process and changes in branch 
structure aimed at Avoiding the domination of the region by 
large or general branches. The first part of this 
distinction should be well understood by now, however, the 
second =art implies that there may be something inherently 
problematic for democracy wil-h large or general branches and 
this theme needs to be amplified by a brief survey of 
membership participation in the branch. 
162 
Participation at branch level 
Potentially, the scope for membership participation in branch 
activities is extraordinarily wide and can involve activities 
of marginal or even no relevance to trade union democracy. 
For this reason it is defined narrowly in this study as the 
level of membership participation in branch decisions. Since 
participation in elections for regional and national bodies 
is examined elsewhere, the present focus is further confined 
to the ordinary decisions taken by branches as part of their 
function of providing the regular means of contact between 
the members and the higher administration of the union. In 
carrying out this function, the secretary of the branch, as 
with other trade unions, is the key channel of communication. 
The branch secretary receives regular mailings from the 
region: regional council minutes, instructions for carrying 
out union decisions and a large number of circulars on a wide 
range of issues varying from wages and conditiions to union 
policy on Nicaragua. The branch secretary sends the region 
resolutions passed by the branch, letters on claims for 
benefit, industrial injury, etc. and any other information 
that he or she thinks may be useful. In accordance with rule 
the branch secretary along with the chairman, auditors and a 
branch committee of not less than seven members, including 
the chairman and branch secretary, is elected every two 
years. 34 
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The rule book stipulates that branches should meet quarterly, 
but some of the more active branches meet more frequently and 
some branches do not appear to; _meet at all. 
In common with 
other trade unions, attendance at branch meetings is normally 
low. This is nothing new, a PEP study of six unions forty 
years ago found that in votes at branch meetings "percentages 
vary from 2 to more than 30 per cent, but are mainly between 
15 and 25 per cent. "-ý Since that time many of the changes 
that have taken place in British society have made membership 
attendance at branch meetings even less likely: post-war full 
employment, the "butske? llite" consensus on major political, 
economic and industrial issues, and the spread of television 
and other competing forms of entertainment have all provided 
disincentives or counter-attractions to attendance at branch 
meetings; -31, it is widely assumed that branch meetings are not 
particularly riveting occasions anyway. Fis has been rightly 
pointed out "the union branch meeting of today is often so 
dull an affair that the member not holding any office in the 
branch who has been persuaded by a keen member to attend 
comes home with the impression that he has wasted his 
tame. "-3--' 
Notwithstanding these general factors, the tendency towards 
membership non-participation in the GMB has been exacerbated 
by its branch structure. One of the ma jor conclusions of the 
PEP survey, although it oversimplified the issue, was that: 
if the large branches were t o be split up into a number of 
smaller branches the numbers attending branch meetings and 
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r. oncerfi, n-c ht: ""th 4-J'"ir Northern regional s ecri:? tary and thCL new 
rogi nn o. 111 2ader sh]. n that came to powar im . __i verpool ' 
that 
small minority of people in large branches were exerni si ng 
a disproportionate influence in the region through the branch 
Ili ocl.:: vote- Tý 1 1. ; is a major theme and will be examined :L S`t 
the n c-s --, t 
Membership participation ± closely correlated with branch 
typo as b'"1o11 branch size and the p1. athoroa of +n r{ý1 
br< nr"hn-; I. h: i ch dr. rni aý'ý: r? ? w.;. ny -14' the GN1JS ` ýý rc-gi Cw c h<i"%%/v r?. ý. `-=f`t 
inhibited membership involvement in branch moet i ngs. "~`' There 
eire two ways in which this happens. The 4irst is very 
obvious: general branches given their ni: itur"o may cover 
workers over a very large area making transport to meetings 
often difficult and time-consuming and putting off all but 
the most dedicated from attending. If this were not enough 
of a problem, many branches also seem to meet at inconvenient 
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places and times, making it particularly di ffi'.: ult for women 
to attend. 'h the ß. Y94 regior1i oqual rights conference in 
the Birmingham region one k. omon stated, to 7cud applause, 
that it was n po ss i. ble:? for !rrtm attcan d hor branch meeting 
An it was held in a room over a pub at 6.30 on a Saturday 
ovening - though one presumes that many men would also have 
problems in attending. The second, and more important, 
rpa<. tion Mnr the low attendanrz. At meetings in general branches 
is that they are not seen by the membership as being relevant 
to their problems, reflecting a growing instrumentalism in 
membership attitudes that has Seen noted in other studies. " 
Many of the lay members interviewed said that attending their 
brench was t'po: intit" sF" since they wore not allowed try factory 
or workplace problems and even lay activists said 
that this was a big rirawback 
RF arch conductmd over twenty years agc'' indicated that 
average branch attandancc in the 0MB was 5 per cent, composed 
with the Engineers at 9 par cent., with attendance at the 
biggest meeting of the year averaging 13 per cent and 16 psr- 
r°S. ^, i" T rp4=pecti vel y. A detailed analysis of hrpnch attendance 
has not been the primary focus of this study, however, 
research indicated that there were variations br tw¬'en 
regions. Across similar types of branches, meombor<.: hip 
participation in Liverpool appeared higher than in the 
Northern region, with it beine even lower in Birmingham. 
Within regions, research also tentatively confirmed that 
large hrenchow are proportionately less well attended than 
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In the Birmingham region, One if its 7 arCjest general brnnch2s 
averaged less than one per cent of the membership attending 
meetings, : +1: 1. th this rising Ito cr- y2 per cent at the i', lc_, cTting 
"h'l ch c: 1st the branch 'f"s block vote for its now gnncr-al 
r.. ecIrotc? r y. In another 1.. or ofc Corner: ]. Jranch the corrC? "^;:. nd : nn 
fi tj _tr^'. " were 
7 per rent and per cent. In contrast, two 
iý .ý6 "a S_filc'. l. i. 
l workplace branches averaged : ý;:. w"ý, ^ý; _,; 
yE_it 5 and 6 per cnent. 
with nearly _!! -t_lh'le that figure participating in the general 
c_c arm}"orv W art±on . 
Attendance at two general br r? r'chns 
in 
the Northern region averaged between 
... 
per cent and 5 per 
cent, with it reaching well into donb1e Figur en at the 
meeting where they voted for Burl I son as general secretary. 
Fi. quran for two one-industry branches were significantly 
higher an both occasions. Attendance at two workplace 
branches in Liverpool was found to average roughly 10 par 
cent, Qth this rising to 17 per cent and 1.9 per cent ý. n the i 
t enr. zr{ 1 ¶; r rrptary ballot. 
cJfl ? Ilt i: J4'? "'1i ry of drawing any "F irm conclusions +, ^"ým to 
Jim: i tcad rc sparcrh conductod in thi ^ Veld; it indicated 
complfxiti'": 
-"`7 of motivation and propensities to participate 
in branch decisions beyond its scope. It is, therefore, 
tentatively suggested that, while other influences may be 
work, iah:. i('. '. a'st part of thn explanation for rt:? f 1ona1 
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variations in membership participation at branch meetings is 
due to -four -factors. Firstly, differences in regional 
culture and traditions which exogenously affect regions. 
Second, variations in regional -factional activity. Third, 
differences in the level of regional political activity and 
organisation. Lastly, and it is suggested importantly, 
variations ons in branch structure. Qne of the reasons for the 
higher level of membership participation in the Liverpool 
region compared with either the Birmingham or Northern 
regions is its workplace-based branch structure. 
The Liverpool region's branch structure, however, is 
exceptional in the GMD. More typical are the Birmingham and 
Northern regions where general branches are a distinctive 
feature. They owe much of their existence to incentives 
provided to branch secretaries through the commission system: 
the significance of this is now examined. 
The Commission system 
The commission system accounts for a substantial part of 
union income. Normally, 2t: 0 per cent of members contributions 
are retained at branch level for the payment of commission 
and, with these totalling over #25 million during 19e4, that 
is a lot of money. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that 
no previous academic study has attempted to loot; at the 
GMB's commission system and examine its impact on the union's 
democratic structure, but then, as chapter one noted, the GMB 
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ý- 4 ! nr, as Tat las i , ý_4. .. and 
4.5 s1^ý. w for the three since t, 
regions, there has bapn an enormous growth in the check; -cu'f'f 
system - the automatic deduction a+ union dues from 
the wage 
parket by employers. Tn 1968 less than one third of the 
'71`siM' s members wore covered by check-a++, but now it accountm 
in- roughly 90 per rent of all ('.. "]ntI'"1. buti cn s. This growing 
anomaly of paying oe. i. ar i. es to chmck-off stewards who do 
virtually nothing to earn such rewards has produced only an 
extremely 1:! mited response at national Z:? ve1.. There are two 
a 'o sfsýu ý ý. l. _n 'ýN^ý, f1: -:: 1l:. Sr1ý. reasons 
for ý". h'lY'? s ýt; ý. 'F:. '. C". iY.: 3ý. C7'ff1.! +G?. ^! ' realisation 
thi"1t:, For some time, shop stewards had been appointed check- 
off stewards as a way of recognising the time and effort they 
spent on the union's behalf and, more importantly, their 
"-eal i sat: i on that any attempt to change tii s system would be 
highly unpopular with a large proportion of the active 
membership and with powerful vested interests. As a result, 
national attempts to change the commission system have been 
discretionary rather than mandatory. 
i here h, avn !,!: n to ch tinge ý cf rule over the i . ýý>i t 'io ýJ c: ý? c-'ýýý , 
, nirn .d at 
ritiona1 icing the com mission sy stem. Tn 196? thL? 
ii. rmi. niham region nuccasisfully proposed to Congress that, 
subject to regional committee approval, branches could levy 
members to provide a fund for shop stewards who lost earnings 
because of doing the it job, 42 This was later enforced by 
union rule , with it boing established that money could be 
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diverted to this fund from commission quarterage. *: 3 However, 
despite campaigning for this reform the Birmingham region has 
not enthusiastically taken.. advantage of the option it offers. 
In 1984 only #7,219 was transferred to commission funds, 
while 0232,30 was paid out in collecting stewards salaries 
during the same period. "" Other regions vary considerably, 
as Table 6.13 shows, but at three per cent the Birmingham 
region has the lowest proportion of collecting commission 
allocated to branch funds. 
Table 4.13 
Amount of money transferred to commission funds as 
a percentage of total collecting commission for all 
GMB regions during 1984. 
London 35.0% 
Southern 31.1% 
Northern 28.7% 
Lancashire 18.5% 
Scottish 14.7% 
Yorkshire 11.3% 
Liverpool E3.1% 
Midland °: East Coast 5.97. 
South West 3.2% 
Birmingham 3.07 
OM}3 17.47. 
SOURCE : Calculated from GMBATU (19E34b ) 
The Northern region has been one of the few regions to 
actively use? the option of setting up branch funds, 
reflecting its long-standing policy of closely involving shop 
stewards in both the recruitment process and the decision- 
making structure of the union, while the Liverpool region, 
171 
along with Birmingham, has tended to pay shop stewards 
directly through commission quarterage. It should be 
expected that regions wi th-. _a 
high proportion of commission 
being transferred to branch funds would have a lower 
proportion of collecting stewards salaries being paid to shop 
stewards than branches with very small branch funds, but, 
athough it is not possible to quantify, this does not appear 
to be necessarily the case. In the Birmingham region, in 
particular, a number of people interviewed complained that 
the appointment or re-appointment of check-off stewards was 
done by their branch secretary who gave these posts to 
personal friends rather than to shop stewards who deserved 
them. While there may he an element of sour grapes about 
these comments, and it is normal for such posts to be voted 
on at a branch meeting, in many branches the re-appointment 
of collecting stewards appears to go through "on the nod'' 
without any discussion and with very few members present. 
The problem with the informal system of using commission 
quarterage to pay shop stewards is that there is no certainty 
that a branch, particularly a general branch, will appoint 
its shop stewards as collecting stewards. The system is 
potentially open to abuse and there is clear evidence that, 
in some branches, the branch secretary, either alone or 
acting with a few key members, can effectively decide who 
holds these posts. In addition to the power a full-time 
branch secretary has by virtue of his position, therefore, is 
the power that can be derived from control of commission 
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quarterage and its potential use as a system of patronage. 
Again, it is difficult to assess how widespread this practice 
is since the only evidence is anecdotal, but, of the three 
regions studied, the impression given is that the patronage 
system is used more extensively in the Birmingham region than 
anywhere else, though it is apparent in a few of Liverpool's 
larger branches, principally those under Militant control. 
Also this impression is tentatively confirmed by the fact 
that, as Table 4.14 shows, the amount of money the Birmingham 
region pays out per member in collecting stewards salaries 
and commission funds combined is higher than any other 
region. Arguably this demonstrates the continued existence of 
a certain number of sinecures within the region. 
Table 4.14 
Amount paid yearly per member of collecting 
stewards salaries and commission funds combined 
far all GMB regions during 1984. 
1# 
Birmingham 3.29 
Midlands & East Coast 3.23- 
London 3.09 
Southern 2.96 
Yorkshire 2.94 
Liverpool 2.93 
Lancashire 2.86 
Scottish 2.75 
Northern 2.58 
South West 2.30 
6MB 2. E39 
SOURCE: Calculated from Cr BATU (1984b ) 
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The other rule change in the last two decades aimed at 
rationalising the commission system was introduced in 1994 as 
part of the Decision 84 prpposals. It introduces a branch 
organisation fund allowing branches to divert payments to 
check-off stewards into this fund for spending on recruitment 
and organisation. Once more, great pains were taken by the 
national leadership to emphasise that this is optional not 
mandatory and it remains to be seen how successful this 
initiative will be. It is interesting to note, however, the 
greater stress that the leadership have placed on recruiting 
new members, a product of a realisation that providing 
incentives to branch secretaries and stewards to recruit new 
members is not much good in the economic climate of the 
1980s, if the financial back-up is not available to allow 
branch members to organise recruitment campaigns. 
The payment of commission to branch secretaries it has been 
argued gave them the incentive to recruit new members and 
often led ambitious secretaries to transform their branch 
into a large general branch in an attempt to make their 
position full-time. This process was widely apparent up 
until 1965: the union recognising "whole-time" branch 
secretaries, exempting them from periodic re-election, and 
even admitting them to the union's superannuation fund though 
still, anomalously, categorising them as lay members and 
hence able to stand for union office. The process, however, 
does not have to involve branch secretaries taking the job 
full-time for its operation. Branch secretaries in ordinary 
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employment have similar incentives to maximise their income 
as a useful bonus to their present job. The introduction of 
branch administrative officers and district officers has not 
altered this process significantly, although some regions 
have used district officers as branch secretaries as a way of 
avoiding paying out commission. On 1984 figures a secretary 
of a branch of one thousand fully paid-up members would 
receive #70 per week in commission, indicating both the 
potentially lucrative nature of such jobs and the motive for 
regions using district officers as branch secretaries. 
The decision taken by regions to use their district officers 
as either i nriu try based officers or to involve them in 
branch administration or some combination of these two roles 
has produced very different regional patterns of payments to 
branch secretaries as Table 4.15 shows. Although it is not 
appropriate to discuss officer structure at this point, the 
broad differences between the three regions studied need to 
be briefly mentioned to explain these differences. Thus the 
Northern region pays out more per member to branch 
secretaries than any other region because it took the 
decision that its district officers should be industrially 
based, while the Lancashire region pays out by far the least 
because the region is dominated by large branches many of 
which are run by district officers. That the Liverpool 
region, with its radically different branch structure should 
pay out the next least is on the face of it surprising, but 
as the next two chapters will demonstrate the region evolved 
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an officer structure which made district officers secretaries 
of a large number of small branches. The Birmingham region 
has had most of its large branches staffed by district 
of "f i cnrs, and also morgeci some of its smaller branches with 
these larger branches in an attempt to make savings b eCZXLASe 
of its declining member-ship. 
Table 4.15 
Amount. paid yearly per member in branch secretaries 
salaries for all 0MB regions; during 1984. 
ýk 
Northern 2.63 
London 2.62 
South West 2.59 
Southern 2.42 
Midlands °". Fest Coast 2.28 
Yorkshire 1.98 
Birmingham 1.95 
Scottish 1.52 
Liverpool 1.41 
Lancashire 1.16 
GMB 2.03 
SOURCE: Calculated from GMBATU (1984b). 
The implementation of Decision ¬34 has stopped this avenue for 
making financial economies by abolishing the district officer 
grade and specifying that branch secretary responsibilities 
should be conducted by lay members, rather than full -ti mca 
officers. It is too early to judge the full implications of 
this reform, but, as far as branch secretary responsibilities 
are concerned, there is already evidence that its proposals 
are producing the re-emergence of powerful lay branch 
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secretaries of large branches who are able to stand for 
higher office in the union and, as shall be examined in the 
next chapter, use their brgnch block vote to facilitate their 
election. 
Summarising bri Rf 1y the main arguments: the commission system 
is at the heart of the strong tendencies that have 
traditionally existed within the GMB for its structure to be 
dominated by large general branches. The commission returned 
to branch secretaries is related to branch size, thus giving 
them a financial incentive to recruit now members without 
being particularly concerned where they come from or whether 
they can be represented adequately through their branch. 
With the growth of the check-off system the payment from 
commission quarterage to collecting stewards who invariably 
do not collect has grown increasingly indefensible. 
Informally, shop stewards have been made collecting stewards 
as a way of recognising their contribution to the union, but 
there is no guarantee that branches will recompense shop 
stewards for the financial losses they incur on union 
business. 
The system is potentially open to abuse and there is clear 
evidence that branch secretaries, either acting alone or with 
a few key people, can use this money as patronage. In the 
face of these strong vested interests national attempts to 
reform the illogicality of the commission quarterage system 
have been half-hearted, emphasing their discretionary nature. 
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The opportunities they present to establish commission funds 
to make payments to shop stewards or branch organisation 
funds for spending money on organisation and recruitment are 
likely to be taken up in branches where there is not much of 
problem anyway, while nothing will be done in branches where 
change is needed. Lastly, Decision 84, although having 
increasing democracy as one of its stated aims, appears to be 
replicating the problem that was noted in the early 1960s of 
a small number of powerful lay branch secretaries dominating 
regions through their control of branch block votes in 
elections. 
The commission system, therefore, not only produces a 
tendency towards the formation of large and general branches, 
which, as the previous section noted, are less likely to be 
well attended, but it also encourages the concentration of 
power at branch level in the hands of the branch secretary 
and, in some cases, a few key people. This suggests that any 
national attempt to increase democracy at the branch level 
will have to tackle fundamentally the inherent logic of the 
commission system if it is to succeed in any substantial way. 
Conclusion 
It is a commonplace to say that trade unions are their 
member a, but few recent studies 4ý tl eve sought to examine tow 
these members are recruited and organised within a union's 
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structure and relate this to concepts of union democracy. In 
academic circles it has become unfashionable to examine union 
constitutional arrangementsa' or structural factor s4M 
affecting union government, instead the vogue has been to 
place an often exaggerated emphasis on the importance of the 
workplace"" and an external factors. "" Accepting that trade 
unions cannot be treated as self-contained systems, and that 
studies of union democracy must take full account of the 
implications stemming from the growth in workplace 
bargaining, still must leave any serious study of trade union 
government with the task of examining the internal decision- 
making structures that operate in different unions, since 
unions can and do exercise discretion to change their 
structures with fundamental consequences for democracy. It 
is in this sense that the governmental arrangements of a 
union's rule book and its organisational structure are of 
distinct relevance. 
In the case of the GMB, its regionalised nature means that 
individual regions can exercise this discretion, developing 
structures and policies very different from those of the 
union as a whole. This chapter has sought to analyse some 
of the elements of this discretion. It is worth stating 
clearly its parameters and making eidetic what has been 
excluded from analysis at this point. The chapter has 
focused on non-bargaining issues not bargaining issues. 
These will be dealt with in Chapter 6. It has focused on the 
degree of horizontal dispersion of decision-making at branch 
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level, not on the degree of vertical decentralisation of 
decision-making to the branch ravel or on branch elections to 
regional bodies. These will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Within these parameters the study has shown that 
substantial variations have existed during the period, in 
regional recruitment policies and performances and in 
regional branch structures, which offer insights into the 
dynamics of democracy within the GMT. 
The GMB's membership growth record has been less than 
inspiring for a number of years. Its poor record compared 
with its major competitors has not been lost on the national 
leadership. Most of the reforms introduced into the GMB from 
the 1960s onwards have had increasing membership or competing 
more successfully with its rivals as their primary objective, 
but none of them have been notably successful. The GMB 
leadership's charter for change, Decision 84, is remarkably 
candid about the union's past performance. In a section of 
the document revealing titled "the historical problems" it 
comment 5: 
Since the war our membership performance has 
been weak, relative to other unions: we failed 
to keep pace with the growth of membership in 
manufacturing in the '50s and '60s, and whilst 
we kept pace in the private sector in the '70s 
we fell seriously behind in the rapidly growing 
area of public service union membership, despite 
the strength of our initial position. " M 
fhrve types of factors can be identified to explain this 
performanc¬?: E::; ogenous, GMEi national specific, and regional 
spec i. "f ic. The study found that exogenoLas "factors, most 
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principally the level of employment, provided only a very 
small part of the explanation for the GMB's poor growth 
record. While the growth bf white collar trade unionism, 
where the GMB was only partly organised, was one reason why 
the union's recruitment record was far inferior to either 
NUPE or NALGO, by definition, exogenoi.. is -factors applied 
equally to its major rival. the TGWU which recruits in 
idEnhi. c: ai. aareis and performed better during the period. 
In contrast, specifically national GMB factors had 
significant explanatory power. In overall growth terms, a 
major reason for the GMB's poor record was the inability of 
the national leadership to attract merger partners. However, 
distinguishing between natural and merger growth, the union's 
natural growth performance has been impeded by the passive 
attitude adopted to recruitment in the Cooper era; its 
"benefit-oriented" rather than "service oriented" approach 
and its image as an conservative anti-strike union during 
this period; and the lack of a clear industrial focus for 
membership representation in the union's structure. 
Notwithstanding these national factors, the study showed 
substantial variations in the recruitment and retention 
performance of the Birmingham, Liverpool and Northern regions 
which could not be explained by the differential regional. 
impact of exogenous constraints. 
The two major variations during the 1968-64 period, the rapid 
growth in membership in the Liverpool region between 1973- 
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1978 and the far better retention performance of the Northern 
region from 1978-1984, can only be explained by specific 
internal regional factors. In clearly establishing that 
regions have a large amount of discretion over their 
membership growth the study confirms and extends a recent 
study"2 which argued that the Scottish and Northern regions 
grew faster than other regions during the 1960s because of 
their regional secretaries using their power to break away 
from the union's passive approach to membership recruitment 
and hostility to industrial action; to involve shop stewards 
in negotiations; : introduce changes in branch structure; and 
actively involve themselves in recruitment. 
These findings apply almost equally to the Northern region 
since 1976. Under Burlison's leadership, the Northern region 
has developed a planned recruitment policy and organisation, 
forming county recruitment teams and involving shop stewards 
and other lay activists directly in recruitment. Increasing 
the region's membership has been stressed as a priority at 
the three-monthly conferences of branch secretaries and 
chairs that Burli. son has instituted, while new members have 
been attracted to the union by the high media profile that he 
has introduced and the campaigning image that the union has 
developed in the region. Although the practice of splitting 
up very large branches, introduced by Burlison's predecessor 
Cunningham, has been continued, however, the region, unlike 
Liverpool, has not introduced any radical change in its 
branch structure. It is this change which distinguishes the 
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rapid growth of the Liverpool region during the 1973-78 
period. This stemmed from membership pressure following the 
F'i 1 ki ngtans dispute which e sul ted in widespread changes on 
the regional council and committee. It was the new 
politicised lay leadership which was elected, not the 
regional secretary, that was the motive force behind changes 
which expanded the role of shop stewards and transformed the 
union's image in the region and, even more significantly, 
totally altered the region's branch structure through 
adopting a conscious policy of splitting up both large and 
general branches and encouraging potential new members to 
form their own workplace branches. 
Generalising, it is suggested that trade unions can improve 
their membership performance through treating recruitment as 
a national and regional priority; producing national and 
regional recruitment plans; forming national and regional 
recruitment organisations; involving shop stewards and local 
activists in the recruitment process; presenting a good 
national and regional image for the union; and through 
ensuring that their branch and representational structures 
are perceived as being relevant to the needs of potential new 
members. It is not possible to generalise about the dynamics 
of change, however, since that is specific to individual 
unions. In the GMD's case the autonomy given to its regions 
is such that either regional secretaries or regional lay 
leaderships can pursue expansionist or innovative policies 
which are very different from those adopted by the national 
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1 ead er sh ip. 
Nowhere is the ability of a region to exercise its discretion 
on an issue of fundamental importance to to democracy more 
apparent than in the area of branch structure. The low level 
of membership participation and the lack of any national 
policy on branch structure have been belatedly recognised by 
the national . leadership. 
Decision 84, characteristically, 
freely admits that "some branches do not meet regularly, and 
do not act efficiently as the means of communications" and 
gives the following damning summary of branch organisation in 
the GMB. 
The level of involvement of the membership in 
attendance at branch meetings and hence the 
quality of "branch life" has seriously declined 
over the last fow decades. Moreover, the 
structure of branches in the GMW has groan up 
historically on a very haphazard basis. There 
is a wide variation in the size of branches and 
the basis of branches, and there has been little 
central direction or even discussion over the 
structure of branches. " = 
Although there has been no formal central direction on 
branch structure there have been strong central tendencies 
favouring the establishment of large general branches. These 
tendencies arise from the operation of the commission system 
and the recognition of full-time lay branch secretaries which 
has been a feature of the union since before the first world 
war. The commission system encourages ambitious branch 
secretaries to recruit new members, but it also produces a 
tendency for branch secretaries to transform their branches 
184 
into large general branches in order to maximise their income 
or maintain it in periods of membership loss. The financial 
logic of this system also encourages the concentration of 
power at branch level in the hands of branch secretaries 
acting with, in some cases, the co-operation of a few key 
people, since they will naturally want to control their 
financial destinies. In this, the commission quarterage 
system, designed originally to pay collecting stewards, but 
now extended to cover payments to shop stewards can be used 
as a potential tool of patronage. Successive general 
secretaries from Dukes to Williamson to Cooper have turned a 
blind eye to this practice and either tacitly or explicitly 
supported the formation of large general branches and their, 
pervasiveness should not be underestimated. Although there 
has been encouragement at the national level, since the mid 
1970s, to move away from large general branches they are 
still very much in evidence. Over half of the GMWU 's 
membership are still in general branches. In 1982 the union 
still had 170 branches with over one thousand members 
compared with 171 at the end of the Sixties. 
Despite these strong central tendencies the branch structures 
of the three study regions have developed very differently 
over the past twenty years. While the Birmingham region's 
branch structure has remained virtually fossilised, owing to 
the strength of the vested interests of the regional lay 
leadership and the absence of serious pressures from 
elsewhere; the Northern region under Cunningham split i.. up its 
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very large branches, primarily to increase recruitment though 
improving democracy in the region was a subsidiary reason, 
but kept its general branc4es; and the Liverpool region split 
up both large and general branches moving much more towards a 
workplace-based branch structure than any of the GMB's other 
regions, with the regional lay leadership stating explicitly 
that making the region more democratic was the major reason 
for the introduction of these changes. 
The evidence available confirms this reasoning that large 
genoral branches are less democratic than other branches, 
suggesting that smaller branches tend to be better attended, 
thereby enhancing democracy in the union by extending the 
horizontal dispersion of decision-making at the branch level. 
More importantly, however, as will be argued in the next 
chapter, splitting up large branches removes the possiblity 
of these branches and hence a few branch secretaries 
dominating elections to the regional council, thereby 
extending the horizontal dispersion of decision-making at the 
regional level. Evidence also suggests that general branches 
are less well attended than other branchF, y. This is often 
because of logistical difficulties in getting to meetings a 
long distance away, but also because, since they are not 
allowed to discuss individual workplace issues, they are not 
perceived as being particularly relevant. 
Within the parameters set for the chapter, therefore, it is 
evident that, in general, membership participation in 
1e 
decision-making on non-bargaining issues is more horizontally 
dispersed in the Liverpool region, with its high proportion 
of members in workplace branches, than it is in the 
Birmingham or Northern regions with their large general and 
general branch structures. However, such is the diversity of 
each regions branch structure that levels of particpation 
vary widely within regions. It is the region which has the 
power to determine this structure and it is the region which 
will now be examined. 
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committees. Under the 1975 rotorm three standing committees 
were established; finance, organisation, and services, and 
lay participation was increased making them in the majority 
in each. Each committee has one representative per region 
and on the first two, seven of there are lay members, while 
on t'. ho third sub-committee there are six lay members and four 
regional secretaries. Lay membership participation in ad hoc 
sub-committees and Executive Council working parties varies 
but in recent years has always tended to have, at least, 
parity between rogional secretaries and lay members, if not 
positively +avourinc the latter. As far- as the union's de 
jure position is concerned, therefore, the 1975 reforms 
increased lay memhership participation in decision-making 
both in the Executive Council and its sub-committee 
structure. 
So far- the term lay members has been used to denote those 
Executive Council members elected by regional councils. A 
number of these lay members, however, have no work 
occupation. Of the two Birmingham lay members an the EC 
in 1994, for example, one was a full-time branch secretary 
and the other retired. it is estimated that over half of the 
Executive Council 's lay members are not directly in 
employment and many of these are f"11-time lay branch 
secretaries. Moreover, many lay members serve an the 
Executive Council continuously; in at least two of the cases 
studied, 'dar well over ton years. "' These members are, 
therefore, not representative cif the bulk of the CMB's 
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membership, but they narr, in theory, accountable to the 
membership through -(-. h n regional council. and rc. gi. onc-0. 
commi tt ca structure and this is. examined in Chapter `,. 
The potential constitutional conflict between the Executive 
Council, responsible for the government of the union, and 
Congress, the union 'c supreme authority, is rnsolved in 
practice in favour of the Executive Council. This is 
inevitable. A study of another union's conference found that 
"it cannot satisfactorily fulfil the role of a legislature 
for one obvious reason. The Annual Conference assembles for 
only one week:: ypir... For the rest of the ti men the 
r: SE? cut i VC? 1. ':: > Inc. h argc.?. " t' The game? 7. ME 
Congress. In addition, much of the Congress is dominated by 
the union's officers and Executive Council. The genera]. 
secretary gives a full report and a keynote speech and a 
great deal of Congress time is spent hearing and discussing 
the reports of the u. nion's national industrial officers. 
Fu_trthermore, the key resolutions at Congress are nearly 
always those put forward in the name of tho Executive Council 
and the impetus for these policy initiatives is likely to 
have come from the general secretary or, occasionally, from a 
working group of a sub-committee of the Executive Council. 
On detailed issues, such as the union's major review of its 
organisation for the 1990s called Decision 84, the union's 
research department, which serviced the working groups set up 
to examine different aspects of the union's structure and 
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f-i. nances, as cm important '. =ßurce? of ideas and information 
and strongly influenced the direction of 3MB policy. 
Factional activity 
As Cinapter One noted, much of the literature on trade union 
democracy hra , focused on the importance of the existence of 
institutionalised opposition"" or, in a weaker formulation, 
on leadership tolerance of organised opposition"O and it was 
suggested that these two views are best seen as a 
continuum. "' Factionalism was identified as a potentially 
significant intervening variable encouraging membership 
participation in union decision-making and one of the reasons 
research was focused on the 0MB was its apparent lack of 
fac_tional activity. 
There is no use-value in defining faction. activity in the 
GMB at a national level in terms which would allow a region 
to be thought of as a faction. Below the term faction is 
used to refer to organised opposition activity which cuts 
across regions. 
In the early 1950s it was found that "except when the handful 
of Left-Wing delegates differs on a particular point, party 
divisions are absent from Congress. Voting is normally by 
region. """ The situation is very much the same in the GMB 
in the 1980s. Delegates are reminded in the Congress agenda 
that 
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"delegates should understand that they do not represent 
any particular Branch. Any delegate elected to Congres 
is a representative of the Region, and cannot, 
therefore, be mandated by a Branch. """-'' 
The delegate is accountable to no-one but the regional. 
Congress delegation. it is normal practice for the regional 
secretary to hold all the regional delegation's voting cards 
and cast these according to the majority view reached by the 
delegation. In 1985 the London region caused a stir by each 
delegation member having his or her own voting card, but this 
has been exceptional. Normally, in terms of voting, the 
opportunity for opposition which does not win regional 
support is virtually non-existent. Similarly, speaking 
against the Executive Council view is di44 i. cult if the view 
does not have regional support as, on all major issues, the 
delegations are asked to appoint a member to express the 
region's collective view. There is very little scope for 
free debate and dissident views can really only bei expressed 
through resolutions which manage to survive the obstacles 
presented by the regional delegations and the standing orders 
committee. 
The union's rule and practices, therefore, minimise the 
likelihood of factional opposition surfacing at Congress 
unless that opposition has a majority in a region. Over the 
last ten years they union':, London and Liverpool regions have 
developed a reputation for being more likely to espouse left- 
wing demands, but, apart from these, the other GMB regions 
have tended to give stalwart backing to the union's 
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l eadersshi p on vi. itu :ti 4r al 1. political and most radmini -tr-ati ve 
1suas.. 
There is factional activity in the GMB but it is very 
Ii mi ted. At yri ou s ti mes attempt- s have been m cie to 
org2. n]. "e c'?. 
"bread left. " in the union such as exists in the 
TOWIJ, NCU, AEU and a number of other unions. These attempts 
have not p roved particularly successful. The most recent 
attempt at factional organisation has been through the 
auspices of the Broad Loft Organising Committee movement, 
which has considerable support in other unions, but a joint 
BLOC meeting of NCU and 1MB delegates at the 1985 Congress 
attracted only five 6MB members out of appro;; i matel y fifty 
present. This is indicative of the weakness y of opposition in 
the GMB. 
The main factional activity that does exist in the GMB comes 
from the Militant tendency"4 and is centred on local 
government, particularly in Liverpool. This has been the 
base for a Mi li tagt inspired and organised attempt to create 
a national joint shop stewards' organisation in local 
government. "" There are a few Militant supporters in other 
regions, mainly London, and some of them do get elected to 
Congress, but once they get known the region's officers are 
likely to use their influence to try to prevent them from 
getting elected in the future. They may even try and replace 
curamt delegates: Militant delegate from the Yorkshire 
region to the 19137 Congress was replaced when he broke r-. a 
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leg and v-aent into hospital.. This is not likely to be 
attempted in the +uture, however, as the delegate want to 3 
judge in chambers and managed to get re-instated and costs 
<awardc, d against thO Union.:! "'- 
Liverpool is also the base for the production of "The General 
Worker" ', which styles itself as the paper of the general 
workers and boilermakers' broad left. Aimed to be issued 
quarterly, its production appears to be sporadic and its 
distribution extremely limited. Its tone is Militant, and 
among its campaign aims is the familiar Militant slogan that 
the wages of all officials should be no more than the average 
wage of a skilled worker; it seems to be another "front'' 
organisation set up to suck new members into the Militant 
tendency. It does, however, have some non-Militant support. 
This is principally because some of its aims are attractive 
to members: the regular election of all officials; for 
national industrial conference decisions to be binding on 
negotiators; and for the Executive Council tu be made up of 
lay members with officials playing an advisory role only. 17 
Distributing propaganda and mobilizing electoral support have 
been highlighted as the hallmarks of factional activity. "° 
As far as national factional activity is concerned, however, 
propaganda distribution in the GMB is extremely limited. 
There is also little regular scope for factional activity in 
union elections at national level since the GMB appoints its 
national officers. The election of Basnett 's successor, 
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Chapter 5 
REGIONAL POWER 
The importance of the region in the structure of the GMB has 
been commented on by virtually every journalistic or academic 
survey or study of trade unions. Recognising the power that 
regional secretaries can exercise they have been variously 
labelled barons, ' oligarchic-- or mini-general secretaries. 
Without exception, however, there has been no serious attempt 
to provide any detailed examination of how a region 
operates. ' This has meant that not only have such 
descriptions lacked sufficient factual underpinning, they 
have also not been subjected to critical analysis. As the 
previous chapter showed, the regional secretary is not the 
only potential agent of change within a region; the existence 
of other potential sources of power suggests that the image 
of the regional secretary as a feudal baron is open to 
question. 
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, twofold: factual 
and analytical. Firstly, it seeks to fill a gap in the 
literature by describing how regions in the GMB are organised 
and operate; and, second, it seeks to analyse the 
distribution of power relations, both within the region and 
between the region and national and branch levels, and 
e>: amine their implications for democracy within the GMWU and 
for democracy in trade unions in general. Encompassing these 
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two aims presents certain problems in structuring the 
chapter. Since description and analysis naturally go hand in 
hand any attempt to separate them is artificial and can be 
obfuscatory. Although it has some benefits, therefore, it is 
not rigorously attempted where clarity of argument would be 
affected. 
Bearing in mind these caveats the research has been divided 
into two parts. The first section presents the bulk of the 
descriptive data on regional organisation, though it is also 
concerned with the vertical distribution of power in the 
union. The second is primarily analytical, focusing on 
regional elections and decision-making processes though it 
does have descriptive content. It is followed by concluding 
comments summarising the main arguments and themes. 
The power of the rule-book 
The boundaries of the GMB's ten regions today remain 
substantially the same as those established following the 
1936 re-organisation. The union's rules stipulate that each 
region shall be administered from a regional office and that 
no region can have the power to establish sub-areas or sub- 
regional offices without the approval of the Executive 
Council, which also can determine geographical boundaries. ° 
Constitutionally, the ultimate authority in a region is the 
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regional council. It has one delegate for every one thousand 
financial members in the region with a minimum and maximum 
representation of 16 and 130 respectively. " The regional 
council is elected every two years from nominations sent in 
by branches which, regardless of size, can nominate only one 
member and have only one representative.? Despite its de 
jure powers, which vest it with the management and 
administration of the business and affairs of the regi on, O 
the regional council is not a very important body. It meets 
only every six months and most of its decisions give formal 
approval to what has been done elsewhere. 
The standard procedure at meetings is for the regional 
secretary to give a report and for the minutes of the 
regional committee to be presented. The minutes are normally 
much attenuated, often simply a list of decisions reached, 
because of the desire for confidentiality in dealing with 
sensitive topics such as appeals for personal financial 
assistance or with disciplinary matters. The meeting can 
question the regional secretary or any member of the regional 
committee on decisions taken and, occasionally, diligent 
individuals do ask embarrassing questions, but the odds are 
very much against them since they are not likely to have the 
detailed background information available to the regional 
secretary or regional committee members. Moreover;, such is 
the time lag that the issue, for example the handling of an 
industrial dispute, is likely to have been already settled. 
The de facto function of the regional council is really to 
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bring together members from all over the region and to 
explain the policies of the union and the benefits that it 
can offer. It is also to elect, -from amongst 
its members the 
regional committee and representatives to other bodies; the 
Executive Council; the Appeals Tribunal; the TUC Congress; 
and the Labour Party Conference.? In reality, therefore, it 
is the regional committee and not the regional council which 
is the most important elected body in the region. The 
regional council acts as a "rubber stamp" for decisions taken 
by the regional committee and is only important in so far as 
it elects the committee, the region's two delegates to the 
Executive Council, and delegates to other bodies. 
The regional committee holds office for the same period as 
the regional council and, by rule, has to meet every four 
weeks and may meet more frequently, if business requires it, 
at the discretion of the regional secretary in consultation 
with the regional chairman. 1° Each region has traditionally 
had a regional committee of seven or eight members, except 
the Northern region which has had ten, owing to the regional 
secretary's idiosyncratic interpretation of the rule 
stipulating that the first meeting of a new regional council 
should elect a regional chairman, two lay delegates to the 
national body and a regional committee of seven members. 'L1 
The regional committee has the authority examine the books 
and accounts of any branch and can take charge of any of the 
union's property within the region. " The regional committee 
is also the disciplinary authority in the region, having the 
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power to authorise the regional secretary to prosecute any 
regional or branch official which it thinks is guilty of 
misapplying union funds or. _property, 
' though there is a 
right of appeal to the Executive Council whose decision is 
final. s4 
The regional. committee is also responsible for appointing 
regional officials as well as dismissing them. Before 
Decision 84 the region appointed district officers who were 
not subject to election and it also appointed regional 
officers who were called appointed officers and became 
regional officers following a confirmatory election by the 
membership after two years; now the region appoints 
organisers who have to be elected within five years of 
appointment. 1ý Finally, the union's rules also give the 
regional committee the power to sanction a strike where not 
more than 300 members are involved. 1 6 
Brief comparisons with its great rival the TGWU indicate the 
regionalised nature of the GMWU. All full-time officers in 
the TGWU are appointed by its e: "tecuti ve at national level , 
which is also responsible for disciplinary matters. It was 
not until 1968 that responsibility for hiring office workers 
and buying office equipment was passed down from Transport 
House to regional secretaries and administrative and 
financial decision-making correspondingly slightly 
decentralised17 whereas the GMWU's regions have always had 
such powers. Moreover, while the TGWUs national 
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headquarters has links with its branches through both its 
regional organisation and through its trade groups, the 
regions in the GMWU are thy. sole formal means of 
communication with the branch, despite the introduction of 
the Industrial Conference structure. The strength of the 
regions in the GMWU is also reinforced by the division of 
representation on the Executive Council and at Congress into 
regions, allowing regional secretaries and senior lay members 
to protect regional interests from action at the national 
level which might challenge their position. In contrast, the 
lack of these and other constraints in the TGWU enabled Jack 
Jones, their general secretary, to introduce sweeping reforms 
decentralising bargaining in the 1960s and early 1977s. '° 
(Bargaining issues are examined in the next chapter). 
The GMB's regions not only possess functions and 
responsibilities which, in other trade unions, are exercised 
at a national level, they also have much greater control over 
branches than most other unions. The rules of the GMW 
section give the regional committee almost absolute power 
over the branch. As was noted in chapter four, the regional 
committee has the power to close any branch or merge any 
branches "for any reason which it deems good and sufficient, 
or where, in its judgement, it is considered advisable to do 
so. ""' Combined with rules forbiding written communication 
between branches without the approval of the regional council 
or committee or the Executive Council, and forbidding members 
attending meetings of other branches without the approval of 
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the regional secretary, 2° this demonstrates the formidable 
constitutional powers vested in the regional council, 
committee and in the officg_ of regional secretary. 
It would be wrong to infer that these rules are constantly in 
use. Branches are normally given a wide degree of latitude 
and much of the work of the regional committee is routine. 
It deals with claims for sickness, accident and burial 
benefit, compensation, travelling expenses, industrial 
injuries, problems with defaulting shop stewards, and 
financial appeals and correspondence from outside bodies. 
The rules do give the regional committee almost total control 
over the branch, however, and, as the previous chapter 
showed, in certain cases they are willing and prepared to use 
this discretion that the GMWU's constitution gives them. 
The regional secretary is the region's administrator. He is 
responsible for drawing up the agendas for meetings of the 
regional committee and council and sending out the calling 
notices. He acts as the employer of the staff at the 
regional office and is in charge of the regional and district 
officers. 2l The office staff may vary from region to region 
but normally include the following posts: finance officer, 
health and safety officer, legal officer, and education 
officer, with perhaps separate officers for equal rights and 
political activities, though these functions may be combined 
with other posts. These staff and the regional and district 
officers are supported by secretarial and clerical staff also 
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under the control of the regional secretary, and co-ordinated 
by his personal secretary. The control that the regional 
secretary has over staff cqn be traced back right to the 
early days of the union's history, with nepotism, at certain 
times, being a prominent feature of staff appoi ntment s. " 
there are some slight differences in the ways that regions 
organise their staff, especially the way that district 
officers are organised, though again, as the next chapter 
shows, Decision 84 is changing this. The fieldwork conducted 
in the three regions also showed substantially similar 
patterns in the way that regions organised their outlying 
district offices, reflecting a common approach to 
geographical problems and areas of membership concentration. 
While the Birmingham region has eight district or branch 
admnistrative officers each in a separate office around the 
region, the Northern region has seven district officers at 
four separate locations, three of them based in Sunderland. 
The Liverpool region, by necessity, has to be slightly 
different, having two regional officers in Belfast and three 
district officers in an outlying office in Portadown. 
However, in Wales it has one regional officer in Colwyn Bay 
and a district officer in Wrexham and in its three other sub- 
offices it has contined the practice of allocating regional 
officers to sub-offices by stationing two of them in St 
Helens. 
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Regional Elections 
The focus of voting in the. MB is the branch rather than the 
individual. The method of election for most posts is by the 
branch "block vote" system: the casting of the total 
membership of the branch according to the decision reached by 
the branch meeting. In all, the branch, in addition to 
electing its secretary and a branch committee, elects 
delegates to regional industrial and equal rights 
conferences, can nominate one person and vote for: 
periodiocally, delegates to Congress and the regional 
council; occasionally a regional officer or organiser; and, 
even more occasionally, a general secretary. Delegates to 
the GMBU°s national governing body, two per region plus the 
regional secretary, are indirectly elected, being chosen by 
the regional council"" as is the regional committee. 
This chapter confines itself to the regional core of 
elections, looking briefly at officer elections, but 
concentrating mainly on elections to the regional council and 
committee. It will also refer to the elections for a 
region's Congress delegation since these are very similar in 
nature to regional council elections. 
Elections for regional officers 
Apart from the election of the general secretary, and the 
extremely rare case where the Executive Council wishes to 
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appoint a national officer or regional secretary who has not 
previously been subject to an election, 24 the only full-time 
r_ 
officer elections in the GAB are to confirm the appointment 
of regional officers or, as they are to be called following 
Decision 84's changes, organisers. This has not always been 
the case. Under the amalgamation rules all officer posts 
were required to come up for re-election every second year. 
When the first such elections were held in 1926, however, as 
chapter two noted, the National Minority Movement, a 
Communist sponsored trade union front organisation, stood 
candidates against virtually every officer in the union, 
leading the Congress of that year to amend the rules so that 
election was only required in the first instance. "O 
Regional Officer elections have not been at all competitive. 
The appointed official has two years to get "known" in the 
region and is given every opportunity to do so by the 
regional secretary and the officers, who also discourage 
well-known lay people from standing against their preferred 
candidate. Not surprisingly, therefore, no appointed officer 
has ever been defeated in a confirmatory election in the 
union's history and, as Table 5.1 shows, in many regions 
these elections are simply not contested. In three regions, 
Midlands and East Cost, South West and Yorkshire no regional 
officer elections were contested between 1972 and 1983, while 
the Scottish region's last contested election was in 1973. 
Of the three study regions, Birmingham last had a contested 
election in 1977 when the appointed officer duly won by 
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59,000 votes to 770; the Northern region's only two contested 
elections during the period were both held in 1982 and 
similarly won overwhelmingly; and of the five contestants in 
the Liverpool region the closest, in 1978, gave the appointed 
officer a comfortable win by 35,000 votes to 11,700. Noting 
this, and another case where a well-known lay activist stood 
against the official candidate, a recent study of balloting 
has, though it recognised the failure of these activists to 
threaten the official candidate, suggested that "they 
-r-ý. l - =. i 
Regional officer elections 1972-85 
Region Election= Elections 
Contested Uncontested 
Birmingham 2 83 
Liverpool 5 3 
Northern 2 5 
Lancashire 2 5 
Midlands & E. C. - 3 
Southern 2 5 
South West - 4 
London 7 2 
Scottish 
1 Q 
Yorkshire - E3 
SOURCE Calculated from GMWU Congress reports 
Liverpool region provides the exception to this formal 
confirmatory process. "'' This appears to rather overstate 
the case. Elections have been contested more regularly in 
the London region, with opposition candidates securing a 
similar percentage poll on at least two occasions, while the 
Lancashire region saw the most competitive election during 
the period in 1963 with the appointed officer winning by 
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48,000 to 1.9,900. Although there are variations in this 
confirmatory process there are no real exceptions: it is, 
above all, a futile exerci e and there seems little chance 
that the confirmatory elections for organi ser y which can now 
be held any time within five years ' will be any more 
meaningful as contests. 
Regional electoral variations 
More important are the elections to the regional council and 
the elections from it of the regional committee. Competition 
in these elections varies greatly between regions. Since the 
rules provide that the regional council comprises one 
delegate for every one thousand members, the growth in 
membership during the 1960s and for most of the 1970s meant 
that there was very little competition for places, with 
regions frequently having more places than candidates. 
This has begun to change with the onset of the recession, 
there were, in general across the union, more nominaatirons 
per seat in 1983 than in 1981, but in the London region there 
were not enough candidates dates to hold contests in either of 
these years or in 1979, ° and no contests in Birmingham and 
Lancashire in 1981 and the Midlands and East Coast region in 
1983. Only the Liverpool and Scottish regions have seen 
consistent competitive elections. Liverpool, had 144 
candidates for 80 places in 1981 and 122 candidates for 70 
places in 1983. 'Table 5.2 summarises the details. 
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Table 5.2 
Analysis of competiti oä for seats on the regional 
council in the 1983-85(1981-83) regional elections. 
R giors Nominations Seats Nom's/seat 
London 
Lan cash i re 
Northern 
Yorkshire 
Southern 
Scottish 
Birmingham 
Liverpool 
Mi dland 
South West 
95 (97) 
107 (94) 
124 (117) 
112 (108) 
92 (105) 
179 (154) 
100 (97) 
122 (144) 
64 (105) 
na 
55 (97) 
87 (94) 
99 (110) 
83 (92) 
76 (83) 
100 (107) 
78 (97) 
70 (80) 
64 (74) 
49 (48) 
1. cx0 (1.00) 
1.23 (1.00) 
1.25 (1.06) 
1.35 (1.17) 
1.21 (1.26) 
1.79 (1.44) 
1.23 (1.00) 
1.74 (1.80) 
1.00 (1.42) 
nc 
SOURCE: Calculated from (3F1BATU (1984c) p 181 
Elections for the regional delegations to the union's annual 
Congress are much more competitive. As Table 5.3 shows, most 
regions regularly have more than two candidates per place, 
with elections being particularly competitive in the 
Scottish, Midlands and East Coast and Liverpool regions and 
also in the smallest region the South West. 
The number of people standing for election to the regional 
council, however, can, at best, provide only a crude 
indication of competitiveness. Even purely electoralist 
conceptions of democracy--`O require close contests and there 
is no alternative to examining, in detail, the GMB's 
balloting system in the three study regions to analyse how 
competitive these elections really are. 
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Table 5.3 
Analysis of competition fol_ places on the regional 
delegations to the 1984 (1983) Congress 
Region 
London 
Lancashire 
Northern 
Yorkshire 
Southern 
Scottish 
Birmingham 
Liverpool 
Midland 
South West 
Nominations Places Nom's/Place 
88 (90) 41 (45) 2.15 (2.00) 
88 (88) 42 (44) 2.09 (2.00) 
120 (120) 42 (44) 2.09 (2.00) 
85 (91) 40 (41) 2.13 (2.22) 
80 (79) 40 (41) 2.00 (1.93) 
152 (146) 48 (50) 3.17 (2.92) 
81 (70) 36 (39) 2.25 (1.79) 
96 (92) .1 (15) 2.91 (2.63) 
101 (92) 32 (33) 3.16 (2.79) 
71 (56) 23 (24) 3.09 (2.33) 
SOURCE: Calculated from GMBATU (1984c) p182 
THE BIRMINGHAM AND WEST MIDLANDS REGION 
The Birmingham region, unlike some others, operates a 
straightforward ballot of all valid nominations for elections 
to the regional council and to Congress. As has been noted 
there were no elections for the 1981-83 regional council, but 
in the elections for the 1983-85 regional council there were 
100 candidates for 78 places and there have been roughly 
twice as many candidates as places in the Congress delegation 
elections each year during the period 1980-86. In both these 
elections the block votes of the large general branches in 
the region are crucial. As Table 4.7 demonstrated the 
largest branch in the Birmingham region has over 6,000 
members, eight per cent of the region's total 
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membership, with four other branches having between 3,000 and 
4,000 members, accounting for a further eighteen per cent of 
total membership. Since the last chapter found that large 
general branches are likely to be more poorly attended than 
smaller workplaces or one-industry branches, the branch bloat; 
vote system can give those few who do attend a potentially 
disproportionate influence. The union's rules, in theory, 
mitigate this by stipulating that each branch, regardless of 
size may only nominate one delegate to the regional council3° 
and one to Congress, "" however, its practical effect in the 
Birmingham region has been to concentrate power in an even 
smaller number of hands. 
Within the region there is a strong feeling amongst the 
larger branches that branches of 25 members should not be 
treated the same as those with over 3,000 members. Many of 
those interviewed stated that it was unfair that somebody 
from a small branch had a one in twenty-five chance of going 
to Congress, but somebody from a large branch only had one 
chance in three thousand. While this view is widely shared 
it is wrong on two counts: first it does not take account of 
the low attendance at branch meetings, and second it confuses 
the chances of being nominated with those of being elected. 
Members from small branches have virtually no chance of being 
elected, unless they have good contacts. This is because of 
the twin effects of the operation of the block vote system 
and the GMs's rules, which severely limit the scope for 
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informed decisions to be taken in these elections. Along 
with restricting the number of nominations a branch can make, 
as has been noted, the union's rules also forbid inter-branch 
communication and members attending branches other than their 
own. Moreover, candidates are not allowed to make personal 
statements and it was not until the 1991 regional council and 
Congress elections that they had to state their age and 
occupation -a minor change that caused outrage amongst some 
of the members in the region. Consequently, branches are 
given a minimum of information about the candidates standing 
and forbidden by rule from finding out anything more. As a 
result, when a ballot paper for the regional council or 
Congress delegation elections is put before a branch meeting, 
the membership are likely to know only one or two of the 100 
or so candidates who are standing. 
These circumstances reinforce membership apathy. A number of 
those interviewed expressed the view that it was pointless 
voting for people they did not know and would probably never 
meet. They also strengthen the position of those people who 
do know some of the candidates: the full-time lay branch 
secretaries; district and branch administrative officers; and 
the lay activist who is a delegate to an industrial 
conference. In theory, every branch member participating in 
the 1983 regional council elections had 78 votes, but only 
extremely rarely are branch members given the full list of 
candidates to vote for in a secret ballot. 
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The regular practice is for the branch secretary to go 
through the names at the branch meeting for the branch to 
"see who they know" and this obviously gives the branch 
secretary enormous influence over the outcome. The aphorism 
"knowledge is power" is extremely pertinent to these 
elections. Frequently, such is the lack of knowledge or 
interest that the branch leaves the decision on who to vote 
for to the branch committee, which often defers to the views 
of the branch secretary, or to the branch secretary alone. 
Even where a branch decides to support certain candidates, it 
is extremely rare that it will pick a full slate and those 
with knowledge of particular candidates, again principally 
the branch secretary, can easily secure the branches vote for 
candidates they personally favour. Clearly, therefore, in 
the Birmingham region, the practical effect of the GMB's rule 
book provisions relating to elections to regional council and 
Congress delegation elections is to give enormous power to 
secretaries of large branches. 
The lack of information about candidates also gives a 
potential influence to regional officers, many of whom are 
conspicuously more assiduous in attending branch meetings 
around election times. As one cynic put it "at least during 
election time you get a chance to see your regional officer. " 
While ostensibly there to talk about industrial issues, 
regional officers have been known to offer advice on suitable 
candidates to support. Not all regional officers act in this 
way, but many have personal friends standing for election or 
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re-election and make an effort to promote their chances. 
Inevitably, the regional officer tends to be in a weaker 
position for offering advice than the branch secretary, 
especially if the latter is a full-time lay member or an 
officer, but they do have a power to persuade which can he 
influential since many of the members attending branch 
meetings do not seem to care who sits on the regional 
council, or is a delegate to Congress, and they are liable to 
agree to any name that is recommended to them. 
Of course, it is possible to exaggerate the power that branch 
secretaries $rom large branches and, to a much lesser- extent, 
certain regional officers wield in the region's elections. 
While the combined effect of the balloting system and the 
union's rules is to produce a paucity of information about 
candidates which, in turn, puts power in the hands of those 
"in the know, " a number of branches have responded to this by 
developing explicit policies or informal rules of thumb to 
determine their voting patterns. The Kidderminster branch 
has a policy to positively discriminate in favour of women 
candidates. Other branches have a policy not to vote for 
unemployed or retired candidates and many branches, 
particularly those in gas and engineering, tend to vote for 
candidates from the same indultry or occupation. It is only 
a few of the more active branches, however, that have adopted 
clear voting guidelines and although the tendency to vote for 
candidates from the same industry or occupation is fairly 
widespread among company and one-industry branches the 
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dominance of the region by large general branches limits this 
impact. Interestingly, this practice of branches voting for 
candidates from the same i. Rdustry is also apparent in the 
executive elections of the TGWU and in the AUEW(E) 'a less 
important elections. "" The TGWU similarly issues no election 
addresses and disallows canvassing, but where its individual 
branch ballot system, resulting in the actual votes cast: 
being recorded for the respective candidates, precludes a 
small number of people exercising a great deal of influence, 
the GMB's branch block vote facilitates power being 
concentrated in a few hands. 
Party politics played no part in the 1983 and 1985 elections 
to the regional council or the three Congress delegation 
elections during this period of study. There appear to be no 
political factions in the Birmingham region and very few 
signs of any emerging. In the absence of political 
information about candidates it might be expected that voting 
decisions would, as in the 'T'GWU, be based on the industrial 
identity of candidates. While this is evident to some 
extent, it is not nearly so important a factor, however, as 
candidates being known and acceptable to a few key people. 
There was clear evidence in all the elections studied in the 
Birmingham region that the region's two principal lay full- 
time branch secretaries acted closely with the district 
officers and the remaining branch administrative officers in 
the region to ensure that the candidates that they favoured 
were elected. Between them, in 1983, these ten branch 
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secretaries, as Table 5.4 shows, were responsible for 48 per 
cent of the total membership, enabling them to exercise a 
decisive influence in the regional council and Congress 
elections. In effect the "big ten" branch secretaries form 
the central core of an organised group whose membership 
depends on an individual maintaining good relations with its 
critical elements. Its other members also tend to be branch 
secretaries because of thc"Ar potential control over branch 
votes, but may include influential shop stewards or branch 
chairmen. 
This group is not organised like "the Group" in the AUEW, "- 
nor it is a Party or a faction in the sense that these words 
have been used. It does not have regular meetings, relying 
on informal contact, and, although its members could be 
described as solid right-wing Labour, their purpose is not to 
put forward political views, merely to maintain their 
existing positions in the region, making them essentially a 
part of the bureaucracy rather than a faction opposing it. 
The "big ten's" group, therefore, is more of a loose alliance 
of personal friends and like-thinking individuals than an 
organised caucus or party or faction, but nevertheless it has 
been highly successful in dominating the elections for the 
regional council and Congress delegations. 
-'ht two key lay branch secretaries are the only members of 
the "big ten" eligible to stand for the election and, not 
surprisingly, came trip of the pall in the- regional. council 
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BIRMINGHAM-. AND WEST MIDLANDS REGION 
Analysis of membership covered by district officer 
(DO); branch administrative officer (BAO) and full- 
timc, lay members (FT) as branch secretaries in i983. 
Name 
A. Berry 
(DO) 
C. Co1c- 
(DO) 
W. Collins 
(DO) 
A. Parker 
(DO) 
Mrs M Walton 
(DO) 
G. Westwood 
(DO) 
L. Hines 
( O) 
R. Stocidart 
(I O) 
Mrs F. Blake 
(FT) 
N. Hough 
(FT) 
Branch 
Cheltenham 
Gloucester Gas 
Wi nchcombc 
Tamworth 
Reddicap Eng. 
Broad Oak 
Hereford Eng. 
Hereford Painters 
Rotherway Eng. 
Stafford Stoke Mun. 
Heath Hayes 
Drierley Hill F3SR 
BSR MATSA 
Hotel °< Catering 
Birmingham Central 
B/ham Central MATSA 
F. Dunlop ?c Erdington 
Willenhall 
Wton Area MATSA 
Wellington 
Market Drayton 
Banbury 
13ricrley Hill 
3400 
304 
59 
3052 
722 
28 
883 
253 
149 
1013 
110 
1169 
113 
849 
3205 
429 
6107 
3408 
486 
3143 
372 
Size 
376 3 
: 774 
1313 
1123 
2131 
9741 
Total MembErshi f 
3894 
3515 
1959 
2799 
48% 35,012 
SOURCE: Branch income and expenditure computer 
print-out sheets 25 June 1983. Manual 
pay sheets and records. 
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elections. They were followed by a large number of other 
branch secretaries, reflecting both their acceptability to 
the "big ten" and their power at the local level. Of the 78 
delegates to the 1983-85 regional council 42 were current 
branch secretaries, with interviews revealing that many of 
the others had been branch secretaries previously and were 
loyally renominated and supported by their branch for as long 
as they were willing to serve. If a regional council membor- 
i is not a current or former branch secretary then he or she is 
likely to be. a shop stewards or convenor and may he a branch 
chairman in addition to this. The relevant statistics are 
summarised in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 
BIRMINGHAM AND WEST MIDLANDS REGION 
Analysis of 1963-85 regional council by offices 
currently held 
Office held Number- 
Branch Secretary 21 
Branch Secretary and 21 
Shop steward 
Shop steward t6 
Shop steward and 14 
Branch Chairman 
Branch Chairman 4 
None , -, 
78 
SOURCE; 1983 Regional Council Ballot Paper 
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The narrow horizontal dispersion of power at the local level, 
concentrated in the hands of the "big ten" and their 
supporters, means that an almost self-selecting group sit on 
the regional council and, correspondingly, turnover of 
membership is low. In the 1983-85 regional council election 
only nine of the 1981-83 regional council members who stood 
for re-election were defeated. Of these six were unemployed 
and either very near retirement age or fully retired, the 
youngest 63, the oldest 76; one was in the process of 
becoming a Full-time officer; and only two were defeated for 
no apparent reason. This pattern was continued in the 1985- 
87 elections when, again, there were 100 candidates but this 
time for only 70 places. There was some turnover of 
candidates, with just over a third being newly elected; 
however, again only nine of those standing for re-election 
were defeated, with two--thirds of these being of advanced 
age. Six of these defeated candidates were the first six 
runners up and, since vacancies that occur during the two 
year period are filled by the next highest on the list, at 
least three of these became members of the 1983-85 regional 
council eventually. 
While it appears that putting the age of candidates on the 
ballot paper has had some effect an voting choices, the most 
important factor is still the ability of a candidate to be 
known and liked by the "big ten". Nine members of the 1983- 
85 regional council were well into their sixties and two in 
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their seventies. It is fanciful, however, to talk of the 
oligarchic petrification"" of the regional council since its 
average age is only forty-gight. But there are very +ew 
young members; only three of the 1983-85 regional council 
were under thirty when they were elected, with the bulk of 
the members being well into middle age, exactly half being 
fifty or older. 
Similarly, the ooccupational composition of the regional 
council reflects the concentration of power in the hands of 
the group centred around the "big ten", who tend to favour 
people from the same occupational and educational background, 
and this is reinforced by the tendency for company and one- 
industry branches to vote for candidates from the same 
industry. Fifty-six of the 78 members of the 1983-65 
regional council came from three main areas: 24 worked in 
engineering; 20 worked for the public utilities (gas, water, 
electricity); and 12 had no work occupation (full-time 
secretaries, retired or unemployed). Other areas were 
significantly under-represented: local government had only 
four representatives; and the health service and the chemical 
industry both had only one. 
Elections for the region's Congress delegation are conducted 
under virtually identical rules.; to the regional council 
elections and follow the same pattern of power concentration. 
It is to be expected that there would be some overlap between 
membership of the regional council and attendance as a 
delegate to the union's Congress. Only the more active 
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members are likely to be prepared to take a week's holiday to 
attend Congress and, in elections where information about 
candidates is minimal, regional council members are likely to 
he better known and hence stand a better chance of being 
elected. However, the degree of overlap is extensive and 
indicative of the power of the group led by the "big ten". 
Thirty of the 44 delegates to the union's 1982 Congress were 
members of the 1981-83 regional council, but a higher 
proportion, 27 out of the 36 delegates to the 1984 Congress, 
were members of the 1983-85 regional council. Moreover, many 
of the delegates had also been attending Congress 
continuously for a number of years. Despite the Birmingham 
region's delegation shrinking in size by over a third between 
1979 and 1985 due to the decline in membership, of the 44 
delegates to the 1982 Congress, 17 had attended ten years 
previously and no less than 28 had been going to Congress 
continually for the last five years. Only two had never 
attended a Congress s before. An even higher proportion, 
virtually half, of the 1984 Congress delegation had attended 
ten or more years previously, with 26 out of the 36 delegates 
having attended for the last five years. 
While the influence of the group centred around the "big ten" 
is pervasive it is not total and it would be wrong to suggest 
that all the delegates to the regional council and to 
Congress have been "fixed" by the block votes of the fLA11- 
time lay branch secretaries and the district and branch 
administrative officers. There are undoubtedly members of 
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the regional council who owe no allegiance to this group, but 
they are in a weak position. If they consistently criticise 
the "pro-establishment" views of the majority then the "big 
ten" are likely to exert their influence to ensure that they 
are not re-elected and do not go to Congress - the latter, a 
week's holiday by the seaside at the union's expense, being 
regarded as a privilege to be awarded for good behaviour. 
There is some evidence, however, of the existence of a core 
of disenchanted regional council members. According to two 
sources, in the 1983 elections for the regional committee two 
candidates stood against the "status quo" and in their short 
floor speeches one of them put forward a well-argued case, 
the other spoke very badly but made clear his irritation with 
the present system. Both failed to get elected but polled 
the same number of votes, indicating that there was a hard- 
core of people who were prepared to vote for change at any 
cost. Nevertheless, there has been virtually no turnover in 
the occupation of the region's higher elected posts. The 
only changes between the 1983-85 and and 1985-87 regional 
committees have been due to the rule change including a BMS 
section representative and to the death of one member, and, 
in turn, the 1983-85 regional committee showed only one 
change from its predecessor, this being due to a member 
becoming a full-time officer of the union. 
The average age upon election of the 1983-85 regional 
committee was 60, twelve years older than the average of the 
regional council. Of its eight members only two were in 
2 13 
ordinary employment; four were unemployed or retired; and the 
remaining two were full-time lay branch secretaries. In all 
r_ _ 
six were branch secretaries and one of the others came from a 
branch of over 3,000 members staffed by a district officor. 
At 1c st two of the branch secretaries had as few as 100 
members in their branch, however, and owed their position on 
the regional council and committee to the support of 
colleagues with : larger branches, showing that, even within 
the regional committee, power is concentrated rather than 
shared equally between members. Much of this power is in the 
hands of the regional chairman. The regional chairman is one 
of the two lay members of the "big ten", he has held this 
position for well over ten years and has served on the 
Executive Council of the union continuously since 1972. 
There have only been three occupants of the region's other 
seat on the executive during this period. 
Despite the lack of turnover, these elections for the 
region's higher posts are certainly regarded by the 
participants as being competitive and they devote a lot of 
energy into fighting them. The only serious rivalry is that 
which emerges occasionally between key members of the 
established group, however, rather than any threat "from 
outsiders which is relatively remote. The maintenance of the 
status quo during the 1980s has essentially revolved around 
keeping people "sweet" which means, as one regional officer 
lamented, "it is impossible to get into any of the pubs near 
regional office at election time because they are full of 
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regional. committee members buying people drinks. " It has 
also i. nvoIvnri using certain regional officers as unofficial 
campaign managers for the re~y candidates and, at times, the 
manipulation of opposition, such as when a member of the 
regional committee, who was planning to stand against the 
regional chairman, was chosen for the regional officer's job 
that he had applied for thereby disqualifying his 
candidature. 
In other words, competition in the regional committee, 
regional chairman and Executive Council elections in the 
Birmingham region is not political. It is heavily 
conditioned by the control exercised by the "big ten" over 
the regional council elections which ensures that their 
acolytes are elected. An informal system of-social contact 
and the threat that recalcitrant members will be prevented 
from going to Congress and removed from the regional council 
next time is sufficient, in normal circumstances, to keep 
members "sweet" and minimise opposition to the status quo. 
On the rare occasions when there are disputes within the "big 
ten's" grouping, however, other measures are available to 
control or manipulate opposition. If such opposition does 
not either carry or split sufficiently the "big ten", it is 
ultimately . bound to fail. 
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THE LIVERPOOL, NORTH WALES AND NORTHERN IRELAND REGION 
Liverpool, like the Birmingham region, operates a 
straightforward ballot of all valid nominations in its 
elections for the regional council and its Congress 
delegation. It also faces the same common obstacles to 
membership participation in these elections embodied and 
derived from the union's rules restricting nominations; 
allowing only minimal information about candidates; 
forbidding inter-branch communication; and thereby giving 
power to those few who know some of the candidates. As these 
obstacles have already been described in some detail, 
however, in the Birmingham study they will not be replicated. 
The section will, instead, focus on the more important 
question of why, given these powerful common factors, 
elections in the Liverpool region are, as Tables 5.2 and 5.3 
indicated, more competitive than those in the Birmingham 
region and indeed most other regions. 
In the 1983-85 regional council elections in the Liverpool 
region there were 1.74 candidates for each seat, slightly 
down on the 1981-83 figures of 1.8 candidates per seat, but 
still overall making the region the most competitive in the 
GMWU. The Liverpool region also has had consistently 
competitive elections for its Congress delegation averaging 
2.8 candidates per place in the three delegation elections 
during 1982-84. Where it was found that in the Birmingham 
region candidates were rarely defeated and 27 of the region's 
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44 delegates to the 1994 Congress had attended continuously 
for the last five years, only two of the Liverpool region's 
1984 delegation had regularly attended Congress over this 
period. Further, only just over half, 20 out of 35, of the 
Liverpool region's Congress delegation in 1983 went to 
Congress the following year and, significantly, while six 
were not nominated again, the remaining nine were, but were 
defeated. One candidate came eighth in the poll with 33,071 
votes in 1983 but only secured 5,811 votes a year later. 
Another, elected with 26,397 votes in 1983 received a mere 
542 the next time. 
The competitive nature of both the nomination and balloting 
processes was confirmed in interviews: it appears that many 
branches change their Congress nominee regularly, though not 
necessarily every year, and also have contested votes on 
which candidates to support. In contrast, other elections 
have seen varying degrees of competition. There were fifteen 
candidates for the seven member regional committee in 1981- 
8-, but for the 1983-85 regional committee there were no 
elections since exactly the required number of candidates 
were nominated. One of the region's two places on the 
Executive Council has changed at virtually each of the 
biennial elections held since 19Th, the other was occupied 
for eight years by one person. Despite these variations, 
however, the Liverpool region has generally exhibited a clear 
tendency to replace its leaders that has been completely 
lacking in the Birmingham region. 
217 
k 
The two special distinguishing features of the Liverpool 
region which have already emerged in this study - its branch 
structure and its factional political activity - are at the 
core of explanations for the competitiveness that is found in 
the region's elections. Surprisingly, given the number of 
small branches in the Liverpool region, the region's district 
officers, potentially at least, have a similar opportunity to 
control elections to the regional council and to Congress as 
that taken advantage of by the "big ten" in the Birmingham 
region. While in the Birmingham region district officers 
have acted as secretaries for a small number of very large 
branches, exactly the reverse policy has been operated in 
Liverpool with district officers being used as branch 
secretaries in a large number of smal 1 branches as wel 1 as 
five of the six branches in the Liverpool area with over one 
thousand members. In Greater Merseyside, which accounts for 
over three-quarters of the region's total membership, as 
Table 5.6 shows, in 1984 eight district officers acted as 
branch secretaries for 144 of the areas 244 branches, 
accounting for 52 per cent of the membership - four per cent 
more than the membership covered by Birmingham's "big ten. '' 
The composition of the regional council is obviously affected 
by the widespread deployment of district officers as branch 
secretaries. While over half of the 1993-85 regional council 
in the Birmi'ngham region were branch secretaries in Liverpool 
they account for less than a third as Table 5.7 shows. Since 
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the Liverpool region only lists one office currently held on 
its ballot paper, however, unlike the Birmingham region which 
lists several, comparisons-between Table 5.7 and 5.5 can only 
he tentative. Nevertheless it is possible to make direct 
comparisons on the occupational composition of the two 
regional councils and the two most striking differences are 
the absence of members from engineering in Liverpool, only 
one compared with 24 in Birmingham, and the lack of 
-r - I- I- Cý. I- 
LIVERPOOL REGION 
Analysis of membership covered by district officers 
as branch secretaries in Gtr. Merseyside in 1904. 
Name Number of Branches Size 
E. Fannon 10 19000 
J. Beech 15 2,828 
M. Egan 22 9,168 
E. Giene 19 : 3,876 
T. Hayes 16 3,056 
A. Pritchard 14 1,441 
B. Roberts 17 2,599 
K. Simpson 31 2,27 
Total Branches 59% 144 Membership 52% : 6,240 
SOURCE: Branch Income and Membership Sheets for the 
period ending December 1984. 
unemployed of retired members, only one in Liverpool compared 
with ten in Birmingham. This latter point again indicating 
the competitiveness of elections in the Liverpool region. 
Sixteen of the Liverpool region's 70 regional council members 
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come from local government, 15 from food and drink, and seven 
from chemicals, but, those areas apart, regional council 
membership is extremely occupationally dispersed, with no 
other industry having more than tour members. 
T_L 7-G -7 
LIVERPOOL REGION 
Analysis of 1983-85 regieanal council by office 
currently held. 
Office held Number 
Branch Secretary 21 
Eiranch Chairman 75 3 
Shop Steward 14 
Staff Representative 1 
Executive Council Member 1 
SOURCE: 1983 Regional Council Ballot Paper 
The proportion of the membership in the Liverpool region 
covered by district officers as branch secretaries certainly 
warns against simplistic interpretations suggesting that the 
break-up of large general branches is sufficient to enhance 
democracy in the GMB, since district officers can still 
dominate smaller branches through their unrivalled access to 
knowledge about the candidates standing for election. 
Indeed, members in smaller branches are arguably less likely 
to have the knowledge or experience to challenge the views of 
the full-time officer that shop stewards in large branches 
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can possess, making the potential for members to acquiesce to 
the suggestions of the district officer even greater in these 
branches. 
t 
In practice, however, the situation is somewhat more 
complicated. As one regional officer- commenting on branch 
structure said: "where there is apathy democracy can break 
down. " In these circumstances, which have been shown to be 
quite prevalent in the Birmingham region, decisions on who to 
vote for in the regional council and Congress elections can 
be taken on the advice of the district officer at a very 
poorly attended meeting, or taken by him directly - or by the 
lay branch secretary or chairman if the branch is not staffed 
by a district officer. Nevertheless, unlike the. Birmingham 
region, in Liverpool it is only in a few isolated cases that 
district officers or branch secretaries take these decisions 
themselves. This is because, as the previous chapter noted, 
the moves towards a more workplace-based branch structure 
that took place in the 1970s have encouraged greater 
participation in union affairs in the region. 
In essence, therefore, it is not the splitting up of ]. arge 
genoral branches that ensure competitive elections, it is 
more that the formation of small, and particularly, 
workplace branches establishes the basis for increased 
membership participation in the elections of the regional 
council and the Congress delegation. Whether this increased 
participation nourishes democracy, however, depends on the 
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information available to the membership about the electoral 
contestants, which, in turn depends on the willingness of 
district officers to offer.. disinterested advice and the 
ability of members to have access to other channels of 
information. It is this latter point which is crucial if 
elections are not to be dominated by officers and a few well- 
informed lay branch secretaries. Democracy is not increased 
by having a larger number of people attend a branch meeting 
and blindly support the views of their full-time officer; 
democracy is about people taking informed decisions -a point 
which is recognised by the regional secretary, John Whelan, 
and stressed regularly to members. 
The principal official channels through which members can 
obtain information about candidates is by personal contact at 
regional council, industrial and equal rights conferences and 
at Congress. These channels, obviously, are available in all 
regions and are no guarantee that information will not be 
narrowly concentrated in a few hands. In the Liverpool 
region, however, they provide the backcloth for, as one 
influential lay member put it, "members getting together and 
exchanging views" and form part of the "informal links" 
whereby candidates get known. In this sense "informal links" 
is an euphemism for factional activity. It is the existence 
of faction which constrains the potential ability of district 
officers to dominate elections by breaking their monopoly of 
knowledge about the candidates. 
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Clear evidence of factional activity in the region has 
existed since the early 1970s. The changes in the regional 
council and committee that tool; place following the 
Pi1kington's dispute, and which produced a transformation of 
the region's branch structure, were the result of a loft-wing 
faction successfully organising to overthrow the established 
right-wing hierarchy that had dominated the region throughout 
the Sixties. This faction has maintained control in the 
region since by developing its "informal links" at union 
meetings, political meetings and events and through social 
contact, enabling its candidates to get known amongst the 
bran c_hcas. 
Nevertheless, since the mid-1970s it has been strongly 
opposed by the much better organised Militant tendency, '', 
parallelling the political changes in the Labour Party in 
Liverpool, where the Left succeeded the right-wing policies 
of the Braddock era"7 and the political battle inside the 
Party is now exclusively between them and Militant. This 
congruence between factional activity within the Labour Party 
and factional activity within the GMWU's> structure in the 
Liverpool region is, needless to say, totally absent in the 
Birmingham region. In short, where voting in Birmingham is 
traditionally industry based and heavily dominated by the 
"big ten", in Liverpool the majority of branches vote an 
political lines in the regional council and Congress 
elections. 
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Despite the constraints on the potential influence of full- 
time officers in the electoral processes -of the Liverpool 
region, there is clear evidence that, since 1982, district 
officers have sought to use their positions as branch 
secretaries to inform the membership that certain candidates 
standing for election were supporters of the Militant 
tendency, and have been successful in preventing a number of 
them from being elected to the regional council and to 
Congress. The most notable example of this is Ian Lowes, the 
Militant convenor of Liverpool City Council's powerful Joint 
Shop Stewards Committee, who was a Congress delegate in 1980 
and 1981, but has been prevented from attending since 1982 
and failed to got elected to the 1983-85 regional council. 
It was this action, weakening the Militant faction's position 
on the regional council, and Militant's increasing interest 
in Liverpool City Council, which explains why the 1983-85 
regional committee elections wegre uncontested. Recognising 
that they were in a minority on the regional council, the 
Militant faction took a conscious tactical decision not to 
put up candidates for the regional committee which they know 
would not win, but would very likely alienate them from non- 
Militant GMB members whose vote was needed at meeting of the 
District Labour Party to control the Council Labour Group. 
This was Militant's main priority, along with maximising soft 
and hard left support in the region and in the Party against 
what they saw as "witch hunts" against Militant members of 
the Labour Party following its disastrous performance at the 
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1983 general election. 
The region's district offiEnrs, apart from taking an anti- 
Militant stance, do not generally promote the interests of 
particular candidates in the way that the "big ten" in the 
Birmingham region do. They do offer advice when asked but in 
most branches unsolicited advice would be counter-productive. 
It would produce an unfavourable response from the 
membership, since many of those attending the meeting will 
know quite a few of the candidates through the "informal 
]. inks" that exist and they would resent, perhaps more in 
Liverpool than anywhere else, being "told what to do. " The 
extent of this dissemination of political information cannot 
easily be quantified and any assessment can only be 
impressionistic. It does appear that it is not confined to 
just a few key lay members and, in fact, is relatively 
widespread. There can be no doubt participation in regional 
elections in Liverpool is more horizontally dispersed than it 
is in the Birmingham region and that this is due to its 
branch structure encouraging membership attendance, and, more 
fundamentally, to the existence of factions in the region 
which contest the elections along political lines, overcoming 
the information constraints imposed by the union's rules and 
breaking-up the potential knowledge monopoly of the union's 
full-time officers. 
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THE NORTHERN REGION 
The Northern region splits, __its 
ballots for the regional 
council and Congress into divisions rather than operating a 
simple ballot of all valid nominations. This initiative was 
introduced into the rc gi on by Cunningham over twenty years 
ago in recognition of the large geographical area that the 
region covers and, according to officers, to prevent the 
region being dominated by the bigger branches on Tyneside. 
Elections for the regional council have four divisions: 
Durham and Toes; South Tyne and Wear; Northumberland and 
North Tyneside; and Cumbria; while elections for the region's 
Congress delegation have seven: Cumbria; Cleveland; Durham; 
Northumberland; Sunderland; Tyne and Wear; and Bede, covering 
Jarrow and South Shields. The size of the divisions is 
deturmi ne: d by the proportion of t.. mi on members in the area. 
Candidates nominated by branches stand for election in th eir 
respective geographical divisions, but branches are not 
limited to voting for their own divisions and can vote for 
candidates from other areas up to the full requirement. For 
a region that is extremely active in external politics, in 
the TUC and the Labour- Party, however, the Northern region's 
internal elections are neither particularly political nor 
particularly competitive. 
Competitive elections for the Northern regional council have 
only taken place, recently. Throughout the membership growth 
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of the 1960s, and for most of the 1970s, there were always 
more regional council places than candidates. Although the 
recruitment climate had changed by 1981, in that year there 
were still only seven more candidates than seats in the 
elections for the 110 strong regional council. The 1983-85 
elections were more competitive still with 124 candidates for 
99 places, but within divisions competition varied and was 
still far from fierce. 
In the Durham and Tees division there were 41 candidates for 
33 places; South Tyne and Wear had only -five more candidates 
than the 31 it was allowed; the Northumberland and North 
Tyneside= division was the most competitive having 37 
candidates for ' places; while Cumbria had no elections 
since there were only ten nominations for twelve places. 
There has been more competition for places on the regional 
committee: 22 candidates for ten places in 1981 and 14 
candidates for the more normal seven member regional 
committee in 1983. 
From analysis and discussion, however, it is apparent that 
this competition is not primarily political; although there 
may be political differences between candidates, in the vast 
majority of cases, they are nuances rather than substantial 
and the determining factors are personality, ability and 
geographical and industrial background, with, historically, 
the regional committee being centred around members 
representing local authorities. The lack of political 
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cleavage has similarly meant that there has been little or no 
competition for the region's higher posts. The regional 
chairman has occupied his position virtually unchallenged for 
well over ten years, while two people served on the Executive 
Council continually from 1972 to 1980 in one case, and until 
1,983 in the other. 
Elections for the region's Congress delegation have been more 
competitive than the regional council elections, producing 
2.4 candidates per place in 1983,2.0 in 1984 and 2.3 in 
1985, but they have not led to any substantial turnover in 
the people elected over and above that expected naturally. 
No less than 46 of the 56 delegates who went to the 1981 
Congress had been delegates the year previously, while, 
despite the change to accommodate the large number of 
Boilermakers in the region post-amalgamation, nearly half of 
the region's 1984 delegation, 25 out of 60, had attended 
Congress for each of the proceeding five years. 1=urt. hermore, 
there is a fundamental overlap between membership of the 
regional council and attendance at Congress. Of the 60 
delegates to Congress in 1984 nearly two-thirds, 37, were 
members of the 1983-85 regional council with, significantly, 
all of the top ten in the regional council ballot for the 
South Tyne and Wear division being elected to Congress, eight 
out of ten in the Durham and Tees division, and seven out of 
ten in Northumberland and North Tyneside. 
The information presented on the ballot paper in the. Northern 
ii 
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region is even more sparse than its Birmingham and Liverpool 
counterpart. Like both the other regions it includes the 
date a candidate joined thV union, his or her industry and 
position in the union. It does not, however, include the 
candidates age, nor does it indicate whether a candidate is 
unemployed or retired, or a previous member of the regional 
council. In many instances the candidate's industry is left 
blank and often so is the date he or she joined the union; 
and, in common with the Liverpool region, it lists only one 
union position held. This means that the only information 
given about some candidates is the branch nominating them. 
Anal vsi. s of the industrial composition of the regional 
council and the offices held by its delegates is handicapped 
by the lack of information on the regional ballot paper but 
also because of an extensive clearout of files in the region. 
What evidence is available confirms the strength of members 
from local authorities and indicates that apart from this it 
is relatively occupationally dispersed, though since 52 per 
cent of the region's membership is in general branches the 
salience of this latter finding is questionable. 
More importantly, it is estimated that a very high 
proportion, around two-thirds, of the regional council are 
branch secretaries with most of the remainder being branch 
chairmen. This prevalence of branch secretaries is very 
similar to that found in the Birmingham region and is at 
least partly attributable to the fact that the region has 
229 
chosen to deploy its district officers on an industrial. 
basis. In stark contrast to Liverpool, where district 
officers acted as branch secretaries for nearly sixty per 
cent of the region's branches, the Northern region, apart 
from around twenty branches in Cumbria, had no district 
officers acting as branch secretaries. The two regions 
thus represent the opposite poles of the implementation of a 
supposedly common union pol icy. 
The Northern region, through not having district officers as 
branch secretaries, has retained much of the character of the 
0MW before the introduction of branch administrative officers 
from 1965, with branch secretaries occupying the key position 
in the branch as the main channel of branch information, and, 
as in the Birmingham region, dominating membership of the 
regional council. The region, therefore, gives some 
indication of how Decision 84's changes to make all branch 
secretaries lay members will affect other regions. From 
interviews in the region, however, it appears that there is a 
big difference between branch secretaries appointed today and 
those appointed twenty or more years ago. Where the "old 
type" full-time lay branch secretaries were very likely to be 
local councillors and county councillors and, perhaps, also 
Justices of the Peace, and their union concerns were almost 
exclusively about getting more cash, the "new type" full-time 
branch secretaries want power in the region. They may also 
be councillors, but they tend to look at local government in 
more political terms than their predecessors and this is 
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translated into their involvement in union politics. It is 
not a factional involvement, however, but, as chapter 3 
noted, a solidarity-tic involvement, the product of a 
recognition that the battle for jobs and economic prosperity 
has both a political and an industrial dimension, and bears 
the stamp of Eurlison' s efforts to give the GMB a higher 
political profile in the North. 
The narrow concentration of power in the hands of branch 
secretaries as the principal channel of communication with 
the branch membership, paradoxically, has been reinforced by 
the network of quarterly area branch secretary and chairs 
meetings that I'urlison has introduced in to the region since 
1978. Although this reform has undoubtedly been successful 
in improving communications within the region, by privileging 
secretaries and chairs it has also had the effect of making 
them into a lay elite, strengthening their position vis-a-vis 
the membership. By virtue of their position, therefore, the 
secretary tends to be regarded as the branches "expert" and 
the natural person to represent them on the regional council 
and at Congress. 
In the absence of political factions providing information 
about the candidates, the branch secretary, as the resident 
expert, is also a highly influential figure in deciding which 
candidates the branch will support. Within a branches 
electoral division this influence is not so important as a 
number of branch members may know candidates through inter- 
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workplace union activity, involvement with area recruitment 
teams, and membership of the district and county Labour 
party. The secretary and branch chairman, however, by 
attending the quarterly area meetings with the regional 
secretary and officers, meet the widest body of lay activists 
and hence are better informed about candidates. Ordinary 
branch members are likely to know something about one or two 
of the candidates standing in the other electoral divisions 
if they read the region's journal "Focus North", but, that 
apart, they are likely to know nothing more than the bare 
details provided by the ballot paper. In these 
circumstances, a respected branch secretary putting in a 
"good word" for a particular candidate is virtually assured 
of getting the branches support, even though some branches 
are noticeably more reluctant in voting for candidates from 
other divisions. 
The specialised knowledge that branch secretaries possess 
concerning candidates in regional elections is derived not 
only from personal experience, through attendance at 
meetings, but also from the per canal recommendation of the 
region's officers. Despite not holding formal branch office, 
the region's officers nevertheless play a crucial role in the 
elections. Regional and district officers were quite open 
about this role. The rodomontade of one was that "we as 
officers decides who is going to get on the regional cai. tncil. " 
Another declared confidentially that officers had "more 
control than you could ever imagine" over the region's 
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elections. Certainly the close contact that exists between a 
number of officers and branch secretaries through the three- 
monthly consultative meetings-, in normal officer-branch 
industrial dealings, through attendance at other 6MB, TUC and 
Labour part meetings, and through personal social contact 
gives ample opportunities for officers to make their 
preferences for particular candidates known. Put 
differently, it is not unrealistic to suggest that certain 
branch secretaries in the Northern region have been 
"incorporated" into the officer bureaucracy. 10 The power 
that officers and lay branch secretaries wield in the 
regional elections, therefore, is substantial and, in an 
occupationally diverse region with over half of the 
membership in general branches, easily outweighs in 
importance the tendency for branches to vote on industrial 
lines. 
The influence of officers is also apparent in the elections 
of the regional committee. As has been noted earlier, this 
traditionally has had ten members and although, in theory, it 
reverted to the normal rule book figure of seven in 1983, in 
fact, there are still ten members as the region elects seven 
members in addition to a regional chairman and two Executive 
Council members. Four of these were elected because, 
according to one regional industrial organiser (and there is 
no reason to doubt his word) he promised he would "get them 
on. " Undoubtedly, the opinions of, the full-time officers 
concerning the capabilities of regional committee candidates, 
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and they are not reticent in expressing them, do have a 
ii. -Arcing i of 
1 urnc_F? in these r. 1 ecti cans , but there are other 
factors ast Nork. Three arEg_ particularly apparent. 
Firstly, there is the tendency, noted earlier in the section, 
for local government delegates to vote for nominees from the 
same sector. Second, there is the geographical factor, with 
delegates supporting candidates from their own division, 
especially apparent in the case of Sunderland delegates 
voting for their local candidates. Third, there is the fact 
that five of the ton regional committee members come from 
branches with over one thousand members; three of them from 
the three largest branches in the region, the other two from 
slightly smaller but mutually supporting general branches in 
the same town. This indicates that there may be similar 
processes of controlling regional council membership to 
maximise support in the regional committee elections to those 
operating in the Birmingham region. The Northern region, 
therefore, notwithstanding its very different officer 
structure to the Birmingham region and its lack of very large 
branches facilitating the concentration of power, has evolved 
an informal grouping of officers and key lay members which, 
though not as extensive, nor probably quite as effective as 
that centred around the "big ton", is nonetheless comparable. 
The. ma-: ain themes and arguments e(norcjing from thc! examination 
of elections in the three study regions should be now 
relatively c1caar. Rather than rc capitulating them at this 
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point they will be summarised in the concluding comments at 
the end of this chapter. Before that, however, to offer a 
complete analysis, it is necessary to return to an area 
17 
already touched on, but not sufficiently explored: the way 
that decisions on non-bargaining issues are made in regions. 
The constraints an the power of regional secretaries 
Decision-making processes within the GMB's regions are 
regulated by the union's rule book which, it will be 
remembered from earlier in the chapter, formally give 
ultimate authority to the regional council, but effectively 
gives power to the regional secretary. Having already 
outlined these functions and responsibilities and examined 
the organisational dynamics behind the composition of 
regional committees, it is the dynamics of the decision- 
making involving the relationship between the regional 
committee and the regional secretary, which is now discussed. 
The canv rational wisdom on the relationship between regional 
secretar-icis and rcgiona1 committees is over thirty years old. 
Summarising i. ts argument: 
"The regional secretary wields very great power within 
his region. He is in sole charge of the day-to-day 
running of business and of the regional officers and 
regional office... 
It is through him that the committee receives most of 
the information on which to base its decisions. I+ he 
is a powerful personality, or a clever handler of men, 
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he should not -Find it difficult to carry his committee 
... with hI(fl 
Only in exceptional circumstances will the regional 
secretary lack the support of his district. The 
regional committee or council are unlikely to succeed in 
a dispute with their secretary. ""''' 
The argument is slightly qualified by noting that regional 
secretaries are not "absolute masters" within their regions, 
citing the 1940 case in the Birmingham region where the 
regional committee suspended its regional secretary. 
However, this is regarded as exceptional and the argument is 
more or less re-stated: 
"in more normal times there must be give and take between 
the regional secretary and his committee. For although 
they are unlikely to succeed in a dispute with him, his 
power in the union will be sadly reduced if he has not 
their support. "'' 
A fresh examination of this conventional wisdom is long 
overdue given the changes in British society and in the GMBs 
organisation that have occurred in the period since it was 
first adumbrated. 
The fact that the regional secretary is in charge of the day- 
to-day running of the region and its officers is not in 
dispute. What is at issue is who makes the key decisions in 
the region. The image of the regional secretary as a nearly 
all-powerful regional "baron" does not bear much relevance to 
the way that decisions are reached in the GMB's regions in 
the 1980s. 
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Three sets of key decisions delineate some of the major 
variations in the decision-making process. Since they have 
already been examined in tyi s and the previous chapter they 
need only be commented on briefly to reinforce the argument 
being developed. Chronologicraliv, they are the splitting up 
of large branches and the involvement of shop stewards in 
recruitment in the Northern region in the 1960s; the post- 
Pi. l ki ngton 's changes in branch structure and policies in the 
Liverpool region; and, again in the Northern region, the high 
profile image, recruitment organisation, and branch chair and 
secretary area meetings instituted since 1978. 
The -first is an old-fashioned case-2 of autocratic decision- 
making. The second an example of a regional committee 
forcing through major strategic policy changes. The last is 
an instance of consensual decision-making, with the regional 
committee fully supporting the change ideas coming from a new 
and energetic regional secretary. Allied to these sets of 
decisions, the principal case of non-decision making, the 
absence of change in the Birmingham region, is also an 
example of the power of the regional committee. The argument 
emerging very clearly from close analysis of the regions is 
that regional secretaries do not have the power in the GN 
today that they had over twenty years ago. Modern regional 
committees are far more likely to demand to play a full role 
in decision-making than their predecessors. The regional 
secretary has a power to persuade but not to dictate and in 
cases ra"fd is pute with the regional committee it is li I<cIl y to 
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he the 1 titter who Succeeds. 
In many ways the relationsbip between the regional secretary 
and the regional committee in the GMB today can be likened to 
that between a chief officer and a council committee. It is 
the elected members who determined the overall policy and the 
officer who is in charge of its implementation. This 
distinction has, of course, always been factitious, since 
policy formulation and policy implementation are not 
inevitably separable; nevertheless it has a verisimilitude 
which cannot be easily ignored. John Whelan, the current 
Liverpool regional secretary, summed up the way decisions are 
reached in his region by saying that members of the regional 
committee "prefer debate and discussion to being told what to 
do. " He sees his role as providing the regional committee 
with information so that they can make an informed decision 
on issues, which he will then implement in the region. In 
any event, such is the level of political activism in the 
region and on the regional committee, that a less enlightened 
regional secretary who sought to take policy decisions would 
quickly find his position untenable. In this respect the 
Northern region is not very different. While it does not 
have the political factionalism of the Liverpool region and 
has a regional committee and regional secretary which are 
like-minded on most issues, the regional secretary would no 
more think of riding roughshod over the wishes of the 
regional committee than his counterpart in Liverpool. Tom 
F. 3url i son, as a highly regarded regional secretary, is in a 
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very strong position, but he has to argue his case, with the 
regional commi. ttE(-: ý being the +ina1 arbiter. 
Regional committees, if they function properly, are the body 
where the important dcacisions on non-bargaining issues in the 
region are taken. But they need the type of factional 
activity or level of union activism found in the Liverpool or 
Northern regions to be effective. In the Birmingham region 
their absence has led to the atrophy of many of its 
functions, reducing decision-making to becoming virtually a 
trial of strength between the regional secretary and regional 
chairman. The regional chairman in the Birmingham region is 
in a stronger position than chairmen in other regions. Where 
both the Northern and Liverpool regions have a regional 
chairman, two Executive Council members as ex-officio members 
and seven other members of the regional committee making its 
size effectively ton, the Birmingham regional chairman is 
also a member of the Executive Council. The other Executive 
Council rnernbar is one of the seven regional committee members 
and, along with others, owes his position there to the block 
votc: -ý of the regional chairman's branch and those of hi 
colleagues in the "big ten". It should not be thought, 
however, that there is continual friction between the 
regional chairman and secretary. In general, the regional 
chairman is not interested in getting involved in the 
detailed running of the region and the regional secretary is 
allowed free rein to take decisions unencumbered by a 
vigilant regional committee. In case= where the regional 
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chairman and secretary differ, however, it is the regional 
chairman who iti: > most : likely to win. 
L- 
The process by which the three regions nominate 0MB 
candidates for constituency Labour party selection as 
Parliamentary candidates highlights the differences in 
interest, activity and decision-making processes found in the 
union. In the Northern region, the regional committee 
decides who will be the GMB's nominee for each parliamentary 
constituency and informs the appropriate branches. There is 
no dispute. Branches accept that the regional committee has 
the authority to take such decisions. The regional committee 
may take advice from a number of sources, but it is clear 
that it is the body that takes the ultimate decision. 
The Liverpool regional committee also decides who will be the 
GMB nominee in certain constituencies, but the political 
factions that exist in the rregion mean that this decision is 
not enforceable and, in particular, Militant branches decide 
independently who they will support. In the Birmingham 
region such is the lack of interest and activism of the 
regional committee that the decision on who to nominate is 
taken, if at all, by a full-time officer charged with the 
responsibility of increasing the level of political activity 
in the region. The only time in recent years that at least 
some regional committee members have been involved in 
deciding who to support in a parliamentary selection was in 
1985 over the re-selection of a sitting MP and brought the 
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region damaging n. Ati. on, -: -. x1 and regional publicity. 
National newspaper reports j' that Jean Gilbert, "a London- 
based interior designer" and the wife of Dr John Gilbert, the 
Labour MF for Dudley East, had been nominated to the General 
Management Committee of the local constituency party, very 
shortly due to go through the parliamentary selection 
process, by "the quarry workers branch of the GMB" was only 
the most prominent example of the union's involvement. Local. 
papers" reported, largely accurately, and in more graphic: 
detail how the LIMB and two other unions, the TGWU and EETPU, 
in a little over a week had appointed 36 fresh delegates to 
the crucial selection body. Four GMB branches were involved: 
two who were already affiliated to the constituency, but had 
not appointed delegates for a number of years, and two who 
newly affiliated. The Brierley Hill No 67 branch, although 
originally a quarry workers branch is now one of the largest 
branches in the region and its secretary, Neville Hough, is 
the regional chairman. Apart from the MP's wife, it 
appointed four other delegates, two allegedly recruited to 
the union at the MP's surgery the previous weekend, and one 
who did not even live in the constituency. The Coseley No 94 
branch also appointed a delegate, their branch secretary, who 
did not live in the constituency and who, when interviewed, 
admitted that the first he had heard of his nomination was 
when he read his name in the local paper. Three other 
delegates were appointed all with less than twelve months 
union membership. The Dudley Electricity branch, despite its 
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branch secretary being a member of the regional committee and 
soon to be elected to the Executive Council, was not 
affiliated to the constitu ncy and in doing so for the first 
time nominated the secretary and his wife plus another as 
delegates. Lastly, the No 133 Hotel and Catering branch also 
decided to affiliate and nominated two delegates: one a 
deputy headmistress in Wolverhampton and the President of 
Wolverhampton NUT; the other not a Labour party member and, 
therefore, ineligible. 
The constituency executive, suspicious of the validity of 
many of the new delegates, refused to recognise them and the 
local party did not meet for nearly six months in the middle 
of 1985 while, supported by the two neighbouring constituency 
parties and the Dudley Trades Council, they called for a 
national Labour party investigation into the alleged 
"packing" of the meeting by the new delegates from the three 
unions. Concerned that they would not get a fair hearing, 
since Neville Hough, the Eir i erl ey Hill branch secretary, in 
addition to being regional chairman, was also the GME's 
representative on the Labour Party National Executive and the 
current chairman of the party, they lobbied the party 
conference. The following month's NEC, however, somewhat 
ungrammatically, ruled that: 
"Provided the individuals are members of the body 
appointing them and there is written confirmation from a 
responsible officer of that organisation that the 
delegate has been properly appointed on behalf of the 
affiliated branch. The Labour Party cannot question 
whether an individual member fulfils the requirements of 
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the Rules of an affiliated Trade Union to be a member of 
that Trade Union nor to question the authority of the 
responsible officers of that organisation to confirm 
that an individual is a properly appointed delegate from 
that organisation. """, - 
This pronouncement effectively ended the dispute since none 
of the unions were prepared to break ranks and admit that 
there might have been some irregularities in the way they had 
appointed delegates. All of them assured the NEC that their 
rules had been strictly followed. The GMB, therefore, 
despite glaring breaches in its rules and procedures, was 
able to bluff it out successfully. 
The decision to get involved in the Dudley East selection was 
taken following a direct request for assistance by the 
sitting MP to the union's regional office. This was referred 
by the regional secretary to the regional chairman who took 
the decision alone. The regional committee were not 
consulted. Implementation was left to a full-time officer 
who allocated delegates to branches from a list provided by 
the tIP. It appears that two branch secretaries were 
contacted to see whether they thought their branch would mind 
affiliating and sending delegates; and, as has been noted, 
one branch secretary was not informed. None of branches held 
meetings to appoint delegates before the list was sent in 
from the regional office and, although all of them met 
subsequently and ratified the decisions taken on their 
behalf, in at least one case, they did so only after a very 
acrimonious debate. 
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The Birmingham region's actions in the John Gilbert affair 
show not only the extent to which an apathetic membership and 
ti 
a disinterested regional committee can have decisions taken 
for them, they also highlight the power of the regional 
chairman. It was he, not the regional secretary, who took 
the final decision. While, to some extent, this is 
understandable, given the fact that his participation was 
required in the enterprise, it is also an indication of his 
considerable influence. Two recent decisions, emerging from 
follow-up interviews, where the regional secretary and 
chairman had different opinions, make this point even more 
forcibly. Both involve the appointment of full-time officers 
where it might be expected that the views of the regional 
secretary, as the person charged with the responsibility 
under rule of managing the region's officers, would be the 
determining factor. 
The first revolved around the appointment in 1986 of the 
region's two regional industrial officers as a result of 
Decision 84's changes. These are important posts, involving 
managing the region's organisers and deputising for the 
regional secretary in his absence. While both the regional 
secretary and chairman agreed on the suitability of one 
person for these posts, dispute centred on the other with the 
regional chairman's nominee being appointed by the regional 
committee. The second case concerns the most recent 
organiser appointment and here disagreement crystallised 
around the regional secretary supporting a woman candidate - 
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there are no women organisers in the region - and the 
regional chairman advocating appointing the region's 
education officer. The regional committee, which meets 
fortnightly, was deadlocked for three months over the 
appointment, until, finally, the person favoured by the 
regional chairman was appointed. 
The fierceness of this battle is indicative of the mutual 
antipathy that exists between the regional chairman and 
secretary and shows that the regional chairman cannot easily 
get his way, but he is likely to succeed because, in most 
cases, he can rely on the support of a nucleus of regional 
committee members who owe their place to him. It, moreover, 
reinforces the general point that the power a regional 
secretary has is the power to persuade the regional committee 
to adopt a particular course of action not the power to 
dictate. Where regional committees are active debating 
forums this is patently obvious, but it is true of even 
relatively ineffective committees. The days when the 
Birmingham regional secretary could buy five thousand shares 
in a local radio station without asking the regional 
committee's permission have long gone. 
Conclusion 
The GMB's highly regionalised structure is unique amongst 
British trade unions. Although many other unions have to 
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regional tier of government or its equivalent, only the 
autonomy given to the MUM's areas even begins to approach the 
power that the GMB's regions wield within the union and its 
electoral processes and highly factional politics are very 
different from the GMB. 44 While the GMB's great rival, the 
TGWU, appoints its officers at national level and has direct 
contact with its branches through the union's trade group 
structure, in the GMB officers are appointed by the regions 
which are the sole formal means of communication with the 
branch. Regional power is further consolidated by the 
division of representation on the Executive Council and at 
Congress into regions and the formidable rule book provisions 
which give the region almost absolute authority over the 
branch. 
The vertical concentration of power at the regional level in 
the GMB on non-bargaining issues has been widely recognised 
and is nothing new. What is not generally appreciated, 
however, is the significant variations that exist between the 
GMB's regions. Most academic and journalistic references to 
the OMB's regions, wrongly, seem to imply that they are 
identical monlithic institutions ruled by an all-powerful 
regional baron and even those studies which do recognise 
regional differences attribute them solely to the actions of 
the regional secretary. "" The previous chapter showed the 
three study regions had very different branch structures and 
noted how the impetus for the changes which developed a more 
workplace-based branch structure in the Liverpool region came 
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through the region's democratic structure and were initiated 
by thal regional. crommittec. A, not.. the. r-egi. onal secretary. 
a-. 
This chapter further strongly refutes the view that regional 
secretaries dominate their regions. The evidence is that 
decision-making at the regional level, far from being 
concentrated solely in the hands of the regional secretary 
is, in fact, dispersed across the regional committee which is 
the body that takes the key decisions in the region, not the 
regional council despite its de jure authority. As the 
region's administrator the regional secretary's views can be 
highly influential, but, in the GMB today, a regional 
secretary's power is the power to persuade not the power to 
dictate. 
The principal way in which the membership can participate in 
the government of the region and the formation of union 
policy on non-bargaining issues is through the union's 
electoral system, most notably through nominating and 
electing delegates to the regional council and to Congress. 
Although the regional council is not, in itself, ra 
particularly important decision-making body, its 
composition and hence its election is important in that it is 
the body that elects the regional committee and the region's 
representatives on the Executive Council. The only other 
elections held relatively regularly in the regions, the 
confirmatory elections of regional organisers, have nothing 
more than ceremonial value since no official candidate has 
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ever come remotely close to being-defeated throughout the 
union's entire history. 
The GMB's rules and electoral system heavily condition 
membership participation in regional decision-making. The 
focus of voting in the GMB has traditionally been the branch, 
rather than the individual, with the union using the branch 
block vote system. This method of voting, casting the total 
branch membership according to the decisions reached at the 
branch meeting, emphasises the importance of regional 
variations in branch structure. Potentially, at least, the 
branch block vote system gives a disproportionate influence 
to activists in large general branches; for instance, over 
one quarter of the Birmingham region's membership is 
contained in just five general branches, which, as the 
previous chapter showed, are likely to be less well-attended 
than company or one-industry branches. The union's rules, in 
theory, mitigate this by stipulating that each branch, 
regardless of size, may nominate only one delegate to the 
regional council and one to Congress. By also forbidding 
inter-branch communication, preventing candidates from making 
persona]. statements or members attending branches other than 
their own, however, they ensure that branch members are 
likely to know nothing more about the candidates in these 
elections than the minimal information provided on the ballot 
paper. 
The formidable rule book obstacles to branch members taking 
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informed decisions 
membership apathy: 
view that it was p 
know and would not 
position of those, 
full. -"tme officers, 
on which candidates to support reinforce 
a number of those interviewed expressd the 
ointlesstvotinq for candidate; they did not 
over meet: but they also strengthen the 
principally the branch secretaries and the 
who do know some of the candidates. The 
aphorism "knowledge is power" is particularly pertinent to 
the GMB; 's electoral system. It is interesting, therefore, to 
find that within the rigid framework set by the union's rules 
electoral competition varies greatly between regions. 
Throughout the 196Os and 1970s many regions frequently had 
more places than candidates for the regional council making 
ballots unnecessary as regional councils, by rule comprising 
one delegate for every one thousand members, expanded in size 
with the growth in union membership during most of this 
period. These elections have become more competitive as 
regional councils have reduced in size following membership 
losses since 1979, but even so the most competitive region 
had only 1.79 candidates per seat for its 1983-85 regional 
council and two regions had more seats than candidates. 
Congress delegation elections, with a narrower 
representational basis, one delegate for two thousand 
members, have been correspondingly more competitive with, in 
1984, all but one of the GMB's ten regions having more than 
two candidates per place and three regions having over three 
times as many candidates as places. The level of competition 
for places on the regional council was very similar in the 
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Birmingham and Northern regions, but dramatically di ffc=, rent 
in the Liverpool region which, along with Scotland, has the 
most competitive regional council elections in the GMB. 
The research found that in the Birmingham and Northern 
regions the influence of officers in the regional council 
elections was extensive. In thn Birmingham region there was 
clear evidence that the region's eight district and branch 
administrative of fi c_ers with branch secretary 
responsibilities acted together with the region's two 
principal full-time lay branch secretaries to ensure that the 
candidates they supported were elected. Between them these 
"big ten" branch secretaries control around 43 per rent of 
the regions membership and form the core of an organised 
group, best seen as a loose alliance of personal friends and 
like-minded individuals whose purpose is not political, but 
to maintain their existing positions, making them essentially 
a part of the bureaucracy rather than a faction opposing it. 
Facilitated by membership apathy, they have been able to do 
this so successfully that that is very little turnover of the 
regional council or Congress delegation from one period to 
another. 
The Northern region in contrast to Birmingham does not have 
its very large branches; has virtually no district officers 
as branch secretaries; is much more politically active; and 
splits its regional council ballot into five geographical 
divisions rather than holding a straightforward ballot of all 
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validly nominated persons. Nevertheless, it has evolved an 
informal grouping of officers and key lay members which, 
though not as extensive or as effective in elections, is 
certainly comparable with the group centred around the "big 
ten. " Two factors have made this possible: the fact that the 
Northern region has a better system of official internal 
communication than any other region, through its newspaper, 
area branch secretaries and chairs meetings, and strong 
officer links at the workplace; and the tradition of 
solidaristic political activism that is common in the North 
and has been assiduously fostered in the region. Together 
these factors enable the views of the union's officers to be 
easily heard and, as respected opinion formers, in the 
absence of political cleavage they are likely to be accepted, 
particularly by the branch secretaries who play a key role in 
the elections. 
The fieldwork in the Liverpool region clearly demonstrates 
that its highly competitive elections are the product of the 
region's branch structure and the factional political 
activity within the union on Merseyside. While the 
Liverpool region's workplace-based branch structure avoids 
the possibility of a small number of large general branches 
dominating regional elections through their block votes, the 
widespread deployment of district officers as branch 
secretaries in Greater Merseyside, (they average eighteen 
branches each and account for 52 per cent of the membership), 
means that the potential for officer influence is still 
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there. It is, however, dispersed under this branch 
structure, which, as the previous chapter showed, also 
encourages greater member yip participation. In itself, this 
is no guarantee that members, rather than officers, will 
effectively take the decisions on which candidates to 
support. What is important is the membership's access to 
information about the contestants and it is here that the 
region's factional activity exorcises a crucial influence, 
with the Gt1fi 's representational structure being used as a 
backcloth for members getting together and exchanging views. 
Factional activity in the GMB has mirrored the factional 
activity taking place in the Liverpool Labour party, with the 
left taking power in the early 1970s from the machine 
politics of the right and Militant taking over as the main 
opposition to them since the mid 1970s. Both factions ensure 
that their supporters know who to vote for, the former by 
"informal links" at union meetings, political meetings and 
events and social contact, the latter through their highly 
disciplined organisation. Consequently, the scope for 
officer influence in regional elections is much reduced. 
There is evidence that since 1982 some officers have actively 
pointed out to their branches that certain candidates are 
Militant supporters, successfully preventing their election, 
but, in a highly politically active region, officer 
interference tends to be resented by the membership and is 
rarely contemplated. Membership particpation in deciding the 
composition of the regional council is, therefore, more 
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dispersed in the Liverpool region than it is in the Northern 
region and far more dispersed than in the Birmingham region. 
t 
Analysis of the Birmingham, Liverpool and Northern regions 
both confirms and suggests modifications to the conclusions 
of a recent study of ballots in number of unions, including 
the GMB. It found: 
The GMWU's elections are, apart from one or two 
regions, free of organized political activity associated 
in other unions with right and left-wing groups. It is 
rather that activists are elected because they have 
proved themselves in particular roles or that it is 
'their turn' to be elected to council or the executive. 
In this process the local full-time officers influence 
over which candidates should or should not be supported 
is extensive. Those who 'rock the boat' are liable to be 
dropped next time round or opposed by someone more in 
tune with the values prized in the traitionally moderate 
GMWU. "ars 
From the research in the three study regions, and drawing 
from knowledge of other GMB regions, there can be no doubt 
that the organised political activity of the Liverpool region 
is very much an exception. The research also strongly 
confirms the influence that officers, though not necessarily 
local full-time officers, have over the electoral process, 
offering fresh insights on its extent and variation. It 
further indicates that it is perhaps overgenerous to suggest 
that activists are elected because they have "proved" 
themselves. Branch secretaries are not disinterested 
parties, many of them want to be elected to the regional 
council and committee, and they will use their influence with 
253 
the region's full-time officers and other branch secretaries 
to ensure that they get support. Of course, ability does 
have some relevance in declAi ng who officers choose to 
support but "voting the right way" is much more important. 
The Birmingham study showed that if the district officers 
were "talent spotters" they were very bad at their job 
indeed, but if their job was to select people who, when 
nudged, voted the right way, their expertise could not be 
faulted. 
The extensive control. of the regional. council elections in 
the Birmingham region has enabled the regional chairman, one 
of the "big ten, " to ensure that people who owe their 
allegiance to him are elected to the regional committee, 
which, coupled with the fact that the region does not split 
the offices of regional chairman and Executive Council 
member, has concentrated power even further. While the 
Liverpool and Northern regions have strong regional chairmen, 
they also have active regional committees, whose members are 
more or less equals, and decisions are reached collectively 
through debate and dicussion in which the regional secretary, 
as has been rioted, has the power to persuade not to dictate. 
The recent appointment by the London regional committee of ca 
new regional secretary with a long history of "rocking the 
boat" is another example of their power. In the Birmingham 
region, however, the power of the regional committee is 
virtually concentrated in the hands of one person and, in 
cases of disagreement with the regional secretary it is 
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likely to be the regional chairman who succeeds. 
In concluding, it is suggested that four factors are 
particularly relevant to democratic involvement in decision- 
making in trade unions on non-bargaining issues at the 
regional or equivalent level: constitutional provisions; 
branch structure; factionalism; and political activity. 
Recognising the importance of the union's rules is redolent 
of the approach taken to trade union democracy in the 
Fifties, 4ý but it is inescapable. The GMB's rules ensure 
that the key posts in the region, the regional chairman, 
Executive Council delegates and regional committee are all 
indirectly elected, and officially allow only minimal 
information to be provided about regional council candidates, 
not to mention stipulating that the increasingly indefensible 
branch block vote system is to be used in these elections. 
As an aside, an interesting area for future study will the 
changes imposed by the 1984 Trade Union Act forcing the union 
to elect its Executive Council, including the regional 
secretaries, by individual workplace ballot. Significantly, 
it has been decided that candidates in these elections can 
issue personal statements which is definitely a step in the 
right direction. It is a pity, however, that that the GMEI 
did not grasp this opportunity for change and decide to 
directly elect its regional chairmen and regional committees 
by similar means. 
Branch structure is relevant to involvement in decision- 
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making in two ways. First, it affects the level of 
participation at branch meetings; as the previous chapter 
t 
established, workplace branches are likely to be better 
attended than general branches. Second, in trade unions 
operating the branch block vote system, the existence of 
large branches means that power can be concentrated in a few 
branches if they decide to act in concert. The existence of 
faction is also important in that it constrains the influence 
of the union's officers in the electoral process and, 
particularly where a union's rules forbid canvassing or the 
issuing of manifestoes, it provides an unofficial 
communication channel to the membership, preventing one group 
of people establishing a knowledge monopoly, and enabling 
them to reach informed decisions. Lastly, in the absence of 
factionalism, it is suggested that political activity 
produces a reverse interest in union activity: members 
involved in democratic politics are more likely to perceive 
the need For democratic involvement in trade unions, and have 
the procedural and committee skills to carry this through, 
than non-politically involved members. 
Having outlined the substantial regional differences which 
exist between the three study regions on the dispersal of 
decision-mating on non-bargaining issues, the focus is now 
switched to describing and analysing membership participation 
in collective bargaining. 
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Chapter 6 
MEMBERSHIP PARTICIPATION IN-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Discussion and analysis of the OMB's organisation up to now 
has touched on its industrial organisation only tangentially, 
principally when referring to the union's officer structure. 
While this approach has been justified in terms of the 
importance and comparative neglect of the internal government 
of trade unions, it has always been recognised that the 
primary purpose of trade unions is to improve materially the 
wages and conditions of its members. Certainly, this is all 
some members are concerned about and any study of union 
democracy which fails to examine membership involvement in 
industry would be fatally flawed. 
The academic context for this chapter is the voluminous post- 
Donovan literature on the workplace; its specific focus is 
the often neglected relationship between workplace and 
union. ' The chapter has two further limitations of focus. 
In examining decision-making on industrial issues the focus 
is on membership involvement in determining industrial policy 
and strategy not on the power relations between the GMB and 
different employers. Similarly, although general comments 
can be made, a detailed study of decision-making in all the 
industries which the GMB organise is well beyond the scope of 
this study and is not attempted. In consequence, research 
has focused principally on local government, as one of the 
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GMB's traditional strengths, and on private manufacturing, 
though information is provided on other sectors where it is 
available. In the case oft-local government, information has 
proved to be particularly rich and its treatment is 
correspondingly lengthier. 
Since the 1936 reorganisation the GMB's industrial 
organisation has revolved around national officers, appointed 
with responsibilities for one or more industries, depending 
can the scale of the union's membership, and officers 
appointed by the region on similar industrial lines. -- The 
traditional practice embodied national officers negotiating 
pay at industry level. and regional officers keeping the 
membership informed of developments, in collective bargaining. 
It was this model of industrial organisation that was carried 
on by the union in the post-war period. 
While the existence of shop stewards was formally recognised 
in the Union's rules in 1951,3 in common with many other 
trade unions, no attempt was made to integrate them into the 
union's decision-making structure on bargaining issues. 
Indeed, under successive general secretaries the union gained 
a reputation for being hostile to shop-floor involvement and 
for treating members as clients rather than participants, 
with union officers often signing agreements with employers 
over the heads of its members. 
This high-handed approach of allowing officers to make their 
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own judgements without consulting the membership led to the 
union signing an agreement with Ilfords, the photographic 
suppliers, in 1965 which, in effect, meant that unofficial 
strikers would be sacked with the union's blessing. In 
addition the agreement bore many of the hallmarks of recent 
single union deals. -4 The union's wholly unsympathetic 
attitude to industrial action and its refusal to recognise 
workplace industrial organisation was most apparent in the 
engineering industry, where the opposition of the GMW's 
national officer, Jim Matthews, to membership demands was 
almost legendary, and, as has been noted previously, it was 
epitomised in the union's refusal to make the 1969 Ford 
strike official, isolating it from other unions and leading 
to 1300 members, including twenty-five shop stewards, leaving 
the union in disgust to join the TGWU. m 
The strike at Pilkingtons and the shock-waves it sent through 
the union, therefore, was the most important, but not the 
only, expression of membership pressure on the official union 
structure. This pressure was not confined to the GMB, O- 
though its officers' attitudes exacerbated the problem. It 
was the product of two developments: the growth of shop 
steward organisation, and the growth of workplace bargaining, 
characterised in the Donovan Commission's "two systems" 
analysis as "largely informal, largely fragmented and largely 
autonomous. " Donovan was reporting at a time of flux and 
there have been significant changes in the bargaining 
structure since then. By 1978, it was estimated that for 
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two-thirds of manual employees and three-quarters of non- 
manual employees the principal means of fixing pay was 
through single employer agýepmpnt z. 
While the TGWU, under the leadership of Jack Jones, responded 
to these changes by decentralising collective bargaining, 
involving shop stewards directly in negotiations and 
encouraging the use of reference back procedures, ° and NUPE 
fundamentally changed its structure to integrate its rapidly 
expanding shop steward organisation, `7 the GMWU's response was 
to follow the Donovan recommendation of increasing the number 
of full-time officers dealing directly with the shop floor. 
In taking this decision it was heavily influenced by Hugh 
Clegg, one of the report's authors and the union's official 
historian, who, in a commissioned study on the workload of 
officers, strongly recommended the introduction of a new 
district officer grade in 1972. 
It is apposite at this point to make some initial comments on 
the relevance to this study of the other major development of 
the 1960s and 1970s, the growth of shop steward organisation, 
since it has been variously described as approximating to a 
model of "direct democracy"1° and having "promoted 
democracy. "'1 The growth in shop stewards is not in dispute, 
although it is notoriously difficult to produce reliable 
estimates: in 1961 a survey put the number at 90,000 though 
it admitted that the figure was "no better than a guess, "1a 
seven years later a study for the Donovan Commission, more 
260 
reliably, put the figure at 175,0OO, 1" while in 1978 it was 
estimated that there were 156,000 stewards in manufacturing 
industry alone, '" with growth being even more rapid in the 
public =ector. 'ý 
What is at issue is first, the implication in Donovan and 
other studies that shop stewards are fully accountable 
representatives of the members who can have regular and easy 
access to them; and second, the assumption that -hop stewards 
are involved in collective bargaining. The majority of 
studies which have led to these views have, rightly, been 
criticised for concentrating on private manufacturing, 
especially the engineering sector, and on medium and large 
factories and the exportability of their conclusions to other 
sectors, particularly local government, has been 
chall. enged. 1a These two areas of disagreement in the 
literature will be examined later. 
The chapter is structured in two parts, divided roughly into 
the GMB's formal system of industrial organisation, its 
officer and industrial conference structure; and the informal 
system as it operates in local government and private 
manufacturing. Concluding remarks follow. 
Change in the GMB' Cx formal organi c ati on 
The election of David Basnett as general secretary, widely 
regarded as being the candidate far change, provided the 
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leadership and enthusiasm, previously lacking, that was 
necessary to give fresh impetus to membership demands for 
changes in the union's attitudes to strikes and for greater 
lay involvement industrial organisation. The contrast in 
attitudes between Cooper, who had supported "In Place of 
Strife" and wanted the union to register under the 1971 
Industrial Relations Act, and F{asnett, who as the national 
officer for the glass industry had witnessed the Pi l ki ngtons 
strike at first hand, cannot be overstated. Basnett was able 
to use the authority and goodwill his election had given him 
to transform the GMB's anti-strike image, making it clear 
that the union was not implaccably opposed to industrial 
action in every circumstance -a task made easier by the 
forma]. concentration of power at national level over 
disputes. 
The union's rules provide that the conduct of trade disputes 
is vested in the Executive Council 2l who must give permission 
for all major strikes to be called: "in no case shall a 
cessation of work be threatened or take place without the 
sanction of the regional committee or the GMW Executive 
Council: " with regional committees having the power to 
sanction strikes where not more than 300 members are 
involved. 10 The rule book explicitly lays down the 
procedures to be followed. 
" Should any branch or body of members of the Union 
desire steps to be taken for an advance in wages or 
improved conditions of employment, the Branch Secretary 
shall report the claim to the Regional Secretary ... who 
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sha11 forward the same to the BMW Executive Counci I.. . 
With respect to those on whose behalf the claim is being 
preferred, there shall be stated, on the form 
provicied, the number of members entitled and not entitled 
to benefit, the number.. of non-members, if any, and also 
the number of votes recorded by the branch, or body for 
and against the claim. 't 
The union's rules also give the Executive Council the power 
to rester disputes, to arbitration and stipulate voting 
requi rements. 
" No cessation of work shall take place unless two- 
thirds of the members belonging to the Branch or body 
immediately concerned, shall have voted in favour of the 
adoption of such a course, and then only with the 
express sanction of the Central Executive Council and 
after legal notice to terminate contracts of service has 
been given. Every member affected shall have an 
opportunity of recording his vote at a special meeting, 
for and against handing in notice to cease work. In no 
case shall members be entitled to strike benefit if they 
enter upon a strike without the sanction of the Central 
Executive Council. "ý4 
Lastly, the rule book legislates for a strike committee not 
exceeding nine to be elected by the members involved, but 
specifies that it shall be subject to the authority of the 
regional committee or the Executive Council or regional 
officials, and clearly states that "it shall not, without due 
instructions, authorise any action on questions of law, 
policy or the methods tobe followed in relation to the 
dispute. " 
Rules also provide that where a dispute occurs over an area 
and affects a number of branches the regional committee has 
the power to appoint strike committees as necessaary. ='- The 
constitutional position in the GMB importantly, therefore, 
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gives total authority over both the decision to strike and 
the way that strikes are conducted to regional committees, in 
cases where less than 300 Lmembers are involved, and to the 
Executive Council in larger disputes. In determining whether 
to sanction a strike within a particular region, the opinions 
of the regional secretary and the region's other Executive 
Council members carry great weight. The general secretary, 
however, particularly a newly elected one, still has a strong 
influence and can set the tone by which disputes are Jt.. tdged. 
National leadership has also been crucial to changes that 
have been introduced in the GMB's industrial organisation, 
but since these policy changes have depended on regional 
secretaries and regional committees for implementation their 
nature and effectiveness has varied widely. Nowhere is this 
better demonstrated than in the case of officer structure 
which shows the importance of policy implementation as well 
as policy formulation and highlights the limits imposed on 
national decision-making in a highly regionalised trade 
union. 
Officer structure re-forms 
So far the GIHB's officers have been frequently mentioned but 
no attempt has been made at definitional precision. As a 
pioneering study noted, there is 
"no accepted definition of a full-time trade union 
officer. The term is not synonymous with 'trade union 
employee, ' still less with 'fully employed on trade 
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union work. ' A trade union typist is clearly not a 
trade union officer, but the line between officers and 
'staff' or 'clerks is variously drawn by different 
unions. ""-' 
This study uses the definition adopted by the GMB: officers 
are defined as those either elected or appointed by the 
Executive Council or regional committees, the general 
secretary and national officers, regional secretary and 
regional, district and branch administrative officers. Staff 
are those appointed by the general secretary or the regional 
secretaries to deal with research, legal work, education, 
administrative and clerical work and specialist services. 
From 1969 these specialist services have grown with, at 
various points, separate national departments being created 
for productivity services, pensions, and health and safety, 
which, following a 1976 Congress resolution, have been 
mirrored by specialist staff in the regions. It is 
recognised that this definition would be unacceptable if data 
were being compiled for comparative statistical purposes on 
the ratio of full-time officers to members, but since this is 
not attempted it is unnecessary to complicate matters 
further. 
Very few academic studies have focused on the background and 
training of trade union officers; some brief points can, 
however, be made to provide a context for the following 
discussion. Published research in the early 1970s found that 
compared with the previous decade "trade union officers 
appear to being appointed younger and with better basic 
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education, """ and that the GMB "appears to provide the most 
training, """ with a survey at a similar time finding "a 
sprinkling of graduates"'', -at the union's national 
level. In 
the decade since that trend has continued and has been 
extended to the regional level. John Edmonds, who was 
educated at Oxford, is the most notable example, but a number 
of graduates have been appointed as staff at national level 
in the union's research department and innovative regional 
secretaries have appointed graduates to posts in education, 
research, health and safety and legal work, with some of them 
eventually transferring to industrial negotiating jobs within 
the region. While a large majority of the union's officers 
have served their union "apprenticeship, " most commonly 
beginning as shop stewards, the (3MB has been exceptional 
among the manual unions in being prepared to appoint staff to 
key posts from outside the ranks of its members. 
The GMB's national officer organisation has hardly changed 
over the last twenty years. The changes in officer structure 
that have occurred since 1965 have been concerned exclusively 
with the officer level directly in contact with the 
membership. The reasons given for the introduction of the 
branch administrative officer grade in that year: that it 
would "allow the Union to increase its officer strength and 
enable it to become more effective in recruitment, 
organisation, service, and the retention of members: "2" 
reflect the familiar concerns noted in Chapter 4. At the 
unofficial level, however, another reason for this reform was 
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the growing concern at national level of the power of "whole- 
time" branch secretaries, "' who were allowed into the union's 
superannuation fund for of icors, but anomalously categorised 
as lay members and hence eligible to stand for elected posts. 
Whatever the reasons behind the reform its institution was a 
recipe for confusion, because of its failure to make clear 
the exact division of responsibilities between regional 
officers and branch administrative officers, Congress 
approving the badly-formulated proposition that it is 
desirable that the new grade of officer should be able to 
take over responsibility for appropriate forms of 
representation. " This inconsistency reinforced the need to 
re-examine regional officer structure to take account of the 
growth of shop stewards and workplace bargaining and, as the 
introduction noted, led to the union following closely the 
advice of one of Donovan's authors, introducing the district 
officer grade and phasing out branch administrative officers. 
In essence, the district officer proposals saw the new grade 
as establishing a greater presence on the ground and 
envisaged that they would be allocated to "informal 
districts" selected for their organisational and recruitment 
potential. District officers would be involved in two main 
kinds of situation: the "greenfield" area, where there may be 
no existing branches but valuable recruiting opportunities; 
and where there are already existing branches: 
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" the District officer will liaise closely with the 
existing membership and their voluntary branch 
secretaries and assist them with their recruitment 
activity. He will also be their first line of access 
to its services. Int certai n cases, when necessary, the t District Officer may undertake some administrative 
duties; though it is important to note that he is not 
principally an administrator of branches. Although the 
District Officer will maintain close contact with his 
branches, one of his major objectives must be to 
encourage them to become as self-reliant as possible in 
the handling of their industrial problems. "" 
Once again, the division of responsibilities between regional 
and, this time, district officers was not made explicit and 
implementation of the proposals was left to the discretion of 
the regions. The result was not satisfactory. Four years 
later an Executive Council report to Congress on finances, 
district officers and services, commented: 
" The practicalities of implementing the 1974 Congress 
decision were underestimated and the appointment of 
District Officers throughout the regions has developed 
in an uneven manner ... Some Regions have developed a 
geographical approach to appointments, others an 
industrial needs approach. There are wide variations 
in direct/indirect branch responsibilities of District 
Officers both within Regions, and Region to Region. "-3° 
The implementation of the district officer grade proposals, 
it has already been noted in previous chapters, varied 
significantly in the three study regions. In both the 
Birmingham and Liverpool regions every district officer was 
given direct branch secretary responsibilities, while the 
Northern region followed the spirit of the 1974 Congress 
decision more closely, with district officers only rarely 
involved with branch administration. The involvement of 
district officers in negotiations also varied widely both 
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within and between the study regions according to different 
general patterns. In the Birmingham region some of the 
district officers performeci_ a first-line negotiating role in 
addition to their administrative function, but mainly they 
acted exclusively as secretaries of the region's large 
(::, ranches, with, in particular, former branch administrative 
officers appointed as district officers carrying on exactly 
the same as before. In contrast, the Northern region used 
district officers explicitly in negotiation and recruitment, 
blurring any distinction between regional and district 
officers and leading some of the latter to feel that they 
were "regional officers on the cheap" because of their lower 
pay scales. While, in the Liverpool region, district officer 
involvement in negotiation varied, depending on the number of 
branches allocated to them to administer, which in some cases 
was extensive. 
Distinctions at this level of generality, however, although 
usefully illustrating different approaches, ignore the fact 
that the scope for district officer involvement in 
negotiations is dependent on the level of bargaining, which, 
in turn, varies in different industrial. sectors. They also 
say nothing about the relationship between district officers, 
shop stewards and regional officers. Both these points 
reinforce the need for the sectorial study of the next 
section. 
It is legitimate at this juncture, though again a 
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simplification, to note the potential for friction that 
existed, and was often apparent, between district and 
regional officers. "* A coymoniy held view among regional 
officers in the Birmingham and Liverpool regions was that 
there was no scope for district officer involvement in 
negotiations since a competent shop steward can cope up to 
the stage where the specialist help of the regional officer 
is needed. A number of regional officers interviewed stated 
that they would not use district officers. On the other hand 
the prevalent attitude of district officers was that, through 
their closer contact, they knew the problems and grievances 
of their members and the facts behind a claim best and could 
therefore deal with it more effectively than any regional 
officer. 
Some district officers interviewed admitted that they tried 
to minimise regional officer involvement in their area. It 
should not be thought, however, that there was a continual 
battle between district and regional officers. While these 
divergent attitudes were commonly held, the actions described 
represented the extremes, and, in the large majority of 
instances district and regional officers maintained good 
working relationships despite the potential for friction that 
existed as a result of the inadequate job specification for 
the new grade and their mutual doubts. 
The difficulties of rationalising district officer Activity 
were discussed at Congress again in 1980. Introducing the 
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Executive Council report re=latincj to organisation, 
recruitment and district officers, the general secretary 
stressed "one of the most important conclusions of the 
report, is to make sure that the i mbal anted development 
between regions is put right. We have from 2 in one Region 
to 16 in another. """ The report, however, apart from talking 
vaguely about budgetary controls, gave no indication of how 
this would be achieved. It also, interestingly, accepted the 
re-defined role that many regions had adopted for district 
officers, in coming to the conclusion that "it was generally 
felt that no gain would be achieved if branch administration 
was taken away from District Officers. ""--3 
The GMD's major review of its finances and administration, 
Decision 84, agreed substantial changes in officer structure. 
Its recommendations recognised the inadequacies and 
inconsistencies of the district officer scheme and the need 
for the union to develop a higher local identity in many 
parts of the country and a clearer industrial identity in 
certain sectors if it was to maintain and improve membership. 
Under its proposals "regions should progressively return 
branch administration to lay members, and away from District 
Officers and Branch Administrative Officers, "14 with "a new 
single grade of first line Organiser eventually absorbing the 
District Officer, Regional Officer and District Delegate 
grades" being established. 30 It also proposed that 
Organisers should "reduce the proportion of time spent on 
National and Regional JIC's and equivalent, where possible, 
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replacing officers with lay representatives, and 
concentrating officer-time on membership recruitment, 
consolidation and direct trvices>""' and that a new regional 
industrial officer grade be introduced, normally two per 
region and responsible for major groups of members by broad 
sector, to give a clearer management structure. 
Implementation of Decision 84's proposals relating to 
officers was delayed, following objections from officers 
about lack of consultation, until late 1986 early 1987, 
beyond the period of fieldwork research, and, in any event, a 
mature assessment of these changes will not be possible for a 
number of years. It already appears, however, that a similar 
pattern of powerful full-time lay branch secretaries, able to 
stand for elected office, is emerging in regions with large 
branches as existed in the union before 1965. 
There also appears to be a strong potential for friction 
between organisers and regional industrial. officers, as 
organisers come to terms with the fact that two of their 
number, previously regarded as equals, are now officially 
their superior. There are further potential problems in that 
the management role of regional industrial officers is not 
clearly defined and, as yet, it appears that they are to be 
given no training in their new responsibilities. In less 
than twenty years, therefore, the GMB has virtually turned 
full circle, moving from taking administration away from 
secretaries in large branches to giving it back to them, from 
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recognising the need for a separate grade of officer to 
establishing a single grade. Despite all these changes and 
refinements two common factors have remained throughout: the 
power that regions have to interpret national decisions as 
they see fit; and the influence of officers in regional 
elections. 
The influence of officers in regional elections does not, as 
the previous chapter showed, conform to a mingle pattern. 
Officer influence is a function of a number of different 
variables: the union's rules, officer structure, branch 
structure, factional activity, union communications, 
membership interest and official and unofficial membership 
contact, to name only the most important. Moreover, these 
variables are determined at a number of different levels, 
varying between and within both regions and branches, making 
any overall assessment problematic to say the least. 
Nevertheless two general comments are cautiously offered. 
The first is that giving branch administration back to lay 
members may potentially increase lay involvement but it will 
not necessarily do so. In the Birmingham region, it appears 
that the impact of Decision 84 will he merely to change the 
composition of the "big ten, " - its control of regional 
elections will remain - while officers in the Northern region 
have never relied on this avenue for exercising influence. 
The second is that of Decision 84's officer reforms it is not 
the allocation of officers, but the allocation of officer 
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time, that may have the biggest consequences for democratic 
decision--making. Fieldwork in the three study regions showed 
that national and regional. JIC's and provincial council 
places were filled almost exclusively by officers in the 
Birmingham and Liverpool regions, with the Northern region 
having a slightly, but not significantly, higher lay 
involvement. By introducing or extending lay involvement to 
regional and national negotiating bodies Decision' 84's 
proposals, if properly implemented (and that must be open to 
doubt on past performance) could, therefore, stimulate 
membership participation in bargaining issues. Such a demand 
for greater lay involvement in these bodies has certainly 
been expressed by a number of national and regional 
industrial conferences and it is this structure that will now 
be examined. 
The reform of the industrial conference structure 
The introduction and development of national and regional 
industrial conferences in the GMB since 1969 has given formal 
status to membership participation in decision-making on 
bargaining issues for the first time, though the relevance of 
this participation has been consistently criticised by 
certain parts of the membership. Pressure for reform, 
stemming from membership comparisons with the role the TGWU 
gave to its members on industrial matters, surfaced on the 
floor of Congress with a proposal being passed in 1968 to 
investigate "the possibility of a trade group structure with 
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vertical and horizontal integration. "ýý The following year 
ni tional conferences were established for r small number of 
industries, but they were only regarded as 
"sounding boards'' 
and not recognised by rule, their operating provisions were 
unclear with it being largely left to national officers and 
regional secretaries to do as they saw fit. Cooper's lack of 
enthusiasm for any substantial change was emphasised in his 
speech to the 1969 Congress, when, in a style hardly 
reminiscent of the times, he G-Argued that: "your national 
officers who negotiate centrally and your regional officers 
whom we have to negotiate specially on a regional basis have 
got to make up their own minds as what kind of wage 
application or conditions application to promote. --f3 As has 
been noted, this attitude, perhaps best summed up as "leave 
it to the professionals" was a hallmark of his stewardship. 
I3asnett 's election marked the beginning of the move away from 
Cooper's benefit-oriented, clientelist approach, towards 
establishing an industrial service union. He had to move 
cautiously in relation to industrial conferences, however, 
since a number of regional secretaries and national officers 
were still. very much against giving them any real power-`' and 
during his election campaign he opposed a proposal at 
Congress from a branch in the London region that "the scope 
and authority of Industrial Conferences be enhanced and that 
more opportunities be given to the lay members to participate 
in the formulation of claims and term a of acceptance and 
agreements. ''40 
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In 1975, however, under Basnett's aegis, Congress accepted a 
Executive Council documentLui. dening the scope and status of 
industrial conferences, stipulating eighteen areas where they 
were to be held annually and laying down guidelines for their 
operation, though not codifying these in the union's rules. '' 
This reform was very different from the trade group approach, 
with its broad sectors, that characterises the TGWU and was 
raised in the 1969 debate. 
Some national officers, less than enthusiastic about this new 
channel of participation, called conferences at extremely 
short notice, not allowing time for regional industrial 
conferences to be held beforehand. Similarly, some regional 
secretaries opposed to the proposals did not bother to call 
regional conferences if they could possibly avoid doing so. 
Moreover, the status of industrial conferences was still far 
from clear: although the document approved by Congress 
explicitly stated that industrial conferences were to act in 
an advisory capacity, the guidelines implied more: 
" Delegates to National. Industrial Conferences have 
authority to discuss and formulate together with the 
National Industrial Officer, the industrial and 
bargaining policy for the appropriate industry. At all 
times, National Industrial Conferences shall be subject 
to the authority of Congress and to the Executive of the 
Union. "a- 
Despite these inadequacies, membership enthusiasm for this 
reform ensured that industrial conferences burgeoned. 
Additional. sub-group conferences were held in the building 
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materials and food and drink sectors, though not necessarily 
annually, and meetings, termed industrial conferences, but 
held for company level negqtiations, sprang up for workers in 
companies such as Rediffusion, Pilkingtons, British Gypsum 
and GEC. There was, however, membership pressure for further 
reform. A number of motions were passed by Congress or 
referred to the Executive Council in 1977,1978 and 1979 
calling for change, and, following a top level review, in 
1980 the Executive Council produced a consultative document 
on national and regional industrial conferences, which was 
finally adopted, with slight modifications, at the 1981 
Congress. 
Moving the consultative document for the Executive at the 
1980 Congress, the secretary of the Midlands and East Coast 
region asserted "it should be recognised by everybody that 
the growth in industrial conferences at both national and 
regional level has led to a major increase in democracy 
within our organisation. "a1 The 1981 reforms for the first 
time gave official status in rule to industrial 
conferences. " They also extended the list of areas covered 
to twenty-four and allowed for conferences to be called for 
smaller groups at the general secretary's discretion; made 
regional representation on national conferences more 
proportional to their relevant membership; strengthened the 
role of regional conferences; and introduced new procedural 
and organisational measures. The most important of these 
limited the number of resolutions submitted to national 
277 
conferences to a manageable number and specified that 
delegates should only be obliged to vote in block where an 
explicit regional council mandate obliged them to do so. " 
The 1981 reform, therefore, extended the GMB's industrial 
conference structure to make conferences mandatory in every 
industry where the union had more than 10,000 members and 
optional, at the general secretary's discretion, in smaller 
cases. A list of industrial conferences is given in Table 
6.1. 
Despite the much vaunted claim that this reform was a major 
increase in democracy and notwithstanding pressure from 
members, particularly in the Liverpool and London regions, 
attempts to make the decisions taken by national industrial 
conferences binding on union negotiators were successfully 
resisted: the new rule stating: 
" National Industrial Conferences shall report to and be 
advisory to the Executive Council and the Union 
negotiators, and decisions of Conferences relating to 
all aspects of policy and negotiations within their 
industries shall. be subject to Executive Council and 
Congress poi i cy. "'I'* 
There was, however, a recognition in the document that single 
JIC National Conferences "play a crucial role in in guiding 
the NI and trade union side members" and their resolutions 
"need to have appropriate status, " but,, in its opinion, in 
most cases other unions' views have to be taken into account 
and conferences must be "subject ultimately" to "Executive 
Judgement, often expressed by the General Secretary and the 
NIO, on how to progress negotiations, "a7 
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List of Industrial Conferences agreed by the 1981 
Annual Congress. 
Industrial Conferences 
Food Manufacturing 
Bi. scuff t s, 
Cocoa, Chocolate °< 
Confectionary 
Distilling 
Brewing 
Shipbuilding 
Engineering 
Water 
Electricity 
Rubber 
ConstruActi on 
Govt. Industrials 
Steel 
Loc. Auth. Manua]. 
Loc. Auth. Craftsmen 
Elec. Cable-Making 
NHS 
Distribution 
Gas 
Hotel & Catering 
Chemicals 
Glass Container 
Textiles & Clothing 
MATSA (biennial) 
Subject to General 
Secretary's discretion 
(Examples only). 
Clay industries 
Quarrying 
Asbestos 
Atomic Energy 
Transport 
Thermal Insulation 
Timber Furniture 
Paper Packaging 
Nurses 
Ambulancemen 
SOURCE: GMWU, Report of Sixty-Sixth Congress, pBOO-8O1. 
The 1981. reforms, therefore, although increasing channels of 
participation, retained ultimate officer authority. National 
officers are still largely free to pursue the negotiating 
tactics that they wish and retain discretion, so long as they 
have the broad support of the general secretary and the 
Executive Council, on whether or not to recall the national 
conference or regional conferences or ballot the membership 
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to ratify any final agreement. In a skilled national offi. cer 
these options can form different parts of the official's 
"managerial" strategy. Of course, any sensible national 
officer will want to establish a good understanding and close 
working relationship with leading lay members of the national 
industrial conference, but other options exist. The obvious 
implication to be drawn from this is that the importance of 
national industrial conferences as decision-making bodies 
very much depends on the relationship they have with their 
national officer and will vary from industry to industry. In 
cases where they are at loggerheads, the ability of members 
to exert pressure on the general secretary and Executive 
Council is crucial, though very few national officers would 
get into such a confrontation without being sure that their 
back was covered. 
Interviews with lay members confirmed that perceptions of the 
importance of the industrial conference structure varied 
significantly between industries and only occasionally 
between individuals in the same industry. Generally, these 
attitudes closely corresponded with the level of bargaining 
in these industries: members in single JIC industries 
regarding them as more important than members in industries 
covering a number of companies negotiating separately at 
either national or local level, such as chemicals, food 
manufacturing, hotel and catering and textiles. More 
systematic interviews over a wider industrial base, however, 
would be needed before any firm conclusions; could be reached. 
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In shipbuilding a number of lay members were sceptical about 
the value of having an industrial conference since its 
resolutions do not get diskussd by the CSEU. There was also 
lingering resentment about the 1984 pay claim, which 
highlights one of the managerial options open to officers. 
Against the activists' wishes, the 17 full-time officers told 
the 6 lay members on the 23 strong CSEU national negotiating 
committee that they wanted to meet on their own to formulate 
an agenda for discussion. They then met for sixteen hours 
with the employers and ACAS, returning to tell their lay 
members that they had signed an agreement, which was later 
unenthusiastically accepted in a membership ballot. 
The option of directly balloting the membership on national 
agreements is, however, as a recent study notes, rarely used 
in the GMB. "O Apart from F'ilkingtona and fibreboard packing, 
which are essentially national company agreements, ballots 
have been used regularly only in the electricity supply and 
water industries where structural conditions: a comprehensive 
national agreement, multi-union negotiating structure and 
dispersed membership, favour their Ae and it is logical for 
all unions to adopt the same method of referring agreements 
to the member=hip. In the water industry, however, this has 
been used more for tactical reasons and, when it has been 
thought advantageous, agreements have been referred back to 
re-called regional industrial conferences rather than holding 
a ballot. The normal practice is for national agreements to 
be referred back to national industrial conferences or, in 
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the case of major sectors such as local government, re-called 
regional industrial conferences, with the latter being used 
on occasion by the national officer as "divide and rule" 
tactics. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that single JIC 
national and regional industrial conferences are the GMB's 
main democratic channel of consultation and communication 
with the membership on negotiating issues and that decisions 
reached by these bodies carry great weight and cannot be 
lightly ignored by any national officer. 
The scope for national industrial conferences which do not 
have a direct relationship with a particular negotiating body 
is necessarily different. While single JIC conferences tend 
to be exclusively concerned with annual wage claim 
negotiations, these conferences tend to discuss wider 
economic and employment related issues and have developed 
more of a "talking shop" role. This can provide a useful 
forum for exchanging information about differences between 
similar companies in wages, conditions and management 
strategies, but is obviously not as important as the near 
decision-making role on bargaining issues that single JIC 
industrial conferences enjoy. This is inevitable, however, 
given the vertical dispersion of decision making in these 
industries. The main significance of industrial conferences 
is that they have increased horizontal participation in those 
industries that bargain at national level. Where bargaining 
is decentralised, members have the opportunity to participate 
in decision making in other ways, making industrial 
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conferences of limited relevance. 
A full survey of collectiv; bargaining procedures in the 
different industries which fix pay through single employer 
agreements is well beyond the scope of this study. In the 
GMB's 1985 Congress report the Birmingham region lists 215 
different company agreements the union has negotiated, the 
Liverpool region lists 123 and the Northern region 226. It 
is possible, however, to make two general and, perhaps, 
obvious comments. Firstly, membership participation in 
formulating initial demands is normally channelled through 
shop stewards, bringing into question, as the introduction 
noted, their accessibility and accountability. Only 
occasionally is it channelled through the branch, though this 
varies between regions depending on the branch structure 
operated. Second, although the practice of referring back 
both national and company agreements has increased 
dramatically over the last twenty years - the workplace 
survey published by the DE in 1983 finding that two-thirds of 
GME manual stewards reported that the last wage settlement 
had been referred back" - the form that the reference back 
of company agreements takes varies widely and will depend on 
the relationship between the shop stewards, branch officers 
and the regional officer. It is this relationship which is 
now examined in the specific studies of the GMB's industrial 
organisation in local government and private manufacturing. 
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Membership participation in the sRctora1 studies 
The eclectic approach to studying trade unions, with its 
concentration on national, regional and local levels of 
government, requires a substantial research input to provide 
a comprehensive picture of democratic practices. As Chapter 
One outlined, this was a principal reason why research was 
located within the eclectic framework and focused on the most 
neglected area of study, the regional level. The study of 
membership participation in the two sectors is, therefore, 
more inchoate than if the workplace had been the primary 
focus. 
Local government and private manufacturing are major and very 
different sectors where the GMB is organised. Local 
government has been one of the GMB's traditional strengths; 
it has more members in this than any other sector and the 6MB 
has dominated negotiations on the National Joint Council for 
manual workers. The 0MB has been less dominant in private 
manufacturing, a more amorphous category, where bargaining 
can take place at different levels, but it has substantial 
membership in a number of industries within this category 
such as engineering, food, chemicals and glass. There are, 
however, additional and compelling reasons for examining 
these two sectors other than the contrast in bargaining 
contexts and the membership coverage that they provide. 
Manufacturing industry his been the benchmark for most 
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industrial relations research over the last twenty years, a 
great deal of which has focused on the growth, influence and 
organisation of shop stewards in workplace bargaining. 
Analysing private manufacturing, therefore, enables the study 
both to be located in and to comment on parts of this 
substantial body of literature and focusing on local 
government makes it possible to assess, as the introduction 
noted, the validity of exporting these findings to the public 
sector. There is a further reason for this choice. 
Industrial organisation in local government has been termed 
the problem of organising a fragmented workforce. ý° However, 
with the growing fragmentation of Britain's traditional 
manufacturing base, the "decline of the big battalions"'-" as 
they have been called by John Edmonds, these problems are 
increasingly being encountered in the manufacturing sector 
and it may be that certain trade union organisational 
characteristics now common in local government may become 
increasingly applicable to manufacturing. 
Edmonds has rather aptly summarised the familiar, bUt 
increasingly outdated, view of the strength of shop stewards' 
committees in manufacturing industry: 
" Throughout much of manufacturing 
power has traditionally been based 
autonomous local committees. To a 
union members determine their on 
shop stewards-s' committee works out 
industry, trade union 
an these semi- 
great extent, the 
local policy, and the 
its own tactics. 
" Full-time union officials are not exactly ignored, but 
neither are they closely involved. In times of dispute 
they may be wheeled in like a mobile battering-ram and 
aimed at intransigent employers. But for most of the 
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time the shop stewards' committee gets on with its own 
business, undirected and without outside help. ", 
This section assesses four themes particularly relevant to 
membership participation in decision-making on bargaining 
issues: the applicability of the traditional model summarised 
above;, the representativeness and accessibility of shop 
stewards to the membership; the extent to which shop stewards 
participate in collective bargaining; and the role of the 
"key steward" in local government. "" It does not examine the 
minutiae of pay claims or the detailed bargaining between the 
GMB and employers since its focus is on internal decision- 
making, but the bargaining context is not ignored and its 
relationship to internal decision-making processes is 
considered where appropriate. 
Before examining the GMB 's involvement in the two sectors in 
detail it is important to highlight the extent of shop 
steward organisation in private manufacturing and local 
government and the formal status of shop stewards in the 
GMB's rules. Table 6.2 shows the formal indicators of shop 
steward organisation in the two sectors, which, within the 
manufacturing sector, vary positively with size. Their 
comparison evinces "considerable similarities between the 
traditional strongholds of stewards and those in which shop 
stewards have only emerged more recently. """ While it is 
interesting to note these broadly similar patterns of shop 
steward organisation, however, it is their scope of activity 
and their accountability to the membership that is of 
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+undarnental concern in this study. 
The accountability of shop= steward-, to their members is 
partly determined by rule, and partly by custom and practice 
at individual workplaces, which can vary widely and is 
dependent on many factors. The GMB's rules allow for shop 
stewards to be appointed or elected by members employed at a 
workplace subject to the approval of the branch committee or 
the regional secretary if more than one branch is involved. "I 
Table 6.2 
Percentage of establishments where a shop steward is 
present. 
Private Local 
Manufacturing Government 
Manual 
Recognised <senior steward 74.0 70.0 
Full-time steward present 11.7 33.0 
Regular steward meetings 36.8 50.0 
Non-manual 
Recognised senior steward 61.4 73.0 
Full-time steward present 2.3 17.0 
Regular steward meetings 30.0 B31.0 
SOURCE: Bain Fad. (1983) p69. 
Appointments can be by any one of three methods: by a 
majority vote on a show of hands, or by ballot of the members 
concerned at the place of employment; by a majority vote on a 
show of hands at a branch meeting or by common consent among 
the members concerned that the office shall be filled by a 
287 
member appointed by the regional secretary. "' Shop stewards 
may also elect one of their number as convenor. The scope of 
their duties, however, is get nationally, being defined in 
the shop steward's handbook published by the union, '' and 
their activities are formally controlled regionally: 
If The Shop Stewards and their Convenor shall be under 
the jurisdiction of the Regional Committee to whom they 
shall be required to give an undertaking to observe the 
Rules of the Union, and at all times to act in 
conformity with the decisions, and policy laid down by 
the governing authorities of the Union. "° 
When the rule book provisions covering the sanctioning and 
the conduct of strikes and the control over strike 
committees, are added this chive a potential panoply of 
controls at regional and national level over bargaining 
participants and strike decisions. The de jure control of 
shop stewards, however, is rarely exercised, although the 
regional committee has the power to remove a shop steward who 
wilfully disobeys union decisions, most of the time they are 
allowed to get on with their own business free from 
interference from union officials or governing bodies. 
Private manufacturing 
The fieldwork conducted in the private manufacturing sector 
is described and analysed first as it forms the backbone of 
the traditional model of trade union power. Twenty-six, 
interviews were conducted comprising eight full-time 
officers, twelve shop stewards or convenors, and six lay 
members. They were supplemented by a large number of 
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informal discussions. Research focused on a large 
engineering company in the West Midlands; a large chemical 
company with plants in the E{irmingham and Northern regions; 
and a company in the construction materials sector with 
plants-. in all three regions. It also focused on six small 
companies. two each in companies in engineering, chemicals 
and textiles. Two companies were examined in each region and 
the companies were characterised by having at most two GMB 
stewards. Rather than presenting lengthy descriptive case 
studies of each company, however, a more selective and 
analytical approach is adopted concentrating on the salient 
points. 
The research in engineering produced no startling new 
revelations, but it provided useful corroborating evidence to 
earlier published research. The traditional model was very 
apparent in an examination of a large multi-plant engineering 
company in the West Midlands which had extensive and 
sophisticated shop steward organisation. In addition to a 
well-established shop steward and convenor structure at each 
plant, with a plant shop steward committee, convenors and 
senior stewards had formed a combine committee which met 
regularly and was an important source of deci zion-makirig on 
pay bargaining strategy. The committee comprised both GMB 
and AEU stewards, whose different occupational backgrounds 
meant that relationships at times were fraught; the fact that 
it met regularly owed a great deal to management positively 
supporting the body, providing facilities, including 
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transport where necessary and allowing time-o+4 to hold 
meetings. A number of convenors and senior shop stewards at 
plant level were either recognised as full-time stewards or 
spent very little time at their work occupation and were 
provided with facilities to carry out their work. 
The initiative for these organisational innovations, most of 
which took place in the early to mid-1970s, appears to have 
come from the shop stewards and the membership, but it was 
evident from an interview with a senior manager that these 
structures were encouraged by the company. This was because 
of the advantages they perceived in identifying a small 
number of key people they could deal with when sensitive 
issues arose, who they were reasonably sure were 
representative of their members, so that decisions agreed 
with them would stick. In this sense the study was a 
confirming instance of the literature noting the importance 
of management sponsorship in the development of shop stewards 
organisation. "'' 
The recession, as Chapter 3 noted, has had a particularly 
devastating effect on GMB membership in manufacturing in the 
West Midlands. While this has led to a decline in the size 
of the workforce in the company, however, it has not led to 
any significant change in the management's attitLAde to shop 
steward organisation. The combine committee and shop 
stewards committees at plant level do not have the power that 
they had in the tight labour market of the 1970s, when 
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members were more prepared to take industrial action to 
pursue their demands, but they are still regarded by 
management as having posit "ve benefits. The demands raised 
by the combine committee and at shop stewards committees at 
plant level have become more muted in a climate of lower 
expectations and management attitudes have hardened, but 
there is no evidence to suggest that shop stewards felt the 
need to keep their heads blow the parapet. 
The relationship between workplace and union structure was 
found to be largely irrelevant in this particular case. A 
number of shop stewards were active in their respective 
branches, but the branches were general not workplace 
branches and did not discuss company issues. The study 
supported the view of a previous study, which found that the 
relationship between the workplace and the lowest level of 
union organisation was subordinate to the relation: -, hip 
between the workplace organisation and the +L. 111-time union 
of ficer. "e4 It, however, also suggested that its contention 
that trade Union whose branches are organised on A general 
rather than a workplace basis sow a tendency to act as Of 
they are workplace branchesbi is ill-founded since this was 
not apparent either in this or any of the other case studies. 
In all three large manufacturing companies the shop stewards 
interviewed tended to conform to the leader or populist ideal 
types that have been noted in micro-analytical workplace 
research. 62 There were variations in this pattern, stewards 
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switching from being leaders on one issue to populists on 
another, but the more important stewards along with the 
convenors all tended to b" leaders. This was explicitly 
recognised by one regional officer who baldly said that 
stewards who were populists had no credibility with either 
him or with management and were excluded from negotiations. 
The three cases, there rore, tended to confirm the validity of 
research noting the important role played by convenors and a 
"quasi-elite" of experienced stewards in determining policy 
on issues in large manufacturing establ i shment s. " 
Substantial similarities were also evident in the pattern of 
membership involvement in the annual wage negotiations in the 
three large comp nies. The common practice was for plant 
meetings of the GMB's members to be held, but at these 
meetings it was the 0MB convenors and quasi-elite members, 
along with the full-time officer, that acted as the crucial 
opinion formers in determining the union's initial bargaining 
position. This was then discussed with the full-time 
officers, convenors and quasi-elite members of the other 
unions before presenting a common claim to management. The 
membership thus while, in theory, having the opportunity to 
determine policy, in practice, deferred to the opinions of 
the full-time officer and the lay leadership. They did, 
however, have an opportunity to vote on any decision reached, 
normally by show of hands at a special section meeting on a 
plant basis, since in all three cases any final agreement was 
referred back to the membership for final ratification. 
292 
The formation of the combine committee in the West Midland 
engineering company in the 1970s gave some indication of the 
opening up of the bargaining process to shop stewards during 
the Basnett era and the influence of management sponsorship 
in allowing stewards to participate directly in negotiations. 
Lay participation also increased but took a different form in 
the company involved with construction material manufacture; 
a major brick-making company which negotiates pay nationally 
and whose plants are as far apart as County Durham and East 
Sussex. The company only recognises two unions: the GMB and 
the TGWU: and up until the early 1970s the standard practice 
was for the national agreement to be negotiated by full-time 
officers with convenors dealing with local agreements. From 
the mid-1970s, however, there was pressure from convenors and 
senior stewards for greater involvement in national 
negotiations and a combine committee comprising 
representatives from all fourteen plants was formed, largely 
encouraged by the TGWU, to coordinate activities. The 
combine committee has been crucial to processing demands 
rising from the membership in the separate plants, but 
although it is important in formulating the bargaining stance 
of the companies workforce, the negotiation of the national 
agreement is still conducted primarily by full-time union 
officers. The combine committee's ability to participate 
directly in negotiations is limited to its electing one lay 
member to serve on the five person negotiating committee 
which, in 1985, comprised three TGWU full-time officials, one 
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6MB regional o-F-f i cer , and a GMB lay member elected with the 
support of the TGWU. 
c_ 
There were, however, significant changes in direct lay 
participation in bargaining at the plant level during the 
1970s. Where it was previously common for full-time officers 
to negotiate local agreements, this negotiating role is now 
undertaken by stewards. The traditional model of the 
semi-autonomous shop stewards' committee was evident; in two 
of the three plants examined stewards interviewed said that 
their regional official had only attended the workplace three 
times in three years to sign the local agreement negotiated 
by the convenors. Only in the plant in the Liverpool region, 
however, were members in a workplace branch; members at 
plants in the Birmingham and Northern regions had to rely on 
the calling of sectional meetings to discuss problems and 
issues relating to the plant and the company. 
In the small engineering and chemical companies, the 
importance of workplace size, noted earlier as being a factor 
shaping the appointment and organisation of shop stewards, 
emerged very clearly. All of the shop stewards interviewed 
had to fit in union work in their spare time and had either a 
rudimentary shop stewards committee or no formal 
oryani-. --ation. In the engineering company in Gateshead, which 
had nearly 100 workers, there was a joint shop stewards 
committee of four; the company in Dudley had only two 
stewards, one from the GMB and one from the AEU. In neither 
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case did their appear to be any problem of members having 
access to stewards. The chemical companies showed a similar 
pattern of organisation. 0 the smallest, a company in 
Widnes, there were two shop stewards for 60 GMB members; the 
other a slightly larger company in Northumberland had a joint 
shop stewards committee of five members, two of them GMB 
stewards. 
The impression emerging from these interviews was that 
stewards in small manufacturing and chemical companies were 
not in a powerful position. A number of cases of 
victimisation were alleged and regional and district officers 
in all three regions indicated that this was more widespread 
and stated that they were increasingly having to perform 
roles and duties that in the 1970s had been performed by shop 
stewards. These officers had nearly always been involved 
with wage negotiations but were now being called in by 
stewards on other issues. In a hostile management climate 
very few stewards were prepared to act as leaders, most of 
them conformed to a populist role and seldom sought to 
initiate or dominate issues. Grievances generated by the 
membership tended to be quickly passed to the appropriate 
full-time officer; the steward acting more as a cipher -than a 
first-line negotiator. 
The fieldwork in the two companies in the clothing industry, 
based at locations in Shropshire and Runcorn, evinced similar 
developments to those noted in the other small manufacturing 
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establishments. Loth textile companies operated piecework 
systems with rates of pay negotiated locally and in both GMB 
members were in a minority position compared to members of 
the Tailor and Garment Workers. Both had functioning shop 
stewards' committees, though no full-time shop stewards. 
Both had particularly confined workplaces, making GMB 
stewards easily accessible to members and able to regularly 
report back on discussions with management. The two GMB 
stewards in the Shropshire company also faced particular 
problems with management changes in 1980 resulting in a 
different, less co-operative, approach to trade unionism in 
the factory, making difficulties for meetings to be held in 
company time and docking pay for time spent at union meetings 
as well as changing working practices without consultation. 
These changes caused the t3MB senior shop steward to use her 
regional officer more than her counterpart in Runcorn; the 
officer functioning as a "mobile battering-ram" and 
protecting the position of the steward. 
The stuciie of small establishments in the private 
manufacturing sector, in contrast to the three large 
companies considered, indicated the increasing influence of 
the Gh1B's officers in decision making on a wide range of 
bargaining issues as a result of changes in the bargaining 
climate. The generalisabilty of these findings must be 
questioned, however, given the limited research base. Less 
contentiously, the case studies also highlighted the greater 
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reliance that stewards in small. companies, often isolated and 
: inexperienced, place: on their full-time officers, emphasising 
the importance of regional. _di ff erences in officer structures 
Regional variations in both branch and officer structure 
appear to have an impact on membership participation in small 
private manufacturing companies. In the Liverpool region its 
workplace based branch system and its officer structure meant 
that workplace problems were regularly discussed at branch 
meetings. Where the branch secretary was a district officer, 
as was the case with the chemical company in Widnes, he took 
responsibility for talking to management about any action 
that the branch decided to trace, In cases where the branch 
secretary was a lay member it was found that officers were 
often requested to attend. In both situations the opinion of 
the full-time officer as to what is "on" and what is "not on" 
can be highly persuasive, but there seemed to be a strong 
element of membership control of decision-making in this 
structure 
Only two of the companies in the Birmingham and Northern 
regions had workplace branches. Although general branches 
can call a section meeting and request the presence of a 
full-time officer, in practice, only one branch held regular 
section meetings. It was more common for section meetings to 
be held when problems arose, but this was also often 
dispensed with and the officer called in immediately to 
negotiate. The importance of workplace branches or regular 
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section meetings is in the opportunity they provide for 
r. i o ate and discussion on current and future issues affecting 
the workplace. The evidence available suggests that 
this increases the scope for membership participation in 
bargaining i.! -ý, sues. 
While officer structure and branch structure are important 
variables in the equation of membership participation in 
decision-making on bargaining issues, industrial conferences 
in the manufacturing sector, surprisingly, were not generally 
regarded as being particularly relevant forums. Very few of 
the shop stewards or officers interviewed mentioned 
industrial conferences unprompted and, when asked specfically 
about their value, the majority view was that they were 
useful for "comparing notes" but not much else. This tends 
to confirm the view noted earlier that industrial conferences 
which are not concerned with national negotiations have 
evolved a "talking shop" role; they provide useful 
opportunities for membership activist contact but are 
peripheral to the decision-making process on bargaining 
issues. 
Summarising briefly, it should be emphasised that private 
manufacturing has not the primary focus of research. The 
limited evidence, nevertheless, indicates that the 
traditional model of members determining policy and the shop 
stewards committee determining tactics is an 
oversimplification. The research in the large manufacturing 
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establishments suggested that convenors and some senior 
stewards acted as key opinion formers, while the influence of 
officers was found to be ptrti. cularly extensive in the small 
manufacturing companies examined. Further, members 
accessibility to stewards varied as did the scope for direct 
steward participation in bargaining. Regional variations in 
branch structure also appeared to affect the propensity of 
the membership to participate in decisions on the union's 
initial bargaining stance, with workplace branches tending to 
facilitate involvement. 
Local government 
The local government bargaining system has traditionally, 
since the 1950s, been heavily centralised. There are between 
30 and 40 national negotiating bodies made up of a large 
number of employee and employer representatives. '-" While 
this is still the most important level for bargaining on pay 
and conditions there have been pressures for 
decentralisationlý and a growing tendency for the local 
supplementation of nationally agreed terms and conditions. '"* 
The study of GMB decision-making on bargaining issues in 
local government, therefore, is concerned with both the scope 
for membership participation in local bargaining, through 
shop steward structures, and national bargaining, principally 
through the industrial conference structure. The -former is 
examined first. 
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The GMB's strength in local government varies dramatically 
between regions. Chapter three noted that while the GMB was 
the dominant union in local government in the Liverpool and 
Northern regions it was comparatively weak in Birmingham. A 
good indication of this is the number of full-time officers 
allocated to service local government manual workers: the 
northern region have seven, Liverpool si: t, and the Birmingham 
region only one. -ý--7 
Thirty two interviews were conducted comprising nine full- 
time officers, fifteen lay activists (convenors, shop 
stewards), and nine ordinary lay members. Research focused 
on three councils in each region. This meant that some 
detail was sacrificed, but it enabled examination of a cross- 
section of local authority types which some other studies 
have lacked. 1° This approach is justified since its aim is 
to comment on the dimensions of membership participation in 
decision-making, and not to give a comprehensive picture of 
shop steward organisation and inter-action. The authorities 
selected were the three major local authorities in each 
region, Birmingham, Liverpool and Newcastle; a metropolitan 
district and a non-metropolitan district in both the 
Birmingham and Liverpool regions and a non-metropolitan 
distict and a county council in the Northern region. 
The GMB has a substantial membership in each of the three 
major citiet.:. As metropolitan authorities they have 
identical statutory functions and the bulk of the union's 
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membership is found in two areas, parks and gardens, and 
education, which covers caretakers, cleaners and school meals 
s 
staff. This membership is served by an occupationally based 
branch structure: all three regions have separate branches 
for these two areas and a separate MATSA branch. While the 
Birmingham and Northern regions have one or two other 
branches in addition to this, however, the Liverpool region 
has fourteen other manual branches and five extra MATSA 
branches:. Twelve of Liverpool city council's GMB branches 
are staffed by a district officer, including the big branches 
covering parks and gardens and education. In the other two 
regions all of the GMB' s city council branches have lay 
branch secretaries. 
Outside the three major cities the relationship between 
workplace and union also varies. The two other metropolitan 
districts, with less union members than the major cities 
though of similar population size to Liverpool and Newcastle, 
had only one branch for the whole GMB manual membership in 
one case and, in the Birmingham region, no associated local 
government branch. In this they conformed to the pattern of 
the smaller non-metropolitan districts which had a single 
branch in both the Liverpool and Northern region. The 
Birmingham region, with its relative weakness in local 
government, again provided the deviant cased its members 
being allocated to a nearby general branch. The Northern 
county council examined covered a large geographical area and 
its members were dispersed in a mixture of local government 
ISO I 
and general branches. All these branche i, with the exception 
of the non-met district in the Liverpool region, had lay 
branch 5cecre tarier 
Examination of branch structures relating to other local 
authorities showed the lack of local government branches in 
the Birmingham region and in the other regions confirmed that 
non-met districts tend to have only one general branch for 
the whole local authority membership. Met districts, having 
more functions are more occupationally diverse, and 
particularly in the Liverpool region had more branches than 
their Northern equivalents. Liverpool city council itself 
was an exception, however, and its plethora of branches 
appear to owe less to the attachment of members to workplace 
democracy and more to factional political activity and the 
desire to maximise seats and political influence through 
affiliating delegates to the district Labour party. 
Shop steward organisation was found to vary with local 
authority si. zo and political control, and also between 
similar authority types and sizes, reinforcing the findings 
of a more detailed study that "to refer to any single pattern 
of steward organisation in local government would ... be 
misleading. "'' The relevance of political, control is 
directly analogous to the arguments stressing the importance 
of "management sponsorship" in the private sector. 7° The 
willingness of the Labour controlled county council in the 
Northern region to provide travel facilities for 
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geographically dispersed shop stewards was crucial to the 
development of an effective shop steward organisation within 
that council. Also, the change in political power which saw 
Labour take control of Liverpool council in 1993 and 
Birmingham in 1984 produced definite changes in management 
attitudes to granting facilities to shop stewards. While the 
size and occupational fragmentation of the workforce in the 
met districts presented specific organisational problems, 
positive support from the new council leadership, 
particularly in Liverpool, was central in allowing the unions 
to develop a unified steward organisation. 
Joint union-management bodies, such as joint consultative 
committees, are the main channel through which unions can 
have access to the formal council decision-making process. 
All five met districts had separate joint consultative 
committees for its manual and its administrative, 
professional, technical and clerical grades, though the 
importance attached to these bodies varied enormously. These 
consultative arrangements are to be distinguished from 
negotiations between management and r-ei ther stewards, acting 
individually or together, or full--time union officers acting 
individually or with officers from other unions, or from 
joint shop stewards committees' where they exist. 
Newcastle, city council, for example, has a sophisticated 
consultative procedure through the two separate JCC's and a 
powerful Corporate Joint Committee comprising all council 
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chief oficers, senior councillors and all trade unions who 
have membership. It discusses council policy issues and its 
decisions carry great weight; however, as far as negotiations 
are concerned the joint shop stewards' committee is 
recognised as being the local joint negotiating committee. 
The joint shop stewards' committee in Liverpool is also 
recognised as the body with which the council negotiates, 
though, as will be shown below, the way that decisions are 
reached in Liverpool is very different to other local 
authorities. In the other authorities negotiations tend to 
be fragmented between occupational work groups and involve 
groups of stewards and officers, often on an ad hoc basis. 
Poor inter-union relations between full-time officers of the 
GIIB and NUPE in the Birmingham region precluded serious co- 
operation on negotiating stances and joint action on issues, 
such as the privatisation of school cleaning in Birmingham 
and the other met district, to the extent that the acrimony 
became public and was reported in the press. 71 
It was found that political control was again an important 
factor in determining the status and membership of JCC's. In 
general, Labour controlled councils tended to accord a higher 
status to JCC's than Conservative controlled administrations, 
especially in Labour local authorities which did not have 
well-established joint shop stewards committees, while 
Conservative councils tended to keep but marginalise the 
importance of JCC' w. One of the Liverpool district officers 
recommended to members, but it was rejected, that they 
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withdraw from the JCC in the Conservative controlled non-met 
district because it was just a "talking shop" and their voice 
&- 
was not being listened to properly. 
The composition of the GMB element of JCC 's was also found to 
vary significantly. One Conservative met district until 
recently refused to have lay members on its JCC, insisting 
that they all be full-time union officers, but this was very 
much an exception. In the major cities, the GMEi's 
representatives on the manual workers' JCC were all shop 
stewards; outside these three areas, however, it was common 
for full-time officers to serve on these bodies along with 
key stewards. This was evident in the three non-met 
districts and also in the met district in the West Midlands, 
but interviews with regional and district officers revealed 
that it was widespread amongst smaller authorites and, 
generally, at the request of members and stewards who wanted 
the officer's expertise in discussions on local bonus 
schemes. This raises questions about the extent to which 
collective bargaining takes place at the local level and the 
degree to which decision-making on local bargaining issues is 
dispersed across the membership. 
In LA11 three major cities, the largest GMB branches were 
those in education and the largest occupational group within 
these branches were part-time women workers: school cleaners 
and dinner ladies. Their separate work locations gave them 
little opportunity to make contacts with fellow workers and, 
ß. G5 
in most cases, it was the branch that appointed or elected 
shop stewards to serve them. These stewards were not work 
croup representatives in the traditional sense and, for the 
vast majority of these workers, the only likely contact they 
would have with their shop stewards was if they attended 
branch meetings. In contrast, the other major areas of GMB 
local government membership, parks and gardens and refuse 
collection were full-time occupations and almost exclusively 
held by men. Although their jobs were peripatet°i;,, c, they were 
not so isolated as they generally started and finished the 
day in a depot, enabling closer contact with shop stewards 
who tended to emerge without branch instigation. It was from 
these stewards that the key stewards who sat on the joint 
shop steward committees and the JCC's tended to be drawn 
from. This made access through the workplace to the 
individuals involved in negotiations and in discussing 
council policy issues extremely difficult for a substantial 
part of the GMB's membership, the part-time women workers, 
particularly as issues affecting them but covering more than 
one workplace were invariably referred straight to JCC' s. 
The nature of local government manual work, therefore, often 
makes it difficult for members to have access to shop 
stewards and makes branch structure of crucial importance. 
Apart from Liverpool city council, regardless of local 
authority size, where there are local government branches, 
it is the branch secretary that is the person who is most 
likely to be the key steward and act as the mobile union 
Z06 
representative. In the Liverpool region this will be a 
district officer, but in the Northern region it is a lay 
G_ 
person and, in the larger met districts, he or she is likely 
to be a recognised full-time shop steward. They are 
supported in the Northern region by the large number of 
district and regional officers given responsibility for 
looking after local government. They meet together roughly 
six times a year to discuss common issues and problems and 
organise the production of a regular municipal newsletter. 
Branches are encouraged to contribute to this which is sent 
out to shop stewards and branches every three months with 
enough copies for a third of the total membership. The 
Birmingham region provides very little support for its shop 
stewrds apart from the intervention of a regional officer 
when problems arise. 
Membership participation in decisions on local bargaining 
issues will depend on branch structure and on whether the 
issue affects one work group specifically or is a collective 
issue. If there is only one general local government branch 
for the authority, sectional meetings are often called to 
discuss issues affecting a single work group. Aside from the 
handling of individual grievances, which, in all cases 
studied, were dealt with through the shop steward structure, 
research suggested that membership participation in 
bargaining operated through the branch structure and was 
processed by the branch secretary for those authorities which 
did not have joint shop stewards' committees. In those that 
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did have J SSC's, the GMB's stewards on these bodies were 
still subject to any decisions taken by their respective 
I 
branches, but the JSSC's duvetoped an important independent 
status. The Liverpool council JSSC in particular clearly 
formulated policy and then sought to ratify it with their 
respective union branch memberships. The scope for local 
bargaining, however, is not great. 
The evidence to suggest that local government manual shop 
stewards are regularly involved in collective bargaining was 
sparse. While a number of the authorities had local bonus 
schemes in operation they tended to cover only a few areas: 
refuse collection, street cleaning and, in two cases, 
gardeners. School cleaners were not included. Moreover, the 
extent to which serious bargaining took place in the 
formation of these schemes is open to question since they 
appeared to conform to very similar set patterns. Further, 
the major debate on JCC's during the research period 
concerned attempts to consolidate the bonus into basic rates. 
This strategy had been agreed amongst the unions at national 
level and, although it was discussed locally, shop stewards 
did not deviate from the detailed guidelines they were given 
on the proposals, while the response from membership in 
sympathetic councils was governed totally by financial 
considerations. In this context, the extent to which 
meaningful bargaining can be said to have taken place is also 
certainly questionable. The only evidence of GMB members in 
school cleaning participating in discussions about wages and 
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conditions concerned the specialised example of a local 
authority putting out this service to tender, with members 
meeting with stewards and Tull-time officers to discuss wage 
rates and hours in compiling a tender bid. While this is an 
area which deserves further study, and will be increasingly 
important in local government with impending legislation on 
competitive tendering, the submitting of tender cannot in any 
way be called collective bargaining. 
Neither, by definition, can GMB participation in JCC's be 
described as collective bargaining. They can be important 
forums, however, as the example of Newcastle's corporate 
joint committee showed. While the decisions they reach are 
merely minuted by the personnel committee and have no binding 
status in the council decision-making structure, they can 
lead either to the opening of formal negotiations or to a 
sympathetic council resolution taking on board their views. 
The views of the GMB, which represents 60 per cent of the 
manual workers in Newcastle, were significant in agreeing a 
policy for the transfer of county council staff following the 
abolition of Tyne and Wear metropolitan county council. The 
GMB were also closely involved in developing the council's 
strategy towards rate-capping, which was discussed 
extensively in the union's branches and in the corporate 
joint committee. ''= 
The two areas where direct negotitions between management 
and joint shop stewards' committees that legitimately can be 
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described as bargaining did take place were over union 
membership agreements and job nomination rights. Other 
research has already pointed to the importance of political 
control in the negotiation and signing of an union membership 
agreement between the unions and Birmingham city council. '' 
This is reinforced by this study since the only local 
authorities to have negotiated UMA's with their trade unions 
were all Labour controlled. The JSSC in Newcastle city 
council negotiated both a UMA and more recently a 
redeployment code of practice which has the effect of the 
unions being notified of all vacancies and being able to 
submit nominees for jobs. This has raised little comment as 
the unions have been careful not to move too directly into 
the managerial role. The practice of unions and, especially 
the 0MB, being granted job nomination rights, however, has 
been widely and controversially used by the Labour 
administration in control of Liverpool city council since 
1.98.3 . 
Decision-making in Liverpool 
The GMB is the largest union representing Liverpool council 
workers with about 9,000 members of the city council's 31,000 
employees. Its actions during the research period were 
virtually indistinguishable from those of the Militant-led 
city council. The GMB was the only trade union to support 
the actions of the council in issuing redundancy notices to 
its staff as a result of the city's financial crisis in 19B 
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when it del. ýýyed setting a rate for over eight month, -: -*. -7" 
The GMB' s high profile in the rate-making crises of 1984 and 
1985 and in other issues were due to its power within the 
Liverpool Joint Shop Stewards' Committee. A key figure in 
this was was Ian Lowes, the chair of the JSSC and the 
convenor of the Gi1B's number S branch, covering parks and 
gardens workers, and a declared supporter of Militant. The 
JS SC was formed in 1979 from the nucleus of a senior 
representatives committee of GMB stewards set up by one of 
the Liverpool regional officers and it expanded to cover the 
whole of the council's employees. A number of unions, 
however, such as NALGO, NIJP'E and the building workers section 
of the TGWU, left the JSSC during 1984/5 in disgust at the 
GMB's tactics. '" Before the end of the council's 
confrontation with the Government the JSSC included only some 
elements from four of the council's 14 unions and was 
virtually defu.. tnct. 
The rise and fall of the Liverpool JSSC as an important body 
owed everything to the attitude of the incoming Militant 
administration. It was their sponsorship that gave it power 
and it was the binding links between it and the council which 
ultimately destroyed it as an effective organisation for the 
joint representtion of workers' interests. Its importance, 
however, was not, as might be expected, in the formulation of 
council policy towards unions and members. The GMB pursued 
its employment objectives through the district Labour party 
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and through close informal contact between convenors and 
senior shop stewards and the chair of personnel, Derek 
Hatton, much to the chagrin of other unions. 7' Its 
importance was a tool for legitimating general calls for 
strike action in favour of the council which it was able to 
do successfully for much of its period of existence. 
The channels through which the 6MB membership in Liverpool 
city council pursues its employment objectives were snown in 
what was known locally as the "Big Asda Caper. " It revolved 
around the granting of planning permission to build a 
hypermarket in the Speke Enterprise zone in mi. d-1985. '' 
Support for this 410 million, 51000 sqare foot development 
was announced by Derek Hatton, the then Deputy leader and 
chair of Personnel, together with the Executive of the 
district Labour party, following Hatton's return from a 
holiday in Tangiers with an old friend and ex-GMB member, 
Tony Beyga, who had recently been appointed PR officer for 
the company which owned the proposed site. Headlining this 
the local paper, the Liverpool. Echo, also disclosed that 
meetings between Hatton, Beyga, and LIMB representatives, 
unbeknown to the Leader of the council , had been held over 
nine months and that the GMB had been given 100 per cent 
nomination rights for the now jobs. After a stormy meeting, 
the district party general committee overruled Hatton and the 
Executive and confirmed its opposition, along with that of 
other Labour parties up and down the country and the 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities, to any retail 
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development in an area set up to encourage small 
manufacturing businesses. Most people thought that this was 
the end of the issue. At a further meeting, however, the GMB 
organised its block vote representation an the general 
committee to overturn the decision and agree to the 
construction of the hypermarket. 
The "Big Asda" episode illustrated both the "sweetheart'' 
relationship between the (3MB and the Council and the 
importance of the district Labour party in the formulation of 
council policy. As the Labour party investigation into the 
Liverpool district Labour party revealed: 
" In the rules the DLP is only responsible for the 
formulation of an 'electoral programme' which 
would in most DLPs be interpreted as the Manifesto 
and other broad strategic policy guidelines. In 
Liverpool the DLP appears to have become involved 
in a number of situations which should be the 
preoragative of the Labour Group. These include 
issues which would normally be decided by 
negotiation between the recognised trade unions in 
the council and council officers or council 
committees. Detailed involvement in industrial 
relations of this nature appears to the 
investigation Team to be inappropriate, 
particularly since it also often gave the 
impression of by-passing normal trade unions and 
industrial relations procedures. 
The GMB' s actions over the three Harthi li gardeners who 
refused to take part in Liverpool's "day of action" in 1984 
is another example of industrial relations procedures being 
conducted through the district Labour party. The three 
people were members of the GMB's Militant-dominated number 5 
branch. It called for their dismissal and the council 
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readily agreed to accede to this demand. A high court 
injunction, however, declared this illegal and said that the 
gardeners should have a jop-as long as Harthill botanical 
gardens exist, whereupon the number 5 branch used its 
influence on the district Labour party to pass a resolution 
saying that Harthill nurseries are dangerous and calling 
for 
their demolition. "Militant have done what they intended to 
do: they have frightened other people" was one of the GMB's 
regional officers assessment of the branches actions. 
The GMB influence in the district Labour party is extensive. 
Over twenty per cent of the 262 strong district Labour party 
in 1935 were direct affiliates from GMB branches and an 
unquantifiable number of delegates from constituencies were 
also 9MB members. The number 5 branch alone appointed 2B 
delegates implying a minimum membership of over two thousand 
when its actual membership was 1195.11 Its convenor, Ian 
Lowes, was an influential member of the district Labour party 
executive which, in effect, determined policy. Further the 
branch had recruited members of the council 's "static 
security force" who attended meetings in uniform. They acted 
as stewards amidst widespread complaints of intimidation. t o 
The recruitment of the static security force was one area 
where the council gave the Gt1B's number 5 branch 100 per cent 
jab nomination rights. It also had these rights in parks and 
recreation, with another Militant-controlled branch, number 
80, having nomination rights in the education area. There is 
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ample documented and anecdotal evidence that these nomination 
rights were used to appoint people who were either members or 
politically sympathetic tWMi. litant. D1 While the intention 
of this was to support the stand being taken by the city 
council it also had the effect of building up Militant 
support in GMB branches. Again the convenor of the number 5 
branch and chair of the JCSC was the focal point in this 
process. Lowes had an office and secretarial and 
photocopying facilities and it was through him that 
application forms for jobs were organised. It cannot be 
realistically said, however, that the GMB negotiated for 
these rights; rather it appears that they were given gratis 
by the Militant council leadership. 
The GMB's Militant stewards also had the power to sort out 
individual and minor collective grievances directly because 
of their close connections with certain leading councillors. 
They were able, therefore, to be highly inluential among the 
membership appearing as union activists who "get things 
done. " Major collective issues would have to be referred to 
the district Labour party, but, as has been shown, the GMF3 
voice was a powerful one within that body. This specialised 
access enabled the GMB's Militant stewards to build and 
maintain positive support amongst the membership. Attempts 
by the district officer, who acted as secretary for most of 
Liverpool council's GMB branches, to play the co-ordinating 
role of the key steward were strongly resisted by Militant 
stewards who carried out a systematic campaign to discredit 
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him with the me_mb(er ship. 
The picture that emerges i g_ Liverpool i that members had 
very little opportunity to participate in decision-making on 
bargai nng issues i+ they were not members of Militant. Vey 
decisions were taken within the Militant organisation" and 
then put into effect through the GMB's Militant-controlled 
branches and the district Labour party. The Joint Shop 
Stewards' Committee did not perform its normal function as a 
negotiating body, it was a political adjunct to the council, 
used to legitimate Militant calls for strike action and also 
as a basis for attempting to spread Militant policies to 
other local authorities by "forming a national local authority 
shop stewards' combine. This body was called the National 
Local Authorities Co-ordinating Committee and its "organising 
secretary" was Ian Lowes. It was through this new structure 
that Militant hoped to increase its influence in national 
bargaining and there is some evidence of co-ordinated 
Militant action at a national level within the GMB's 
industrial conference structure. 
Bargaining and the local government industrial conference 
structure 
The complicated network of national bargaining bodies that 
exists in local government has already been briefly commented 
upon. Other research has looked in detail at pay bargaining 
in the public sector during the i97Os, I32 individual local 
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government wage round negotiations, -- and the pressures that 
have been place on the bargaining structure. 04 Since this 
study is focused on GMB meybership participation in decision- 
making, however, its treatment can he relatively brief as 
detailed analysis of negotiating bodies and negotiations is 
not required. 
The caveat to this limitation of focus is the issue of lay 
representation on negotiating bodies. There is no lay GMB 
representation on the National Joint Council for manual 
workers. This is despite pressure from activists at 
industrial conferences, largely emanating from the Liverpool. 
region but having other support. John Edmonds, when national 
officer for local government and secretary of the trade 
unions' side of the I\IJC, bluntly told delegates to 
Liverpool's 1985 regional industrial conference that they had 
no chance of getting lay representation through. There is, 
however, lay representation on the provincial councils and 
this varies from region to region. The Birmingham region has 
no lay representatives. In Liverpool there are more lay 
representatives than full-time GMB officers on the North West 
provincial council, principally because the senior GMB 
officer allows them to since he regards it as not being a 
very important body. The GMB has 10 of the 18 seats on the 
trade union side of the Northern provincial council. These 
are split equally between full-time officers and lay members, 
the latter being elected by branch ballot. Some lay 
candidates are-vetted and not allowed to stand if thought 
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unsuitable. A with the regional council elections, the 
recommendations of officers are crucial to a candidates 
chances of success and, not-surprisingly, there is a close 
personal identity between GMB members and officers on the 
Northern provincial council that is lacking in its Liverpool 
equivalent. 
The procedure through which members can influence the GMB's 
national bargaining stance follows a predictable sequence. 
Branches meet before the annual national wage round 
negotiations and draw up wage claims which are submitted to 
the regional i. ndustri. al conference. The regional industrial 
conference then formulates a claim, which may be in the form 
of one or more resolutions, and this is discussed at the 
national local government conference which produces one claim 
which is then discussed with the other local government 
manual unions prior to a single claim being submitted from 
the trade union side. 
The detail required in formulating a national claim, however, 
and the fact that agreement has to be reached with other 
trade unions, means that the opportunity for branches to 
formulate policy directly is effectively limited to the 
possibility of expressing broad policy guidelines. 
Resolutions from regional conferences can be more detailed 
than this and the opinions of the region's full-time 
officers concerning what can and what cannot be achieved are, 
in most regions, closely listened to, particularly as some of 
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them are likely to be members of the GMB's NJC negotiating 
team. Similarly, the national officer at the national 
conference is a highly influential figure as he knows the 
likely bargaining positions of the other unions and is in the 
best position to form a judgement on what is likely to be 
accepted by the employers side. Evidence suggests that there 
is still a great deal of debate and disagreement about the 
correct course of action to be taken, but, in the period 
studied, interviews revealed widespread respect for the 
abilities of John Edmonds as a negotiator. 
The main focus for opposition to the stance taken by Edmonds 
and the regional officers came from supporters of the 
National Local Authorities Co-ordinating Committee. Although 
vocal and organised it was not numerically strong. Lower' 
claim that the committee's founding conference in March 1985 
was attended by 250 delegates representing 500,000 workers at 
60 councils has the familiar ring of ultra-left groups 
exaggerating the importance of their "front" organisations. 
The recruitment form issued shortly after listed only 40 
councils who were said to have participated and it is 
strongly suspected that many of these did not do so in an 
official capacity. Certainly that was the case with the 
Newcastle JSSC. The WLACC' s core was essentially Liverpool 
JSSC and the London Bridge JSSC, another Militant 
organisation linking stewards in the inner London boroughs. 
Apart from that it only had isolated pockets of supporters. 
It was Militant GMB members in these two areas which provided 
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the only discernible opposition to the negotiating line taken 
by Edmonds. 
Of the alternative methods of referring back national 
agreements that exist in the GMB, the practice in local 
government has been for the NJC agreement to be referred to 
re-called regional industrial conferences for ratification. 
Membership participation in this decision-making process is, 
therefore, indirect, through the election of its regional 
conference delegation. The normal size of these conferences 
is 40 which means that very few people are involved in taking 
the final decision, however, the delegation basis is through 
the branch structure which, in most circumstances, allows 
delegates to be held accountable to a clearly identifiable 
constituency. Whether this accountability is diligently 
exercised will depend on the level of activity of branches, 
and their members, which as Chapter 4 showed, can vary 
enormously. 
Liverpool.., under Militant's influence, was the only GME 
region to reject the L984 and 1985 local government manual 
pay awards at its regional industrial conference - an action 
that was interpreted as "breast beating'' by the region's 
full-time officers. It once again indicates the uniqueness 
of Liverpool and the power that this political faction has 
over local government decision making in the region. 
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ConCI USI to 
This chapter has completed the research in the eclectic 
framework by examining the OMB'S industrial organisation and 
membership participation in bargaining issues. It has had 
two distinct elements. First, it analysed the main 
developments in the GMB's "formal system" over the past 
twenty years; the rule book position, changes in officer 
structure and the industrial conference reforms. Second, it 
related these developments to two case studies of the GMB's 
"informal system" in the local government and private 
manufacturing sectors, which focused specifically on 
membership participation in bargaining issues. 
The first part of the chapter reinforced the 
importance of union constitutional provisions, which had 
already emerged as a pervasive factor in proceeding chapters. 
It showed the constitutional authority that the union's rules 
vest in the general secretary and the Executive Council over 
the sanctioning and the conduct of strikes involving more 
than SOO members; it also emphasised the importance of the 
change in national leadership as a factor in transforming the 
clientelist, anti-strike image that characterised the union 
in the 1960s. It further conirmed the central importance of 
the GMB's regions within its structure and showed the 
effective limits on the power of the general secretary to 
implement change policies which relied for their success on 
regional imp'levmentation. This was particularly the case with 
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the union's cf4i. cer- structure which developed very 
differently in the regions to that originally intended, but 
t. 
also evident in the early öbstr'uctionism of regional 
secretarieas to industrial conferences. These findings 
corroborated the work of a major study of change in trade 
un i on s. I, * 
The recent officer structure changes, by returning branch 
administration to lay members, potentially also affects 
participation in decision making on non-bargaining issues at 
a regional level. It appears, however, that while this may 
increase lay participation it will not necessarily do so. 
The indication from the Birmingham region is that it is 
merely changing the composition of the "big ten" which the 
prvious chapter showed dominated the region's elections. The 
even clearer lesson of the Northern region is that officer 
influence in a region's elections does not require them to be 
branch secretaries and it will remain however they are 
structured or whatever their formal responsibilities. 
The development of the GMB's industrial. conference structure 
has provided a clear channel through which the membership may 
participate in decision-making on bargaining issues. 
Industrial conferences are particularly important in 
industries which bargain at a national level, the single JIC 
industries, where conference decisions, although not binding 
on negotiators, are highly influential. They are inevitably 
of less relevance in industries where the normal means of 
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fi, x. ing pay is through single employer agreements. In these 
areas industrial conferences have developed more of a 
"talking shop" role, but tt-ey are still a useful forum, 
allowing members from different companies to meet and discuss 
industrial conditions and management strategies. These 
different roles for industrial conferences were apparent in 
the sector studies. 
The second part of the chapter analysed the GMB's informal 
system, examining membership participation in the private 
manufacturing and local government sectors. It focused on 
four themes that have emerged from recent industrial 
relations research which has stressed the importance of the 
workplace in studies of union democracy. First, the 
applicability of what was termed the traditional model: 
expressed by Edmonds as being semi-autonomous from the union 
structure, with members determining policy and the shop 
stewards committee working out tactics. Second, the 
representativeness and accessibility of shop stewards to the 
membership. Third, the extent to which shop stewards 
participate in collective bargaining and fourth, the role of 
the key steward in local government. 
Since the primary research focus within the eclectic approach 
has been the regional level the evidence underpinning the two 
sectoral studies is more inchoate than if the workplace had 
been the central research focus. This makes the drawing of 
firm conclusions difficult. Nevertheless, the distinction 
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drawn in the traditional model, between members determining 
policy and the shop stewards' committee determining tactics, 
appears to be an idealistic distortion. The research 
conducted in large manufacturing establishments indicated 
that plant convenors and some senior shop stewards, the 
quasi-elite, acted as key opinion formers in determining 
policy, while the influence of full-time officers was found 
to be extensive in the smaller establishments studied, 
although the membership had the opportunity to participate 
more directly. 
Branch and officer structure was found to have a significant 
impact an the live]. of membership participation in the 
smaller companies. Differences in the role of stewards 
between small and large manufacturing establishments were 
arguably explained by size effects. While small companies 
can approximate to a model of direct democracy large multi- 
plant companies cannot and require representative channels. 
It is suggested that in large establishments members 
recognise that they cannot solely determine policy or 
participate directly in decision-making, because other work 
groups, plants and trade unions are involved. Instead, they 
perceive their role in the bargaining process as electing a 
representative who is accountable to them and who will 
negotiate agreements on their behalf which will then be 
referred back to them for ratification or rejection. The 
adequacy of this as a democratic mechanism may be variable, 
however, as research indicated that there may be problems in 
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large, g r_ompani e<s with members having access to key decision- 
. makers 
Fieldwork focusing on trade union membership participation 
in the bargaining process inevitably touches on the growing 
debate about the role and influence of trade unions in a 
recession. 07 Although the debate is not of direct relevance* 
to this study, it would be remiss not to point out the 
relevance of the fieldwork to two elements of the discussion: 
the power of shop stewards and the longevity of shop steward 
organisations. The latter can be disposed of quickly as the 
fieldwork confirmed the substantial survey evidence that 
there have been no significant changes. " The difficulties 
of assessing whether shop stewards are getting weaker has 
been pointed out, however, along with the limitations of case 
studies. 09 Noting this, the research evidence is simply 
offered without comment. Interviews with full-time officers 
in private manufacturing in the three regions revealed that, 
particularly in smaller manufacturing establishments, 
requests for their involvement were more frequent and often 
on issues which previously had been dealt with by shop 
stewards without full-time officer intervention. Partly 
related to this, a number of shop stewards also reported a 
hardening of management attitudes at their workplace, many of 
them reporting that management were not prepared to negotiate 
on issues that they had previously. Interviews with local 
government stewards and full-time officers, however, revealed 
a totally different picture; the major factor governing 
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management attitudes to stewards in this area was the 
political composition of the council. 
The importance attached by the membership to the union's 
industrial conference structure was very different in the two 
sectors. Industrial conferences in private manufacturing 
areas such as textiles and clothing, and even in engineering 
and chemicals tended to be regarded by activists as useful 
"sor "comparing notes" but little else. In contrast, the 
local government national conferences were dominated by 
detailed discussion of the annual wage claim. 
The industrial conference structure has provided an important 
new dimension for membership participation in collective 
bargaining in local government. The influence of the 
national officer at these conferences, and full-time officers 
at the regional. conferences, however, is extensive and stems 
from their membership of the negotiating team and their 
superior knowledge of structures and inter-union attitudes. 
There is no lay GMB representation on the National Joint 
Council, though there is, in some regions, on the less 
important Provincial Councils. Nevertheless, there is the 
potential for members to determine the GMB's initial 
bargaining position, as factional opposition from the 
Militant tendency proved. It was not successful because of 
its extreme stance and the widespread respect that existed 
for Edmonds' negotiating abilities, but it is not difficult 
to imagine that a different national officer might find it 
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problematic to get an industrial conference to agree to his 
or her wishes. The industrial conference membership, while 
not having access to detailed information, are experienced, 
often full-time, lay activists with significant political 
skills. They insist on their right to make decisions and, - 
despite the fact that they are not contitutionally binding on 
national officials, they obviously carry great weight. 
At the local level the local government fieldwork found only 
a very limited scope for negotiations an bargaining issues, `'° 
confirming a recent study which found that "collective 
bargaining forms only a very small part of the steward's 
activities. "" It also supported the study's view that shop 
stewards were not inevitably work group representatives. The 
research found that workers in parks and gardens tended to 
elect their stewards, who were based on depots and did act as 
work group representatives, but that the largest single group 
of 0MB members, the part-time women employed as school 
cleaners and dinner ladies, were so occupationally isolated 
that shop stewards did not naturally emerge. Instead they 
were appointed by they branch and, because of the 
fragmentation of these work, unit, the only normal acce s 
these workers had to their shop stewards was if they attended 
branch meetings. 
The branch emerged as a central focus for membership 
participation in decision-matting on issues where bargaining 
did take place. Branch structure varied by region and local 
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authority size. The larger metropolitan district authorities 
studied all had yepztrate branches for park. and gardener and 
for education workers. The non-me-trop]. i tan districts tended 
to have a single branch covering the authority, though in the 
Birmingham region, where local government membership is weak, 
there were very -few local government branches. The Liverpool 
region tended to have more branches than the Northern region 
for equivalent sized local authorities, with Liverpool city 
council, exceptionally, having 16 manual branches. 
The key stewards in local authorities tended to be the branch 
secretaries, which in the Liverpool region were district 
officers. In Liverpool council itself there was competition 
for the role of key steward between the district officer, who 
was secretary of 1.2 of the manual branches, and the Militant 
chairman of the city council's Joint Shop Stewards' 
Committee, with the latter playing the dominant role by 
virtue of his close association with the council's political 
leadership. By contrast, the research found good working 
relationships between shop stewards and fu11-time officers in 
Newcastle and other local authorities in the Northern region, 
which was found to provide the most support for its stewards. 
The political composition of the council was found to be the 
crucial factor determining shop steward organisation, 
willingness to negotiate, and the status of joint 
consultative committees. Labour councils were found to be 
more likely to provide facilities for stewards and recognise 
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bodies of stewards' for negotiating purposes than 
Conservative authorities, and to attach greater importance to 
JCC's. Liverpool city council, again, was a completely 
aberrant case, with the GMB being dominated by Militant 
supporters and using its influence in the district Labour 
party, which was effectively given council policy-making 
powers, to achieve its employment objectives. It cannot 
realistically be said, however, that GMB members participated 
in bargaining issues. The GMB's key local government branches 
in Liverpool were effectively hijacked and used to promote 
Militant political ends. Decisions were taken within the 
Militant organisation and then implemented through utilising 
the GMB's branch structure. 
The study, in completing the research within the eclectic 
framework, has uncovered substantial variations in membership 
participation in decision making on bargaining issues. These 
findings, however, have been based on relatively thin 
evidence; an inevitable by-product of the eclectic approach, 
which requires research into all levels of union government, 
and the decision to focus primarily on the regional level. 
Despite this caveat, however, the case studies clearly showed 
significant variations within sectors in three regions and 
between sectors in three regions, which indicate that there 
may be serious limits to the value of the conclusions reached 
by studies which focus on a single sector or workplace. 
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Chapter 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This study has been about the organisation and government of 
the General Municipal and boilermakers' from 1970 to 1985. 
Its focus is, as far as is known, unique in that it has 
concentrated primarily on government at the regional level. 
In examining the GMB's Birmingham, Liverpool and Northern 
regions it has sought to address the common conception that 
regional secretaries are barons of their area. It has also 
sought to analyse the wider issues of power and participation 
relevant to the ballot debate arising from the 1984 Trade 
Union Act, rather than focus explicitly on this policy issue 
which has already been well examined. x 
The conclusions have been organised into separate sections. 
The first outlines the eclectic approach that has been 
adopted to union democracy and the research focus and 
framework applied in the study. The next four sections 
examine the regional focus: the vertical distribution of 
power in the (3MB; patterns of regional organisation; the 
declining power of. regional secretaries; and factors 
influencing participation at regional level. The sixth 
section analyses participation at the national level and the 
seventh participation in collective bargaining. Some brief 
final comments are then offered. 
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The eclectic approach and union democracy research 
The debate on the nature of union democracy has relied 
heavily on terms borrowed from political theory and the 
voluminous literature spawned in this century reflects the 
intellectual schism in political theory between 
parliamentary, or as it is sometimes called, representative 
democracy, and participatory democracy. This schism has 
focused research at opposite ends of the trade union 
governmental structure. At the national level, the 
parliamentary approach has been embodied in the literature 
e>camining -factors attenuating oligarchy: closeness of 
elections, parties and factions, and constitutional checks 
and balances. On the other hand, the participatory view has 
been expressed in the more recent literature on the 
workplace, focusing on the "direct democracy" resulting from 
the growth of shop stewards and the decentralisation of 
bargaining; and on micro-analytical studies of membership 
involvement at branch meetings. 
The eclectic approach recognises that attempts to define 
union democracy solely within one of these 4rameworks. are 
inadequate, and argues that these approaches are 
complementary, not alternatives, and therefore capable of 
synthesis. It does this by adapting the framework developed 
by Undy et al. - This analyses union decision making, 
distinguishing between bargaining and non-bargaining issues, 
and examines the level and scope of decision making. Two 
331 
forms of dispersion of decision making are related to this: 
vertical dispersion; the degree to which doci lions are 
1L. 
- 
decentralised from the national level: and horizontal 
dispersion; the degree to which members participate in 
decisions at a given level - national, regional, or local. 
This framework is.: -, a useful descriptive device for examining 
the reality and variety of trade union democratic processes, 
but it offers no defining characteristic of democracy. It 
can be adapted relatively easily, however, to specify an 
ideal type of union democracy. The definition offered here 
prescribes that the lower the level of decision making and 
the wider the level of participation (and the more informed 
the participants) at any given level, the closer a union 
approaches an ideal democratic form. In taking this view, 
the eclectic approach thus subsumes previous approaches to 
union democracy within the framework of the vertical and 
horizontal dispersion of decision mating by postulating them 
as intervening, variables of potentially varying importance. 
Previous research on trade union government by f ocu ai. ncg on 
either the national or local level has ignored the 
significance of regional union structures. In making this 
the primary focus of study it is hoped that future research 
will add to knowledge in this neglected field by regional 
studies of other unions and comparative regional studies. As 
a secondary focus, however, the study also examined the 
importance of three intervening variables within the eclectic 
ý J tiý 2 ý. 
approach which preliminary research suggested might 
signi-ficantl. y affect membership participation at the regional 
checks and balances, and other levels: constitutional 
factionalism, and branch structure. 
The vertical structure of government 
The GMB's highly regionalised structure is unique amongst 
British trade unions. Only the autonomy given to the NUM's 
areas begins to approach the power that the GMB's regions 
wield within the union. While its great rival, the TGWU, 
appoints its officers at national level and has direct 
contact with its branches through the union's trade group 
structure, the GMB's officers are appointed by the regions 
which are the sole formal means of communication with the 
branch. Regional power is further consolidated by the GMB's 
rule book provisions dividing representation on the union's 
national bodies, the Executive Council and its sub- 
committees, and Congress, into regions. The union's rules 
also give the region almost absolute power over the branch 
and allow the regional committee to close or merge branches 
"for any reason it deems good and sufficient" and to act as 
the disciplinary body for the union. 
In addition, the., region has certain rule book powers on 
bargaining issues. The regional committee can sanction a 
strike where not more than 300 members are involved; a 
provision that is becoming more significant with the 
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increasing trends towards workplaces fragmentation. Moreover, 
unless strikes are of national importance, the regional 
committee has jurisdiction over the strike committee and can 
appoint its members if more than one branch is involved in 
the dispute. 
Patterns of regional organisation 
The vertical concentration of power at the regional level in 
the GMB has been widely recognised. What has not been 
appreciated or analysed, however, is the significant 
variations that exist within the regional horizontal level of 
government. Most academic and journalistic references to the 
GMBB'a regions have seemed to imply that they are almost 
identical monolithic institutions. This gives a false 
impression of regional government in the GMB. The case 
studies revealed substantial regional differences in branch 
structure, officer structure, recruitment strategies and 
performance, and political activities and organisation. 
These differences make the GMB appear more like ton general 
unions rather than one. The Liverpool region has 86 per cent 
of its members in workplace or single-industry branches, the 
Lancashire region only 9 per cent. District officers have 
varied in number from two in one region to sixteen in 
another. Their role has also varied from being used almost 
exclusively as branch administrators in Liverpool and 
Firmingham, to having solely industrial responsibilities in 
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the Northern region. The latter region since 1978 has also 
developed an explicit recruitment strategy and organisation, 
and a political organisation, that was absent in the other 
two regions studied. 
The principal reason for these differences is the autonomy 
traditionally afforded to the GtiFi's regions to run their own 
organisations and enshrined in the union's rules. They are 
also due to the discretion that regions have to interpret 
national policy - the variations in officer structure are 
testimony to this. This ability to maintain traditions and 
to frustrate or minimise the impact of national initiatives 
which affect them indicates the negative power of the GMB's 
regions and the constraints imposed on a reforming general 
secretary. it is also important to realise, however, that 
regions have the positive power to promote change in the 
absence of pressure from the national level. This occurred 
in Liverpool in the aftermath of the Pilkington's dispute. 
Although a national level inquiry prompted the break up of 
the large Pilkington's branch, there was no pressure for 
further reform; the region, however, chose to transform 
fundamentally its branch structure, splitting up large 
general branches and moving towards a workplace based 
structure. 
The declining power of regional secretaries 
The power- that the GMD' s regions have within the union's 
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structure has commonly been associated with one person, the 
regional secretary. This may have been true before and 
immediately after the second world war; Clegg has convincngly 
shown that rfecgional secretaries dominated their regions 
before the war and in the 1940s and 1950s. -21 It has probably 
also been true more recently. In the 1960s, the Northern 
region's secretary, Cunningham, dominated not only union 
affairs but politics on Tyneside; Liverpool's regional 
secretary was notoriously unresponsive to membership views; 
and, in the uariy 1970s, the Birmingham regional secretary 
could buy 5,000 shares in a local radio station without 
informing the regional committee and without facing 
subsequent criticism. This has altered, however, as regional 
committees have become more active. 
The image of the regional secretary as an all powerful baron 
does not bear much resemblance to the way that decisions are 
reached in the 1980s. The evidence is that decision making, 
far from being concentrated solely in the hands of the 
regional secretary, is, in fact, dispersed across the 
regional committee. This is the body that takes the Frey 
decisions in the region, not the regional council despite its 
de jure authority. As the region's administrator, the 
regional secretary's views can be highly influential, but, in 
the modern GMD, a regional secretary's power is the, power to 
persuade not the power to dictate. This was well expressed 
by the Liverpool regional secretary, John Whelan, who said 
that his committee "prefer debate and discussion to being 
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told what to do. " The Liverpool regional committee has 
been 
particularly active since the early 1970s. It was the motive 
force behind the changes in the region's branch structure; 
and this activity is sustained by the factional political 
activity in the region. 
The regional secretary is, of course, still in a strong 
position. Since 1978, Burlison, the Northern regional 
secretary, has developed a high profile image for the union 
in the region; established a coherent recruitment strategy 
and organisation; increased political activity; and 
instituted quarterly conferences of branch reprosentatitives 
on a county basis to improve communications. It is 
recognised, however, that it is the Northern regional 
committee which takes the final decision an whether the 
regional secretary's proposals for change will be 
implemented. 
Regional committees, nevertheless, depend on a level of 
activity and interest from its members if they are to be 
effective decision making bodies and a serious constraint on 
the power of regional secretaries. This is ensured in 
Liverpool by the factional activity that exists i: - the region 
and in the Northern region by its high level of union 
activism. Its absence in Birmingham has led to the regional 
committee allowing many of its functions to atrophy and to 
decisions being taken either by the regional secretary or 
delegated to officers. Where lay members have been involved, 
337 
however, decision making has become virtually a trial of 
strength between the regional secretary and chairman with the 
vi Ewa of the latter prevailing. 
Factors influencing participation at regional level 
The principal opportunity for members to participate in 
decision making at the regional level is through the 
elections to the regional council. This is because 
participation at the regional level is heavily conditioned by 
the union's rules. These ensure that the key posts in the 
region, the regional chairman, Executive Council delegates 
and regional committee are all indirectly elected., " They 
also allow only minimal information to be provided about 
candidates standing for the regional council - the body that 
elects these posts - and commit regions to using the 
increasingly indefensible block vote system in this election. 
The restrictive participatory framework at regional level set 
by the union's rules can be either mitigated or reinforced by 
the two other issues that have developed as secondary 
research focuses. Branch structure is relevant to 
involvement in decision making in two ways. First, it 
affects the level of participation at branch meetings. The 
evidence confirmed earlier research findings that workplace 
branches are likely to be better attended than general 
branches; and smaller branches proportionately better 
attended than large branches. Second, in trade unions 
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operating the branch block vote system, the existence of 
large branches means, that power can be concentrated in a few. 
branches if they decide to act in concert. 
The low level of membership involvement in branch meetings 
has been recognised by the union nationally. " A large part 
of the reason for this, however, must be attributed to the 
union historically favouring the formation of large general 
branches. These were particularly encouraged when Cooper was 
general secretary, but they are also reinforced by the 
union's commission system which allows branch secretaries to 
retain 10 per cent of membership subscriptions in commission 
and a further 10 per cent to be paid to collecting stewards. 
This has encouraged ambitious branch secretaries to recruit 
new members regardless of their work occupation or whether 
they could be represented properly through their branch. 
Furthermore, the growth in check off has highlighted the 
potential for abuse of the commission system and there is 
clear evidence that in some branches, the secretary, acting 
either alone or with a few key people, effectively uses 
collecting stewards salaries as a form of patronage. 
The study of regional elections in the Birmingham region 
graphically illustrated how branch structure, the block vote 
system, and patronage powers had led to the formation of an 
informal non-political grouping centred around the "bit, ton" 
branch secretaries who between them wielded nearly half the 
votes in the regional council and Congress delegation 
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elections and dominated the outcome. The influence of 
officers was extonsive in these elections, as it was in the 
Northern region, but while=the Northern regional officers 
relied on arcgument and persuasion of key local activists, the 
majority of the "big ten" in Birmingham were union officers 
and exercised influence directly. (although these are no 
longer to be branch secretaries under the union's Decision 84 
reforms, there is already evidence that they are being 
replaced by lay members committed to the same tradition. 
The workplace branch structure in the Liverpool region is a 
key reason for its elections being the most competitive in 
the GMB, but another is its high degree of factional 
activity. The evidence of the Liverpool study is that the 
existence of faction constrains the influence of the union's 
officers in the electoral process, and also encourages and 
informs participation. Factional activity tends to ensure a 
higher turnout and, where a union's rules forbid canvassing 
and the issuing of manifestoes, it provides a vital 
unofficial communication channel to the membership, 
preventing one group of people from establishing a knowledge 
monopoly. This occurred with the activity that saw the left- 
wing faction come to power following the p'ilkington' a 
dispute. 
The most recent manifestation of factional competition, 
however, has been provided by the Militant tendency, based 
from its strength in local government in Li. verpool, and has 
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been surrounded by accusations of intimidation and suspicious 
democratic procedures. Militant's antics have undoubtedly 
led to some GMB members deciding to refuse to participate in 
decision making on local government matters, particularly 
within Liverpool city council itself, but also at regional 
industrial conference level. They have, however, also 
stimulated members in other industrial sectors to organise 
against them and forced the faction which emerged following 
P'ilk: ington's into heightened activity. The battle has not 
been pleasant, but it has promoted and informed 
participation. It is a paradox that an organisation 
committed to the overthrow of democracy can enhance democracy 
by the opposition it generates. 
Participation at the national level 
The GMB's rules governing the national political system give 
supreme authority both to Congress and to the Executive 
Council. In practice, however, it is the Executive that is 
the important body. The GMB's annual Congress is more docile 
than most. It is relatively small in size and the union'.; 
rules present formidable obstacles to branch resolutions 
being debated. Congress is, moreover, geared towards the 
articulation of regional interests. The scope -for factional 
activity is, therefore, seriously limited by the GMB'S 
constitution and rarely surfaces. 
Membership involvement in decision making at national level 
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in the Cooper era was limited to this unsatisfactory 
participation at Congress and to the lay members elected 
from 
the regional councils to the union's general council, where 
they had a bare majority over the regional secretaries, and 
to the more important national executive, where they only had 
parity. Lay participation was extended by Basnett's 1975 
reform proposals. The two-tier structure was abolished and 
replaced by a single Executive Council, where lay members 
outnumbered regional secretares by two-to-one, and the role 
of industrial conferences was strengthened to increase 
membership participation in bargaining issues. The 1987 
Congress has agreed to dilute the numerical influence of 
regional secretaries even further by introducing an 
additional reserved seat in each region for women. 
The institution of consultative procedures on major 
organisational reform issues, beginning in the mid 1970s, 
opened up policy making in a limited manner to the wider 
membership and reflected the more open and consensual 
management style of Basnett compared to his predecessor. It 
also had the purpose, however, of enabling E essnett to utilise 
membership pressure for change to pass reforms through the 
Executive Council, which was important in the absence of any 
significant organised factional activity in the union to 
promote change. 
The study essentially confirms Undy et al's findings that the 
GME+ general secretary's job is primarily one of balancing a 
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small number of regional interests. - These were most evident 
in leading to Decision 84's proposes o. to reduce the number of 
regions being dropped. Thn regional interests of the 
Executive's lay members, however, are not necessarily 
identical to those of their regional secretary, and some lay 
Executive members are less committed to the concept of 
regionalism than others. The general secretary can through 
adroit brokerage, therefore, obtain support for change 
proposals which challenge certain regional interests. 
Government at national level in the GHB is a far more complex 
process than it seems on the surface; it centres around the 
construction of shifting coalitions of support. It is clear, 
however, that the influence of lay Executive Council members 
in decision making is greater than it was a decade ago. 
Membership participation in collective bargaining 
The occupational heterogeneity of the GMB's membership makes 
it impossible to offer general conclusions about the vertical 
and horizontal dispersion of decision making on bargaining 
issues. It is possible, however, to make three related 
general comments about the bargaining context. First, the 
union's rule importantly specify that the key decision to 
sanction a strike and to regulate their conduct is vested in 
the Executive Council where over 300 members are invo]ved. 
Second, this concentration of power at the national level 
enabled Basnett to move the GMB away from its totally 
unsympathetic attitude to industrial action. This had caused 
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intense membership dissatisfaction in the 1960s and was a 
main caul o of the Pi l k: i ngton 's unrest. Third, the new 
national officer appointments made under Basnett tended to 
share his more democratic attitudes and sought to encourage 
membership involvement in decision making. Unlike the 
majority of their predecessors, the new officers treated 
members more like participants and less like clients. 
The introduction of industrial conferences has provided za 
significant extra channel for membership participation in 
bargaining issues in certain industries. The relevance of 
industrial conferences directly depends on the locus of 
bargaining. In industries and sectors which bargain 
nationally, such as local government, they have been an 
important forum for discussion and debate, and much of their 
time is devoted to consideration of the annual wage claim. 
Although the decisions reached by industrial conferences are 
not binding on union negotiators -a fact which has caused 
resentment amongst a number of activists - they do assume an 
influential status in single JIC industries and cannot be 
easily ignored. In industries where the primary means of 
fixing pay is through single employer agreements, however, 
such as textiles and clothing, the usefulness of industrial 
conferences is limited to comparing notes and discussions of 
general industrial problems. 
The study of private manufacturing and local government 
confirmed the variability in importance attached to 
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industrial conferences. It also -found wide differences 
between the -h wo sectors in the scope, for- bargaining gat a 
local level and in the role of shop stewards. The research 
in the local government sector strongly pointed to the 
importance of branch structure as the focal point for 
membership participation in bargaining issues and emphasised 
the importance of local authority political control in 
expanding what limited opportunities for local bargaining 
were available. More generally, the manufacturing studies 
highlighted a shift over time from from the confident 
workplaces of the early 1970s, to shop stewards, particularly 
in small, companies, increasingly using full-time officers 
when problems arose. This caution, however, was not so 
apparent in the karger manufacturing establishments, and 
almost totally absent in local government. 
The case studies were based on relatively thin evidence, 
nevertheless, they clearly showed significant variations 
within sectors in three regions and between sectors in three 
regions. This indicates that there may be serious limits to 
the capacity of single sector or workplace studies to offer 
generalisations about membership behaviour and democratic 
practices at the workplace -a point which needs to be born 
in mind in future research in this field. 
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This study has been about the problem of research into union 
democracy and the democratic pr_ar_tices of a single union - 
the General Municipal and Boilermakers. ' It would be remiss 
to finish without commenting on the implications of the 
conclusions for both the GMB and for union democracy 
research. As far as the GMB is concerned, two sorts of 
conclusions need to be made concerning its democratic 
practices. Firstly, it is necessary to make a judgement 
about the relative merits of the different regions' systems 
of government. Second it is apposite to offer some comments 
about democracy in the GMB as a whole. 
On applying the eclectic model of union democracy, the 
research found that participation in decision making, and 
hence democracy, at the regional and local levels on non- 
bargaining issues was much less prevalent in Birmingham than 
the other two regions. Assessing the relative merits of the 
Liverpool and Northern regions, however, is more 
problematical since they offer very different governmental 
systems but both produce a relatively high level of 
participation. Nevertheless, it is argued that, out of the 
two, the Northern region offers a better model for other GMB 
regions to emulate. 
Any comparison between the Northern and Liverpool regions 
needs to clearly poriodi e Liverpool pre and post Militant. 
Between the Pilkington'a explosion of 1970 and the rise of 
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Militant in the region around 1977-78, the region benefitted 
from factional activity; the left faction which came to power 
shortly after the Pilkington's_strike promoted democracy 
by 
transforming the region's branch structure into a primarily 
workplace based structure, stimulating local participation. 
Since around 1977, however, the brand of factionalism 
provided by the Militant tendency has damaged 
the union's 
image in Merseyside and, outside Liverpool City Council when 
Militant controlled, reduced the GMB's effectiveness as an 
organisation. Militant's intimidatory tactics have also 
prevented members from participating in union politics; 
though they have encouraged members to organise to oppose 
them, the overriding impression from the fieldwork was that 
their net effect has been almost certainly negative. 
This finding indicates the need to re-appraise the 
significance of factionalism to the union democracy debate. 
The conclusion of this study is that factionalism provided by 
groups which accept democratic values can enhance democracy, 
but factionalism from groups, such as Militant, which reject 
democracy, can only corrode democratic structures in the long 
term. It is also concluded that the traditional counter- 
position of factionalism and oligarchy is misplaced. The 
example of the Northern region shows that factionalism and 
oligarchy are not of necessity opposite sides of the same 
coin. 
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The high level of active participation in governmental 
structures in the Northern region can be attributed to a 
R. 
, 
number of factors, but certainly not to factionalism, which 
is almost totally absent in the region. Participation levels 
have been enhanced, particularly by the splitting up of the 
regional council and Congress elections into geographical 
divisions; the absence of large branches since they were 
broken up in the 1960s, - the regular branch chairs and 
secretaries meetings that the regional secretary and officers 
hold with staff; the close integration of shop stewards in 
union activities; the regular and successful production of 
the region's newsletter; the GMB's positive image and profile 
as the pivotal union in the North; and the general 
solidaristic traditions of Northern trade unionism. 
In essence, the Northern region's activist governmental 
system offers the GMB+< "middle way" between the virtual 
oligarchy of the Birmingham region and the factionalism of 
the Liverpool region. This "middle way" of activism is also 
arguably applicable to, and practicable in, other trade 
unions. Other studies within the field of union democracy 
could usefully examine the extent to which an activist model 
is applicable to other GMB regions and, indeed to other trade 
unions. This would, interestingly, involve assessing whether 
this model is a regional, that is a Northern, phenomenon; a 
task that was beyond the scope of this study. 
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It should not be thought, however, that the Northern region 
is being held up here as a perfect example of activist 
democracy. There are disadvantages and difficulties in the 
non-factionalised activist model. While the Northern region 
has been able to inform and involve members in elections, and 
in taking decisions, without having factions, through its 
communication systems, the introduction of some of these 
systems has had a double-edged effect. The institution of 
branch chairs and secretary conferences, for example, has 
improved communications and encouraged participation, but it 
has also led, in some instances, to the emergence of a "lay 
elite. " This "lay elite" has privileged access to 
information, which encourages the tendency for ordinary 
members to rely on their judgement or leave decisions to 
them. It also produces the tendency for "lay elite" members 
to be inculcated with the values and opinions of the union's 
full-time officers; it was very evident, in some cases, that 
the views of these members were not only indistinguishable 
from, but scarcely disguised carbon-copies of, the views 
expressed by certain regional officials. 
The Northern region's electoral system of dividing 
it regional council and Congress delegation 
elections into divisions, although an improvement on the 
other regions' systems, is still far from satisfactory. 
Members are likely to know a large number of the candidates 
standing in their division and are thus able to take informed 
decisions, but branches are eligible to vote for candidates 
X49 
in divisions outside their on and this puts power in the 
hands of full-time officers and the "lay elite" who are the 
only people likely to know many of those standing and can use 
their influence to give crucial support to candidates they 
-favour. 
Another disadvantage with the Northern region's activist 
model is the persistence of its general branch structure. 
The official GMB opinion is that general branches reflect the 
union's historical traditions and are becoming increasingly 
relevant as a form of organisation as workplaces become 
fragmented and smaller. This is true on both counts, but it 
is still unsatisfactory. The research evidence available, 
although limited, clearly showed that, proportionately, 
general branches were less well-attended than workplace 
branches; it also indicated that workplace branches were 
perceived as being more relevant forums by members. 
Undoubtedly, changes in workplace size will increase the need 
for unions to re-assess their branch structures, but there is 
no a priori presumption in favour- of general branches. 
Britain's other big general union, the TGWU, NUF'E and others 
have maintained or established workplace branch systems, and 
these have played a part in making them more successful in 
attracting new members. 
This discussion naturally leads on to more general comments 
about democracy in the GMB as a whole: how it has changed 
over the last fifteen years; how it compares with that of 
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other Unions; and how it compares with the democratic ideal 
posited in the eclectic approach. 
The GMB has changed considerably since the Cooper era. In 
1967 the union in its written evidence to the Donovan 
commission considered that: 
"the structure of an individual trade union should; 
(a) provide a framework within which economic and 
industrial ends can be efficiently pursued; 
(b) be administratively efficient; (c) conform to 
membership conceptions of democracy. "-7 
This probably accurately reflected the priority that 
Cooper attached to union democracy. Largely under Basnett's 
influence, the GMB has witnessed increased membership 
participation at both national and regional level. It has 
also seen increasing workplace participation in areas where 
bargaining has been decentralised, but participation at the 
branch level has remained a problem, as it has for other 
unions. In this sense the conclusion from applying the 
eclectic approach to union democracy is that the GMB can 
legitimately be described as having become more democratic 
over the last decade and a half. 
While the GMB has become more democratic it is still regarded 
by many as being woefully oligarchic compared with a lot of 
other trade unions. It would not be right to introduce fresh 
information at this concluding stage of the thesis, which has 
been an intra-union rather than an inter-union study, but a 
few comments that have already been made need to be 
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re-iterated. On the general level, the GMB' s lack of a 
workplace branch structure compared with the TGWU and NUPE, 
the total unfairness of its brich block vote system, its 
system of indirect elections For its powerful regional 
committees, and the inadoquacies of its industrial conference 
system compared with the TGWU's trade group structure, all 
indicate that the GMB still lags behind a number of other 
unions in its democratic practices. There remain, therefore, 
opportunities to increase membership participation which can 
be grasped by imaginative leadership in the future. 
Comparing the GMB with the eclectic model's democratic ideal 
type, the following suggestions for improving participation 
and promoting activism could usefully form an agenda for the 
GMB's leaders to discuss ways of enhancing democracy in their 
union. They are in no particular order and are not an 
exhaustive list. Firstly, re-structure the union's branches 
on a primarily workplace basis. Second, overhaul the 
commission system so that the incentives for forming large 
general branches are removed. Third, elect regional chairmen 
and regional committees directly by secret individual ballot; 
this could be done at the same time as Executive Council 
elections if desired. Fourth, expand the regional council 
into a regional conference of members, or, at a minimum, 
introduce electoral in the regional council elections and 
preclude inter-divisional voting. 
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Fifth, elect the Congress delegation either on a delegation 
basis with a number of branches clustered together, or, if on 
a regional basis, by electoral 
=divisions with no inter- 
divisional voting. Sixth, radically expand Congress in size; 
its current delegation basis is half that of the TGWU and 
much smaller than virtually any other British trade union. 
Seventh, re--examine the need or desirability of Congress 
being strucutred to reflect regional viewpoints. Eighth, 
clarify the role of industrial conferences: to give 
participants policy-making powers on bargaining issues which 
affect them solely. Lastly, examine the applicability of the 
Northern region's communication systems to other regions. 
Analytically separate from the implications the research's 
conclusions have for policy makers in the GMB are the 
implications that the study has for researchers in the field 
of union democracy. This is the final area that needs 
comment. It involves assessing the implications arising from 
the regional focus of the study and analysing the advantages 
and disadvantages of using the eclectic approach as an 
organising framework/research tool. 
The empirical research into the GMB's regions clearly 
showed the importance of regional governmental systems, and 
the extent of regional variations, within the union': -, over-all 
governmental system, and related these to the union democracy 
debate. It also highlighted the importance of constitutional 
provisions in determining regional power. Since the study 
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did not set out to compare the GMB with other unions, 
however, the importance of regionalism in other trade union 
structures has not been examin d. Based on the GMB's 
experience, the regional level must be regarded as being an 
important level of analysis in any study of trade union 
democracy. Future research could usefully examine the scope 
for important decisions being taken at regional level in 
other unions. It could also usefully compare regional 
government in a number of different unions and assess the 
role of union constitutional provisions in promoting regional 
decision making. Since regional trade union government is 
virtually an unexplored area, studies of this nature promise 
many fascinating new insights into trade union democratic 
practices, which should be of interest to students of union 
democracy and organisational behaviour, to the trade unions 
themselves, and to central government policy makers. 
The eclectic model of union democracy developed for the 
research has proved to be a useful framework for analysing 
trade union government; the advantages of adopting the model 
significantly outweighing the minor disadvantages. It is 
difficult, however, to compare the eclectic approach with 
other models, since it subsumes them in its framework. Its 
strength as an analytical tool lies partly in that fact, 
combining, as it does, approaches which look at factionalism, 
elections, constitutional provisions, and local level 
participation; and partly in its focus on participation in 
decision making at all levels of union government - national, 
Z354 
regional and local. The comprehensive picture of union 
governmental activity required by the model 
does, 
nevertheless, present a practi al difficulty 
in that it 
requires a formidable research input. 
Its adoption as a 
research tool, therefore, is more practicable 
for team 
projects rather than individual research. 
In this field it 
should be noted that there is a clear case 
for future group 
research updating Undy et al's work 
"Change in Trade Unions" 
to take account of the enormous changes that have occurred 
since 1979. 
The principal advantage of adopting the eclectic model is 
that it avoids the sterile debate between parliamentary and 
participatory theories of union democracy, and the national 
or local research focuses that these have produced. By 
bringing together these disparate traditions it also provides 
the context for future research. A further advantage of the 
model is that it indicates the need for examining the 
relationship between different levels of government - 
national and regional, regional and local - in order to 
understand the dynamics of democracy. This is another area 
where. future research could usefully contribute: to knowledge. 
Apart from the practical difficulty of the formidable 
research input required, the only significant disadvantage of 
adopting the eclectic approach is that, as it stands, it does 
not clearly specify all the variables affecting the level at 
which decisions are taken and the degree of membership 
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participation at each of these levels. Identifying 
factionalism as a variable, for instance, pushes into the 
background the large number of ; *factors which studies of 
factionalism have shown determine its extent and variation. 
As long as these variables are recognised, however, there is 
no particular problem. There is nonetheless scope for 
considerable work in this area, particularly in the 
specification of contextual variables, which could lead 
to 
the extension and improvement of the eclectic approach. 
How important is it to study democracy in trade unions? 
Democracy is a much used and abused term, and trade union 
democracy is no exception. Orwell noted that the defenders 
of any kind of regime claim that it is ýa democracy. ° Shaw's 
hero, John Tanner, in "Man and Superman" was even more 
contemptuous, suggesting that "democracy substitutes election 
by the incompetent many for appointment by the corrupt few. ""' 
Such cynicism cannot, however, deflect the belief that 
democratic processes are essential, and are as desirable in 
trade unions as they are in society as a whole. The study of 
these processes in trade unions is important not only because 
trade unions ought to be democratic, but because the study of 
union democracy can usefully highlight ways of enriching 
democracy in society as a whole. The application of the 
eclectic approach to British society and to central 
government decision making, however, is well beyond the scope 
of this study of the GMB. 
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368 
The new branch figures for 1976 -78 are taken 
from NUGh1W Congress Reports for 1977 to 1979. 
20 NALGO boundaries are far from coterminous with 
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27 GMBATU (1984a) Core Rule 1301. 
28 Undy and Martin (1984) p91. 
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35 This term has been used by Sovietologists to 
describe the CPSU central committee pre- 
Gorbachev. Without pushing the analogy too 
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45 Undy and Martin (1984) p92. 
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3 Ibid, pill. 
4 Lane and Roberts (1971) p54. The parallels 
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8 Undy (1978). 
9 Fryer et al (1974). 
10 This has been suggested by the eminent legal 
expert, Kahn-Freund (1979) p5. 
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analysis which had a different focus. 
17 GMBATIJ (1984a) Core Rule 5.1. 
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between regional and district 
been examined in another region 
ished MA dissertation by Friend, 
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33 Ibid, p714. 
34 GMBATU (1984c) p714. 
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40 Report of Fifty Eighth Congress, 1973, p317. 
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Conference in 1975 the structure of industrial 
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pp794-610. 
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p79; and Terry (1983) p52. 
60 Boraston et al (1975) p1ß7. 
61 Ibid, p160. 
62 Batstone et al (1977) p34 also distinguish two 
further ideal types -"- nascent leaders and 
cowboys - however these are less common 
categories and research did not reach this 
level of sophistication since the case studies 
were not nearly so detailed as Batstone et al's 
study of a single plant. 
63 Ibid, p53. 
64 Walsh (1981) p45 quoting a discussion paper by 
Society of Chief Personnel Officers. 
65 Ibid, p53. 
66 Ingham (1985) in a survey of 235 local 
authorities found, p7, "not an inconsiderable 
level amount of supplementary local level 
bargaining. " 
67 This is a slight but justifiable simplification. 
The Birmingham region has one or two district 
officers who spend some time servicing local 
government members but they are not comparable to 
their counterparts in Liverpool and Northern in 
this respect. 
68 Kessler (1986) rightly-critices Terry', (1982) 
sample of authorities which were all small semi- 
rural districts. 
69 Kessler (1986) p427. 
70 Footnote 59 refers. 
71 See "Union 
1:. 10.84. 
Continuous 
Birmingham 
a mass mee 
row a threat to , 
jobs, " Birmingham Post 
Poor 
, 
GMB/NUPE re1ations have, -been ,a feature..,, Again., on shoal cleaning see 
Post 20.4.82 where NUPE walked out of 
fing in protest at the OMB's stance. 
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72 A useful survey of Newcastle's financial problems 
is provided in the Local Government Chronicle, 
i6.8.85, p938. 
73 Kessler (1986) p4+O. The West Midlands district 
referred to is Birmingham council. 
74 Guardian 19.11.85. 
75 See "Jobs for the Boys, " Union World ti-O. 3. G5. 
Channel 4. Transcript available from author. 
76 Ibid, see comments from NALGO and NUT 
representatives in particular. 
77 Information has come mainly from interviews but 
see Liverpool echo, 24-31 1985. The New 
Statesman 22.2.85, p12-133 tells part of the story. 
78 NEC (1986) Q. 
79 Ibid, see Annexe 0 and Annexe C. 
8o Ibid, p10. 
81 Ibid, p32 for documented evidence. This was 
confirmed by interview. 
82 Thomson and Beaumont (1978). 
83 For example, Kessler and Winchester (1982) 
examine the 1981-82 wage round in some detail. 
84 Walsh (1981). 
85 See the Guardian 3.4.85. 
86 The importance of leadership as a change agent 
is a major theme of Undy et al (1981) which also 
notes the limited power of the GMB general 
secretary compared with his TGWU rival, p53-54. 
87 See in particular the papers given to the workshop 
on this subject reproduced in the British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, July 1986, for references 
to wider debates. 
88 Ratstone (1984); Millward and Stevens (1986). 
89 Terry (1986) gives an excellent survey of the 
problem areas in this debate. 
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90 Ingham (1985) p6, argues that "there appears to be 
not an inconsiderable amount of supplementary 
local 
'bargaining. " but his figures somewhat belie this 
interpretation. V 
91 Kessler (1986) p438. 
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1 Undy and Martin (1984). 
2 Undy et al (1981). See particularly p20. 
3 Clegg (1954; 1964). 
4 An interesting area for future study will be the 
changes imposed by the 1984 Trade Union Act forcing 
the GMB to elect its E:: ecutive Council, including 
the regional secretaries, by individual ballot. 
Significantly, it has already been decided to allow 
candidates to make personal statements for the first 
time. It is slightly disappointing, however, that 
the union did not grasp this opportunity and decide 
to elect its regional chairmen and committees by 
similar means. 
5 Decision 84. See GMBATU (1984c) p713. 
6 Undy et al (1981) p53-54. 
7 Donovan (1968) p1777. 
8 This is quoted at the beginning of Chapter One. 
9 G. B. Shaw, "Man and Superman, " Penguin edition, 
1977, p252. 
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